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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the legal framework of the bid protest system in Iraq, which is
designed to check illegalities and irregularities in awarding public contracts by contracting
agencies. Several regional and international agreements emphasize the significance of bid protest
processes for member states. However, the mere existence of bid protest forums is not sufficient
to ensure their effectiveness. The vast majority of developing countries have bid protest
mechanisms, but this does not mean that they are functioning as necessary. This work begins by
assessing the theoretical controversies surrounding the issue of what works best, more discretion
or more oversight, in public administration and legal jurisprudence.
In addition, the procedural rules of bid protests in Iraq are examined. Since availability of
effective remedies is a prerequisite for a functioning bid protest system, remedies available to
unsatisfied bidders under the Iraqi laws and regulations are also examined. Other forms of
monetary compensation available to protesters are also addressed. Cooperation between anticorruption agencies and bid protest mechanisms is also considered.
This dissertation concludes that the bid protest system in Iraq does not effectively
scrutinize the processes of awarding public contracts that require more transparency. Bid protest
processes should be improved by amending the laws and regulations involved. Such amendments
should be conducted in light of the principles of transparency and accountability by facilitating
access to bid protest mechanisms and expanding the rights of those challenging procurement
activities.
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Introduction
This dissertation addresses the bid protest system in Iraq and its ability to reduce the level
of corruption in the public procurement field. Corruption is rampant in Iraq in a way that
transparency International lists the country among the most corrupt countries in the world. It has
a deep root in the government of Iraq. There are many reasons that made corruption
uncontrollable including several major wars, economic siege, sectarian war, and political
divisions. Since Iraq was historically adopted a socialist policy, the public sector was and still
huge controlling all major sectors of services and market. Such policy made corruption spread
easily to all sectors in the Country including education, health, electricity, and so on.
Public administration does not function properly especially in terms of transparency and
accountability. Accordingly, introducing bid protest processes, which allow challenging the
decisions of contracting agency, was new to the Country. In fact, agencies in Iraq enjoyed a great
deal of discretion in awarding public contracts to contractors. There were no strict transparency
measures that require contracting agencies to award contracts through competition. Most of
public contracts were awarded through the sole-source contracting method. In fact, the entire
administrative system was not transparent.
Bid protest processes were introduced after the fall of the previous regime in 2003 by the
Coalition provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA was an American-led authority which governed
Iraq for a year after the 2003 invasion. It designed the bid protest system in Iraq after the US
model. Such protest system contradicted the traditions governed the public procurement
processes because the US procurement was more developed and transparent than the system in
Iraq. Thus, such transplantation created some major problems for enforcement of procurement
laws and regulations.

In addition, the administrative environment and staff is quite conservative regarding
changes that require transparency and openness. It is difficult to enforce measures that allow
individuals and business entities to access documents held by public agencies. Secrecy is a norm
in government agencies. Applying strict centralization adversely affects the function of
government agencies. The administrative system relies on a strong hierarchy of distribution of
administrative powers, which causes delay, complexities, and costly rules and procedures. It is
common that a paper work is delayed for months because of a signature of a minister or director
general. Although many laws and regulations have been changed to conform to transparency
measures and to decentralize distribution of powers, this culture is still dominant.
Introducing a new bid protest system that incorporate measures facilitate transparency
and openness was new to the Iraqi procurement system. Accordingly, such new rules and
procedures created contradictions with the administrative traditions widespread in the country.
For instance, Order 87, which is public procurement law in Iraq, grants contracting powers to
either a semi-independent agency or a division in each contracting agency. In contrast,
contracting powers are specifically granted to the head of agencies. Order 87 is not followed by
agencies because the tradition is that contracting powers are solely in the hands of heads of
agencies including ministers or heads of non-cabinet agencies. In other words, the reform is not
easy to be accepted in an environment that was accustomed to strict administrative hierarchy.
The bid protest system is part of the public procurement processes in which unsatisfied
bidders are allowed to challenge the decision of contracting agencies. The organization and
function of bid protest systems has recently been the focus of regional and international
agreements, legal and public administration scholars, and various countries especially developing
nations. The major force behind such a development of bid protest mechanisms and rules is
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liberalization of trade among countries. There are several regional and international free trade
agreements that cover certain aspects to of public procurement.
Some of these regional and international agreements and models are specifically
dedicated to public contracting. For instance, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law), EU Public Contracts Directives, and the
World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement (WTO/GPA) are some
examples. The UNCITRAL Model Law is not an agreement, but it is a model designed originally
for developing countries intending to reform their procurement system. Although each agreement
has its own goals, there are several fundamental principles that such agreements introduce to
regulate public procurement activities among member states.
The principle of non-discrimination between suppliers participating in competition to win
a public contract is one of the most common principles that both free trade agreements and
special procurement conventions generally embrace. Another major principle in public
procurement is protecting the integrity and transparency of the process from corruption, abuse of
power, and illegal acts that prejudice the rights of participants. In addition, the availability of bid
protest mechanisms to correct procurement breaches is another fundamental principle of modern
public procurement policy and law. In fact, bid protest processes are considered the enforcement
mechanisms of such fundamental principles.
The structure and form of bid protest mechanisms vary from one jurisdiction to another.
Generally speaking, there are three forms of bid protest mechanisms in the field of public
procurement. First, many countries provide for agency-level bid protest mechanism according to
which unsatisfied bidders may, or sometimes must, submit their protests to the contracting
agency that issued the initial decision. In some jurisdictions, a higher body other than the
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contracting agency itself receives protests. For instance, in Iraq ministerial review committees
receive bid protests for procurement transactions of all subordinate agencies that are part of the
ministry.
Second, in some countries administrative independent agencies are also allowed to
receive and review bid protests. Such independent agencies are sometimes designed to address
general procurement issues or to resolve bid protests exclusively. In some jurisdictions,
independent agencies function as a judicial review for bid protests as they are required to follow
judicial procedural rules in resolving bid protests. Third, there is also judicial review for bid
protests in almost all countries. It should be noted that some countries have all the three bid
protest mechanisms such as the US, while Iraq has only agency-level and judicial review for
resolving bid protests. Accordingly, the legal and administrative structures of a particular country
decide questions involving such diversity in bid protest fora.
Fundamental principles governing bid protest system varies among state, regional and
international agreements and models. Under the EU Directives member states are required to
review effectively bid protests submitted by contractors alleging infringements of the Directives.
However, the Directives are silent on what constitutes effective review. In addition, the
Directives also require member states to make a decision on bid protests as rapidly as possible.
Speedy review means that reviewing bodies should follow the time limits contained in the
Directives. The most important time limits in bid protest review are the time limit for filing bid
protests by unsatisfied bidders and the timeline for resolving such protests by reviewing bodies.
In addition, the Directives require that bid protest fora be independent in their decisionmaking process from the contracting agencies that issued the protested decision. Such
independence requires that members of the reviewing body described as independent must be
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appointed and leave office in the same manner as members of the judiciary. Further,
independence also means that the review body, in resolving bid protests, must adhere to certain
procedural rules or guarantees that are tantamount to those of an ordinary court. Accordingly,
there are structural and procedural elements to the meaning of independence under the remedies
directives.
Under the WTO/GPA, parties are required to provide for bid protest processes that are
non-discriminatory, timely, transparent, and effective. The requirements of the WTO/GPA are
similar to those of the EU Remedies Directives. The WTO/GPA also requires independence of
the review body through making sure that the body has no interest in the outcome of the
procurement. In addition, it requires that members of such a body be secured from external
influence. Finally, a review body that is not a court must be subject to judicial review or
otherwise adhere to court-like procedures in resolving bid protests.
The UNCITRAL Model Law, which has been incorporated into the domestic law of some
developing countries, emphasizes the importance of the principle of independence. The text of
UNCITRAL does not provide any information regarding independence of review bodies.
However, the Guide to Enactment mentions some features of independence. It states that the
body exercising the review function be independent of the procuring entity. It further states that
when the reviewing body is the one that is to approve procurement actions of the contracting
agency, the section responsible for protest review must be independent from the section that is
responsible for the approval process. Yet UNCITRAL does not identify any requirements for
procedural rules to be followed by the administrative body that conduct the review function.
It is generally true for all the above-mentioned regional or international instruments that
they offer little guidance respecting the underlying procedures involved in resolving bid protests.
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Since procurement agreements usually apply to several countries with various legal systems, it is
extremely difficult for such agreements to address details of bid protests. In addition, the bid
protest resolution itself is complicated as it involves judicial and administrative issues that are
sometimes controversial. For instance, standing to challenge contracting agencies’ decisions, the
bases on which provisions of tenders can be challenged, and the remedies available to unsatisfied
bidders are issues that vary widely from a jurisdiction to another.
This dissertation analyzes these underlying procedures of bid protest resolution.
Specifically, it examines the Iraqi structures and procedures utilized in bid protest mechanisms to
resolve such protests. It compares the experience of Iraq to other countries to identify how other
procurement systems deal with issues related to the functionality of bid protest fora. Such
comparisons are important because Iraq has only relatively modest experience in bid protest
processes compared to some other countries. In order to conduct such comparison, it is necessary
to examine the underlying procedures of the Iraqi system.
The dissertation first covers the controversial issues of oversight and discretion in the
public procurement field. This controversy centers on whether oversight or discretion benefits
the public procurement process. Since bid protest processes function as an oversight mechanism
over public procurement, it is often viewed as restrictive of the discretion of contracting
agencies. Some scholars strongly suggest that, for public procurement to function more
effectively, the discretion of contracting officers managing procurement activities should be
released.
Such scholars believe that more discretion allows agencies to select the best contracting
methods and terms, thus selecting the right and suitable contractor for obtaining services or
goods needed. Furthermore, they believe that tightening oversight on contracting agencies results
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in delay and complication of procurement procedures. The bid protest system is an oversight
mechanism on the procurement process which requires both time and expenses. Accordingly,
more oversight undermines the innovative behavior among contracting agencies. In this case,
contracting agencies act in a way to please the contractors’ community to avoid bid protests.
On the other hand, there are scholars that emphasize the importance of oversight on the
public procurement process. They underscore that public procurement involves public funds and
taxpayers money. Thus, contracting agencies should not be left to spend such money on their
own or without strong checks and detection because they are should maximize benefits to the
public. In addition, they disagree with pro-discretion scholars that oversight including bid protest
processes undermines the innovative behavior of procurement officials. Bid protest processes
will not prevent contracting agencies from exercising their discretion; instead, they are only
designed to prevent corruption and abuse in awarding public contracts.
In this view, public procurement is vulnerable to massive corruption and collusion
especially in developing countries. Effective oversight over procurement activities is essential to
prevent illegal activities. These scholars agree that, bid protest processes impose some
restrictions on the discretion of procurement officials. After all, such procedures are costly, timeconsuming, and complicated. However, they conclude that the benefits of restrictions imposed
on the procurement sector outweigh these costs. Oversight strengthens the public’s trust that their
money is spent fairly and transparently. Discretion should not be strengthened at the expense of
transparency and accountability.
Striking a balance between discretion and oversight is not an easy task and it remains one
of the major difficulties facing designers of public procurement systems. The author believes that
answering the question of which one works best, oversight or discretion, is complicated because
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it relies on several major factors. For instance, it requires extensive studies in a particular
jurisdiction regarding historical backgrounds of public procurement, the level of corruption, and
the culture of transparency in public administration. A quick answer for such an important
question is neither sufficient nor productive.
Generally speaking, in developing countries in which the level of corruption is high,
strengthening bid protest processes would assist in reducing corruption. This proposition should
not be stated in absolute terms because bid protest is not enough if there is not a sufficient will
on the part of the government and politicians to support anti-corruption efforts. It also relies on
the culture of challenging government decisions by contractors because sometimes offerors
decline to challenge government decisions not only out of fear of retaliation. This is an important
cultural factor that often must be overcome.
Whether corruption can be effectively reduced through bid protest procedures also
depends on how far procurement laws allow contractors to challenge contracting decisions. For
instance, in some countries procurement laws allow contractors to challenge the method of
contracting, e.g., whether it is public tendering or single source contracting. In contrast, in some
jurisdictions procurement laws do not permit contractors to challenge the method of contracting
selected by contracting agencies. Some jurisdictions allow contractors to challenge the
provisions of a tender document, while some others do not. Remedies available also can vary
from one jurisdiction to another.
Suspension of procurement procedures is one of the tempting remedies for contractors.
Under such a remedy, when an unsatisfied offeror challenges a decision of a contracting agency,
procurement procedures will be ceased until the protest is settled. In fact, this remedy is the basis
for strong criticisms of the bid protest system as it delays procurement processes. Nonetheless,
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UNCITRAL, the WTO/GPA, and the EU Procurement Directives provide for the remedy of
suspension under these circumstances. In fact, it becomes a crucial element in assessing the
effectiveness of a bid protest system in a particular country.
Another issue that this dissertation analyzes is the structure of bid protest mechanisms.
Structural issues are crucial as they affect the level of independence of bid protest fora and
independence is one of the major elements of a successful bid protest system. These issues have
not been examined in detail in regional and international procurement agreements because of the
diversity of legal and administrative structures of member states. In addition to this issue, another
structural aspect is whether bid protest mechanisms are centralized or decentralized and how this
affects the function of bid protest mechanisms.
Independence has been discussed in light of the requirements set forth by regional and
international agreements mentioned above and the standards of independence under the Iraqi
legal system. The independence of the IAT conforms, to a reasonable extent, to the requirements
of such agreements as it is structurally independent from contracting agencies and follows strict
procedural rules in resolving bid protests. However, the appointment of the majority of the
members of the IAT is vested with the Minister of Planning. Awarding appointment powers to
the Minister of Planning is against the standards set in such agreements. According to these
agreements, the appointment of members of an independent agency should rather be similar to
that of the members of the judiciary.
It is worth noting, however, that the requirements of independence under the Iraqi legal
system are quite close to the guidelines contained in regional and international agreements. For
instance, independent agencies are generally not part of the executive as they are part of the
legislative branch, though there are some independent agencies that are related to the executive.
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Nonetheless, being part of the legislative or executive branches does not necessarily mean that
there is interference in the activities of such independent agencies. In fact, the law in Iraq
regulates the composition and function of these agencies. Accordingly, many independent
agencies in Iraq have their own statutes that regulate their duties and jurisdictions. The role of
Parliament or the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) is limited to appointment of the head of
such agencies. The rest of the function of these agencies is organized by law.
The above was the status of independent agencies in Iraq at least until 2011 when the
Federal Supreme Court (FSC) issued a decision limiting the independence of such agencies. The
content of the decision is that when the constitution states that some independent agencies are
under the jurisdiction of Parliament or the OPM, this means that the supervising body is allowed
to intervene in the affairs of agencies subordinated to them. More importantly, the FSC rules that
all independent agencies including those that are part of Parliament are subject to the supervisory
power of the OPM. The 2011 decision contradicts the constitutional principles organizing
independent agencies as separate from both Parliament and the OPM.
This dissertation also assesses the role of the underlying procedures involved in bidprotest resolution. The effectiveness of bid protest processes relies on major elements mentioned
above, including independent review, effective remedies, and speediness. Achieving these
elements also depends on the underlying procedures of the bid protest process. For instance,
many regional and international procurement agreements emphasize effective review of bid
protests. However, such agreements do not address what review procedures constitute
effectiveness. Accordingly, examining the procedures used in any bid-protest system is the only
way to evaluate the effectiveness of bid protest processes.
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An important issue that can be examined through the underlying procedures is the
jurisdiction of review mechanisms. Not all review fora have the same jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction of such review bodies varies from one legal system to another. Some jurisdictions
allow bid protest fora to only protest the award decision determining the winning contractor in
the competition. This is the case in Iraq. In other jurisdictions, bid protest mechanisms are also
allowed to challenge provisions of a tender including the choice of selecting contracting methods
by agencies. In addition, bid protest fora in some countries are empowered to receive protests
challenging decisions of contracting agencies related to an award of a public contract including
disqualifying a contractor from competition. In other words, this issue centers on the question of
what can be protested. Understanding this diversity in the jurisdiction of bid-protest bodies is
crucial to examining the effectiveness of a protest review forum and it is also important for
comparative legal studies.
One of the major questions that can be answered by examining the underlying procedures
revolves around who has the right to challenge decisions of contracting agencies. Many
procurement agreements and domestic procurement systems, as noted above, use interested
parties that have the right to submit bid protests, but who, again, the issue arises as to who should
be regarded as an interested party. The answer to this question is specific to the respective
procedures of each country. Some countries allow only those bidders that have actually
submitted tenders for a public contract to protest. However, some countries expand the term to
also include those bidders that have not submitted tender for a particular contract but are
otherwise eligible to participate. Other countries expand the definition even more to allow other
parties to submit bid protests that are not even contractors, such as consumer protection agencies.
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Identifying and assessing remedies that bid protest mechanisms are empowered to grant
is another benefit of examining underlying procedures of bid protests. Remedies are the ultimate
result that unsatisfied bidders intend to obtain from their protests. There are several major types
of remedies for unsatisfied contractors: suspension of procurement procedures, corrective
actions, and monetary compensation. Although many jurisdictions provide for the same remedies
for unsatisfied bidders, the requirements under which such remedies are awarded vary from one
jurisdiction to another. These variations will be explored in this dissertation.
Every jurisdiction has its own laws and regulations that organize the award of such
remedies. Every remedy also has its own requirements or conditions that must be followed by
protesters seeking to obtain such remedy. For example, some jurisdictions award a suspension
remedy automatically once an unsatisfied bidder submits its protest, without additional
requirements. However, in some other jurisdictions, protesters are required to meet specific tests
and requirements in order to obtain a suspension remedy. In addition, the period of suspension
and availability of exceptions also vary from one jurisdiction to another.
Obtaining other forms of remedies, including corrective actions and monetary
compensation, also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Such variations belong to the
difference in legal and administrative systems. For instance, not all of these remedies are
awarded by bid protest mechanisms in every jurisdiction. Some of these remedies are awarded
by courts in some countries and under different legal requirements and procedures. In addition,
the distinction between civil law and common law systems changes the types of remedies
available, the body or court that is empowered to grant such remedies, and the procedures that
are used to obtain them.
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The power of bid protest mechanisms to issue decisions binding on contracting agencies
and contractors is a critical element that will be examined in assessing the effectiveness of bid
protest processes. Decisions of some bid protest mechanisms are binding, while other mechanism
are empowered to issue only recommendations. In fact, various enforcement powers exist even
in countries that have multiple layers of bid protest mechanisms. In such cases, one forum might
be empowered to issue binding decisions, while others may only issue recommendations. Yet it
happens only rarely that recommendations of bid protest mechanisms have the power of a
binding decision.
These and other issues are central to evaluating the effectiveness and shortcomings of a
bid protest system. For instance, when a procurement system allows unsatisfied bidders only to
protest the award decision but not provision of a tender, there is a limitation on the right to
protest. Further, a procurement system that allows only those bidders that participated actually in
tender procedures to protest a procurement decision provides little transparency. Such procedural
details can only be addressed properly by examining the underlying procedures of bid protest
processes in a particular jurisdiction.
Cooperation or interaction between the anti-corruption system and bid protest processes
in Iraq is another major subject of this dissertation. There has been an anti-corruption system in
Iraq since 2004 that consists of three major institutions: the Integrity Commission (IC), the
Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), and the Offices of Inspectors General (OIG). The goal of this
system is to prevent and reduce the level of corruption in Iraqi government institutions. Since an
anti-corruption system involves complicated and sensitive tasks and exercises an oversight
function on government institutions, the IC and the BSA are independent agencies subject to
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parliamentary oversight in their activities. They are not part of the executive and their function is
organized by laws that guarantee such independence.
Each institution is empowered with specific jurisdiction in the fight against corruption.
The jurisdiction of the IC is to a reasonable extent general in terms of its scope as it is
empowered to fight corruption by adopting effective preventive and curative measures.
Preventive measures include strengthening the awareness of Iraqi officials and the public
regarding the negative consequences of corruption and developing a code of conduct for public
officials. They also include regulations that must be promulgated by the IC organizing conflicts
of interests of government officials. On the other hand, the curative measures include exclusively
investigating corruption cases which include a wide range of acts such as bribery, embezzlement,
and abuses of power.
The BSA’s jurisdiction is limited to financial auditing of all government records or
documents. The BSA is an old institution, established in 1927, but Coalition Provisional Order
(CPA) Order 55 and Order 77 amended the law of the BSA by incorporating it into the anticorruption system. It is granted various powers in performing its duties including unrestricted
access to records, documents, data, and any other documents the Board deems necessary. It is
also required to report any irregularities revealed in its audits to specialized investigative
authorities or the IC for proper actions.
On the other hand, the OIG’s jurisdiction is to uncover and undertake an administrative
investigation into acts of fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption in every Iraqi ministry. The OIG is
empowered to exercise its function within the administrative boundary of a particular minister,
meaning that every ministry has its own OIG. It is also granted a broad range of powers
including access to all documents, processes, programs, or data of the ministry concerned. In
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addition, it is empowered to conduct administrative investigation into allegations of fraud, waste,
and corruption and make appropriate recommendation to the minister or head of non-cabinet
agencies.
As discussed above, both anti-corruption institutions and bid protest forums share a major
goal, which is fighting corruption according to their respective statues. One of the major
strategies in fighting corruption is cooperation between not only government institutions but also
public and private sectors. However, in Iraq there is very little cooperation or interaction, formal
or informal, between bid protest forums and anti-corruption agencies. Statutes organizing
structures and functions of these agencies do not provide for any forms of cooperation or
interactions, whether formal or informal.
Anti-corruption and bid protest bodies in Iraq function under the traditional theory of
administration as they work in isolation to each other. Under such theory, every agency works
within strict jurisdictional boundaries described by statutes that organize the structure and
function of such agencies. Accordingly, any form of cooperation or interaction between public
agencies is viewed as intervention in the affairs of each other. In contrast, the modern
administration theory considers cooperation or interaction as necessary for producing more
efficient outcomes.
This dissertation suggests that interactions between anti-corruption and bid protest
systems is necessary for reducing the high level corruption in public procurement in Iraq. It also
suggests close interaction in the field of bid protest resolutions by involving anti-corruption
institutions in the bid protest processes. The bases of such involvement and its form will also be
examined in detail. For instance, independence is a serious concern in every bid protest system
including Iraq, but anti-corruption agencies enjoy a much higher level of independence. Thus,
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the problem of independence in bid protest resolutions may be reduced by involving an agency
that is independence by statute form the executive.
Of course, such involvement might create some practical problems including overlaps of
statutory jurisdictional and other issues related to appointment of staff and budget. However, the
author believes that the benefit of involvement of anti-corruption agencies in the resolution of
bid protest outweigh the disadvantages that result in such interaction. The best way to mitigate
the impact of problems associated with such interaction is through statutory amendments that
carefully define the features of such potential interaction. By introducing inter-agency
cooperation in the field of bid protest processes, the resistance to cooperation or interaction that
exists because of the traditional theory will diminish over time.
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. After this Introduction, Chapter I addresses
general backgrounds about public procurement in general, including its goals. It also examines
corruption in public procurement as one of the major obstacles challenging the effectiveness of
such processes as in Iraq. In addition, it covers the difference between civil law and common law
legal systems in organizing public procurement. Public procurement laws and regulations in Iraq
are also examined including governing principles and the importance of bid protest processes.
Chapter I also reviews the literature of public procurement and public administration regarding
discretion and oversight. Regional and international agreements are examined in addressing such
issues.
Chapter II addresses two major issues in procurement bid protests: structural and
procedural. Structural issues examine the centralized and decentralized structures of bid protest
mechanisms and their influence on the effectiveness of bid protest processes. Bid protest
mechanisms in Iraq are centralized, creating difficulties in accessing them by unsatisfied bidders
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though increasing routine and predictability to the process. On the other hand, procedural issues
involve the detailed procedures used in resolution of bid protests. Such procedures address the
jurisdiction of bid protest mechanisms, including who has standing to submit bid protests, and
what can be protested. In addition, they include time limits for submitting protests by unsatisfied
bidders and resolving protests by bid protest mechanisms.
Chapter III of the dissertation examines remedies that can be granted by bid protest
mechanisms. As discussed above, availability of effective remedies is one of the fundamental
elements of a successful bid-protest system. Accordingly, the Chapter examines remedies that
are available to unsatisfied bidders under Iraqi public procurement laws and regulations and
comparing them to remedies in procurement agreements and other countries. Suspension of
procurement procedures as a major remedy has been examined mostly because it has been
criticized for delaying the procurement process.
In contrast, others praise suspension as it encourages unsatisfied bidders to challenge
decisions of contracting agencies resulting in revealing illegal activities. Suspension also makes
granting remedies easier, including, e.g., cancellation of the protested procurement or awarding
the contract to the protester. Awarding such remedies is quite difficult after the award of the
contract. Other forms of remedies are examined in Chapter III, including corrective actions and
monetary compensations. Corrective actions generally include cancelling the award decision,
requiring the contracting agency to re-solicit the contract, or requiring the contracting agency to
change the method of contracting. Monetary compensation includes awarding bid preparation
costs, bid protest costs, and other forms of compensation.
Chapter IV of the dissertation examines the issue of cooperation or interaction between
the bid protest system and the anti-corruption system. It addresses the similarity between the
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goals of the two systems which is reducing corruption and irregularities in government
institutions. Advantages and disadvantages of cooperation or interaction between anti-corruption
agencies and bid protest mechanisms are addressed. In addition, forms of cooperation or
interaction between the two systems are also analyzed. Recommendations to amend Iraqi laws to
promote better interaction between and among anti-corruption and bid protest agencies are also
made. Finally, a brief Conclusion ends this dissertation. It includes several additional
recommendation bid protest system in Iraq in order to enhance its effectiveness.
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Chapter I
1. Bid Protest Mechanisms in the Public Procurement System
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Public Procurement Process and Its Major Goals
Generally speaking, the public procurement is the process of buying goods and services
from the private sector by government agencies. Public procurement or government purchasing
is a complicated process consisting of several various phases with different sets of procedures
governing those phases. In contrast to the private sector, government agencies would not enter
into contracts with other parties when and how they prefer. 1 There are specific regulatory frames
for the government to follow with respect to when, how, and with whom to enter into contracts. 2
Although public procurement laws are different according to different jurisdictions, in systems
operating under the rule of law, they share major governing principles such as transparency,
competition and accountability.
Public agencies purchase a wide variety of goods, services and public works from the
private sector, from basic commodities to large construction projects. 3 Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) Order 87 4, or Public Contract Law in Iraq, defines procurement as “the
acquiring by contract with public funds of goods, services or construction services by and for the
use of the government through purchase or lease.” 5 Government procurement is a major
economic activity of governments that constitutes a substantial percentage of world-wide GDP
1

William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 Admin. L.J. Am. U.
461, 466-467 (Fall, 1995).
2
Id.
3
OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES FOR INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMRNT, 9 (2002).
4
Order 87 issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004. The CPA was a transitional government led
by the United States and its allies which is established in 2003 following the fall of the former Iraqi regime. It vested
itself with all executive, legislative and judiciary authority from April, 2003 to June, 2004. It issued tens of orders,
regulations and memorandums that had the force of law. For more information visit this website
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#Regulations.
5
Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 87: Public Contracts, Sec. 1, CPA/ORD/14 May 2004/87, available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040516_CPAORD_87_Public_Contracts.pdf.
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estimated at 10-15%. 6 The percentage of public procurement in some developing countries is
estimated at 15-30% of the GDP. 7 There are no reliable and specific data about the size of public
procurement expenditures in Iraq 8; however, it is assumed to be large as the percentage of
government spending, including the salaries of all public officials, reached approximately 68%
of the 2012 budget which approximated US$ 100 billion.9
1.2 Goals of the Public Procurement Process
It is difficult to identify with precision the purposes of a public procurement system. 10 A
part of this difficulty can be attributed to the domestic versus the regional and international
perspectives about the function of public procurement. Authors also vary on the purposes of the
procurement process. Concerning the issue from a domestic perspective, Schooner suggests, nine
non-exhausted objectives for the procurement systems: “(1) competition; (2) integrity; (3)
transparency; (4) efficiency; (5) customer satisfaction; (6) best value; (7) wealth distribution; (8)
risk avoidance; and (9) uniformity.” 11 He identifies three among the nine goals as the pillars of
the United States procurement process: system transparency, procurement integrity, and
competition. 12 To Arrowsmith, the procurement objectives are; (a) value for money; (b)
efficiency in the government contracting process; (c) integrity; (d) fair and equal treatment of
offerors; (e) promoting industrial, social and environmental objectives; and (f) outsourcing

6

Supra note 3, at 9.
Saima J. Zuberi, The High Cost of Controlling Corruption: The Achilles' Heel of the OECD
Dacmethodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 209, 211.
8
OECD, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, OECD 170,
footnote 1 (2010).
9
The Federal Budget Law of the Republic of Iraq No. 22 (2012), Article 2.
10
Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, P.P.L.R. 2002, 2, 103
(2002).
11
Id.
12
Id.
7
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policies. 13 In addition, key policy objectives of public procurement are often considered to be
value for money and competitiveness. 14 Value for money is defined as “the optimum
combination of whole-life cost and quality to meet the user’s requirements to be achieved
through competitive tendering.” 15
Of course, there is also international perspective on government procurement. The
purpose of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is
to open the national procurement market to international competition as much as possible.16
Similarly, the European Community Procurement Directives (EC Directives) intend to create an
internal European market with genuine free movement of goods and services through effective
competition rules. 17 Public procurement has been viewed as an important non-tariff trade barrier
in the community by EC members. 18 Thus, the major purpose of the WTO GPA and EC system
is to open national procurement markets to the member countries. In addition, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted in 2011 a new version of the
Model Law on Public Procurement (UNCITRAL Model Law). Under the new model, “achieving

13

SUE ARROWSMITH ET AL., REGULATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 27 (2000).
14
PETER VINCENT-JONES, THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING REGULATION, RESPONSIVENESS,
RELATIONALITY, 14 (2006).
15

Id.
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, the Agreements, Gocernment Procurement: Opening up for
Competition,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
(2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm#govt.
17
SIMON EVERS HJELMBORG ET AL, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: THE EU DIRECTIVE ON
PUBLIC CONTRACTS, 12 (2006).
18
CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, EC PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: CASE LAW AND REGULATIONS, 12 (2006).
16
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value for money and avoiding abuses in the procurement process” 19 are among the major goals
of public procurement.
1.3 The Problem of Corruption in Public Procurement
Corruption in public procurement is common among both developed and developing
countries. Public procurement activities are considered among the most vulnerable to fraud and
corruption. 20 According to a survey of the World Economic Forum, international firms offer
bribes more frequently in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries in public procurement process than in taxation, utilities and the judiciary.21
Yet, public procurement provides multiple opportunities for both the public and private sectors to
divert public funds for private gains. 22 Procurement involves essential public services such as
health, education, and infrastructure that have a significant impact on the development process. 23
Corruption encourages competition in illegal acts and has the potential to reduce the
quality of the goods and services provided to the public. 24 It can occur at all stages of the
procurement process from issuing the solicitation to the process of awarding a contract and
finally to the enforcement of government contracts. 25 According to a report from Transparency
International (TI), approximate of US$ 400 billion is lost annually around the world in
procurement due to bribery. 26 Iraq is no exception.
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United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011),
UNITED
NATIONS
COMMISSION
ON
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
LAW,
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html.
20
Supra note 3.
21
Id.
22
OECD, INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: GOOD PRACTICE FROM A-Z, 9 (2007).
23
Supra note 19.
24
Supra note 7, at 212.
25
Id.
26
Supra note 3.

22

1.4 Corruption in Iraq
According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the TI, Iraq is listed in the 2012
index as the seventh most corrupt country in the world. 27 It is reasonable to assume that public
procurement constitutes a significant share of such corruption because of the considerable
amount of money allocated for the purchase of goods, services, and construction works by the
government of Iraq. 28 Corruption has a history in Iraq, but it was exacerbated at the time of the
Gulf War which led to the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq from 1990 to 2003. 29 Nor
was corruption in Iraq purely a domestic matter. The Oil-for-Food Programme that implicated
major international companies and individuals is an example. 30 The aftermath of the fall of
Saddam’s regime resulted in a US-led administration, the CPA, which itself engaged in financial
irregularities such as no-bid contracts. 31 There is also the corruption of the Iraqi government
since 2004. 32
Many of the scandals associated with the forgoing occurred through public procurement
transactions. Thus, to limit the level of corruption, Iraq has established for the first time in its

27

Transparency
International:
Corruption
Perception
Index
2013,
available
at
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/.
28
This proposition based on the large government spending under the Iraqi Budget Law (2012) which is
approximately 68% of the entire budget. It is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of the 68% government
spending is allocated for the purchase of goods and services by the government of Iraq.
29
Supra note 8, at 105.
30
See the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee that was established according to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1538 to investigate corruption in the Oil-for-Food Programme. The Committee chaired by Paul
Volcker who issued a final report, Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Program by the Iraqi Regime, regarding the
result of the investigation confirming that US$ 10 billion has been wasted because of corruption, the report is
available at, http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/volcker_report_10-27-05.pdf.
31
See Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction website, Quarterly Reports and Semiannual Reports To
Congress, assuming that US$ 9 billion spent on reconstruction projects unaccounted for because of inefficiencies
and
mismanagement,
available
at,
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20130930185834/http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/inde
x.html.
32
See Supra note 27.
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history a comprehensive anti-corruption system through Order 55. 33 Regardless of the existence
of the anti-corruption program, corruption in public procurement is still widespread. 34 One of the
major ways to reduce the level of corruption in the public procurement process is through
making the bid protest or bid challenge system more effective.
1.5 Response to Corruption in Public Procurement
Strengthening integrity and transparency in the management of public procurement may
well be the key to reducing corruption in this sensitive sector. Since public procurement field has
become part of the international trade with an eye to opening this market to international
competition, several regional and international organizations have become involved in the
development of transparency and integrity-related measures to limit corruption in the
procurement process. 35 In addition, as a response to demands of more transparent and
accountable government, several countries have established programs to reduce corruption in the
public sector especially in public procurement. 36
The fight against corruption in public procurement has been launched from two major
fronts; strengthening transparency and enforcing accountability measures in the procurement

33

Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 55: Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public
Integrity, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20040204_CPAORD55.pdf.
34
Supra note 8, at 10.
35
See the United Nation Convention against Corruption has attempting to involve procurement-related aspects to its
convention, for more information see http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_1/INF.2.pdf. The
OECD also attempts to enhance transparency and accountability of the procurement markets. The OECD has issued
several books, reports, and assessment reports for the effectiveness of its members’ procurement system especially
with respect to transparency and integrity of public procurement. For more information see
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/integrityinpublicprocurement.htm.
36
See for example, the World Bank; Public Procurement Reforms in the Middle East and North Africa, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22880747~menuPK:3
949143~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:256299,00.html. In addition, many countries have prepared and
established reform programs with the aim of reducing corruption such as South Africa, see for more information,
http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/green_papers/procgp.html#PROCESS, or India, for more information see
Sandeep Verma, Integrity Pacts and Public Procurement Reform in India: From Incremental Steps to a Rigorous
Bid-Protest System. Inaugural International Conference on Public Procurement Regulation in Emerging
Economies, 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656722.
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process. 37 In addition, many international and regional organizations working in the area of
economic development and a free market economy introduced several sets of transparencyrelated standards for member states to embrace in their public procurement systems such as
availability of bid protest mechanisms, 38 or publication of procurement opportunities 39. The
World Bank, various UN agencies, the OECD, the WTO, and the Asian Development Bank are
among those organizations that developed such measures. 40
This dissertation examines the bid protest process, which is considered an oversight
mechanism on the entire public procurement process. The underlying procedures of the bid
protest process are crucial in enhancing transparency and accountability in public procurement.
Making the bid protest process effective strengthens the level of accountability of the
procurement system because it allows unsatisfied protesters to be more active in challenging
wrongful or suspicious actions of contracting agencies. In addition, transparency and
37

Raj Kumar, Corruption, Development, and Good Governance: Challenges for Promoting Access to Justice in
Asia, 16 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 475, 496 (2008).
38
See the Preamble of the EC Remedies Directive: 89/665/EEC, On The Coordination Of The Laws, Regulations
And Administrative Provisions Relating To The
Application Of Review Procedures To The Award Of Public Supply And Public Works Contracts, which states
“…….Whereas the absence of effective remedies or the inadequacy of existing remedies could deter Community
undertakings from submitting tenders; whereas, therefore, the Member States must remedy this situation…”,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0665:20080109:EN:PDF.
See also the Preamble of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (WTO/GPA)
which states “……..Recognizing the need to establish international procedures on notification, consultation,
surveillance and dispute settlement with a view to ensuring a fair, prompt and effective enforcement of the
international provisions on government procurement and to maintain the balance of rights and obligations at the
highest possible level…” available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm.
39
See Article XI of the WTO/GPA which states “In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, entities shall publish an
invitation to participate for all cases of intended procurement, except as otherwise provided for in Article XV
(limited tendering).” And see also Article 24 of UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction
and Services (1994) (UNCITRAL Model Law) which states “A procuring entity shall solicit tenders or, where
applicable, applications to prequalify by causing an invitation to tender or an invitation to prequalify, as the case
may be, to be published in ... (the enacting State specifies the official gazette or other official publication in which
the
invitation
to
tender
or
to
prequalify
is
to
be
published).”
Available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement/ml-procure.pdf.
40
See
supra
note
36,
available
at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22880747~menuPK:3
949143~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:256299,00.html, or the United Nations through the Commission
on International Trade Law issues Model Procurement Law that is specifically designed for developing countries,
see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html.
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accountability principles should be examined more. Furthermore, the dissertation analyzes
transparency and accountability measures available under the current Iraqi procurement law to
determine its adaptability with what has been developed internationally.
1.6 Public Procurement Law and Regulations in Iraq Prior to 2003
1.6.1 French Public Law and Its Influence on Iraqi Law
Generally speaking, the legal system in Iraq has adopted the French legal tradition which
is the civil law system. The civil law tradition has several distinctive characteristics from the
common law system such as the legal systems of the United Kingdom and the United States. The
most fundamental distinction is the existence of separate bodies of law for governing public and
private activities. 41 In civil law countries the distinction between public and private functions in
the daily legal affairs is acute. 42
The idea of public function or public utility as the cornerstone of the public sector goes
back to Ulpian. 43 According to Ulpian, there is a major separation between what is done for the
public good and what is done for private benefit. 44 There are four elements for an action to be

41

EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW, A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, 249 (2010).
Id.
43
JOHN BELL ET AL, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW, 169 (2008). See also Encyclopedia Britannica, Ulpian
(Domitius Ulpianus, born , Tyre, Phoenicia—died ad 228), is Roman jurist and imperial official whose writings
supplied one-third of the total content of the Byzantine emperor Justinian I’s monumental Digest,
or Pandects (completed 533). He was a subordinate to Papinian when that older jurist was praetorian prefect (chief
adviser to the emperor and commander of his bodyguard) under Lucius Septimius Severus (reigned 193–211), and
he annotated Papinian’s works. Afterward Ulpian was master of petitions to the emperor Caracalla, and
under Severus Alexander he served as praetorian prefect from 222 until 228, when he was murdered by officers in
his command.
Ulpian wrote prolifically on law in a clear, elegant style. Like Papinian, he was an intelligent editor and interpreter
of existing ideas rather than an original legal thinker, such as Marcus Antistius Labeo. His major works are the
commentaries Libri ad Sabinum (51 books interpreting the civil law; incomplete) andLibri ad edictum (81 books
concerning praetorian edicts). Justinian’s compilers, headed by Tribonian, drew heavily on these and other treatises
and monographs by Ulpian. A work variously called Tituli ex corpore Ulpiani, Epitome Ulpiani, or Regulae
Ulpiani is no longer believed to be his. Available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/613301/Ulpian.
44
Id.
42
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considered public under the civil law traditions,45 including the legal system of Iraq. First, the
purpose behind performing an action is to serve the public interest. 46 Second, the mechanisms
used to perform the administrative activity or action whether it is an administrative decision or
government contracts. 47 Third, the public institution or body executes the activity or service as a
state representative. 48 Finally, parties involved in providing the service which may be the civil
service personnel or sometimes a private party, as in public contracts. 49
Furthermore, this distinctiveness of public order and public service justify distinctive
regulations and legal principles. 50 In other words, the notion of giving public service or order a
special status led to the existence of two different laws; public law and private law. Some
scholars trace the existence of the two major bodies of laws to the post-revolutionary France and
its special values and traditions. 51 More importantly, the principle of separation of powers, which
received a very rigid interpretation, became the pathway for the public/private divide. Further,
Montesquieu’s seminal work The Spirit of the Laws which illustrates two forms of laws, political
and civil, had a great impact, too. 52
Inherent in the civil law system is a strong rejection of the interference of the judiciary in
administrative functions. This rigid application of the separation of powers has a historical

45

Id.
Id.
47
Id. Under the civil law tradition, government acts are classified into two categories; first, administrative decisions
which is issued unitarily by an agency and affect the rights and freedom of the people concerned. Further, there are
other acts that require the existence of the government and a private party in the relationship such as public
contracts.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id., at 176-177.
51
Supra note 41, at 249.
52
Id.
46
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background. 53 Prior to the French Revolution, Parlements that worked as the common-law courts
of appeal were very powerful and obstructed the decisions of the King to reform the
administrative system. 54 They opposed those reform efforts in order to maintain their interests
and powers throughout the eighteenth century. 55 Thus, abolishing these parlements was one of
the dominant requirements of the Constituent Assembly and they were eliminated in 1789. 56
As a result, this distinction has been formalized in a statute by the Constituent Assembly
during 1789 and the Law of 16-24 August 1790, which is still applicable today and states:
Judicial functions are and shall remain separated from administrative ones.
Ordinary judges shall not interfere in any way whatsoever with the activities of
public authorities nor hear a claim brought against a public authority in relation to
the performance of their official duties. 57
Consequently, the rough struggle that the administrative system had experienced because of the
judicial oversight and interference in the executive issues which created distrust to the entire
judicial process caused not only a complete separation of administrative and judicial functions,
but also separate court systems. 58 “Ordinary courts can neither award an injunction against
administrative bodies, nor question the lawfulness or quash any administrative act or decision.” 59
Since then the French legal system and many countries adopted this system have two separate
court structures. The highest court for the administrative justice in France is the Conseil d’etat.
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Id., at 250, and see also BERNARD
COMMON-LAW WORLD, 6 (1954).
54
Id.
55
Supra note 41, at 250.
56
Supra note 53.
57
Supra note 41, at 249-250.
58
Supra note 53.
59
Supra note 41, at 250-251.

SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE

28

The Ottoman Empire also affected the legal system of Iraq because Iraq was ruled by the
Ottomans for centuries. 60 The Ottoman law has also been affected by the European law. 61 By
19th centuries the Ottomans adopted reforms that were based on European models of law and
administration. 62 The reform program was known as Tanzimat, which means reorganization in
Turkish, and was undertaken by Abdulmecid I and Muhammed II. 63 The content of the reform
included new regulations regarding administration, taxation, the conscript system, the rights of
individuals, and the educational system. 64 These new regulations guaranteed the equality of all
subjects regardless of religion in taxation, military service, eligibility for civil service positions,
and access to higher education institutions governed by the state. 65
In addition, the program guaranteed citizens the security of life, property, and dignity
within the empire. 66 Several laws were adopted based on European examples such as a Penal
Code in 1858, modeled after the French Penal Code, a Commercial Procedures Law of 1861, and
a Civil Code of 1876. 67 The Ottomans also codified Islamic jurisprudential rules of the Hanafi
School in a digest named: the Gazette of Jurisprudential Rules “”ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻻﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﻌﺪﻟﯿﺔ. 68 The Gazette
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of Jurisprudential Rules was one of the main sources of the law of contract and delictual liability
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of Iraq and many other Arab countries written by the Egyptian well-known scholar Abdulrazaq
Al-Sanhuri. 69
Iraq adopted and implemented the French legal system. The judiciary and jurisprudence
of Iraq relies indirectly upon the French legal traditions. It mostly seeks the Egyptian law for
guidance about an issue that the Iraqi law and courts are silent. Even judges and scholars in the
academia rely on Egyptian court decisions and scholarly writings. Thus, Egyptian law is a
secondary source for the Iraqi law. Of course, the Egyptian legal system itself is based on the
Napoleonic Codes. 70 Just as in France, there are two separate fields of law in Iraq; public and
private law.
In addition, law schools’ faculty is sharply divided between public and private law areas
of research. Public law is the law that regulates the activities of the state and covers those legal
relationships to which the state or one of its bodies is a party provided that the state possesses
extraordinary powers and privileges which cannot be found in private legal relationships. 71 For
instance, constitutional law, administrative law, financial laws, and public international law
belong to the public law branch.
On the other hand, private law is the law that governs the activities of individuals among
themselves and individuals with the state or one of its bodies provided that the state acts like a
private party without possessing any extraordinary powers or privileges. 72 The law of contract,
delictual liability (torts), civil procedure, evidence, and commercial and business transactions are
deemed part of the private law world.
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Regardless of the fact that Iraq has adopted the French legal tradition, it is interesting that
until 1989, unlike France it did not have two separate court systems. In other words, the regular
civil courts had jurisdiction over all disputes between ordinary people, individuals and public
agencies, and between public agencies themselves. However, in 1989 the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) issued an amendment to the Council of State Law No. 65 (1979)
(COSL) that established for the first time an administrative court in Iraq. Under Article 7 of the
COSL, an administrative court structure was created wholly outside the regular judiciary. 73 The
administrative courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising under administrative
decisions issued by public officials. 74
1.6.2 Public Contracts or Government Contracts under the Civil Law Tradition including
Iraq
Since there is a distinction between public and private law in the civil law tradition, there
are separate legal principles that govern contracts of government agencies. Government contracts
are called in civil law countries “contrats administratifs,” 75 administrative contracts, government
contracts, or public contracts. 76 The obvious distinction is suggested by these expressions that
the government, represented by one of its public bodies, is a party to the contract. In addition to
the ordinary private law of contract, therefore, civil law countries have a separate law for
administrative contracts.
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Under the French civil law system government can enter into contracts as a private party
which is subject to private law. 77 In these situations, the legal justification for considering such
contracts as ordinary is that the state enters into such contracts without having extraordinary
powers. 78 For instance, the contract of buying stationaries and supplies for daily uses of a public
body in France and Iraq is not deemed an administrative contract even though the government is
a party to it because such a contract does not usually contain extraordinary conditions.
There are several criteria that can be used to determine the status of a contract, whether it
is administrative or not. The first is that one of the parties to a contract is a public body. The
second criterion is that the contract is closely involved in the provision of public services to the
people concerned. 79 Finally, the contract in question should contain provisions granting special
and extraordinary powers to the government that are not usual in ordinary private contracts such
as the power to amend the provisions or even to terminate a contract unilaterally. 80 However,
courts have the sole jurisdiction to identify the administrative or ordinary characteristic of a
disputed contract. 81
The criterion of possessing extraordinary powers in a contract by the state is very
controversial and complicated. It is almost impossible for the administrative judiciary and
administrative law scholars to define precisely these extraordinary powers and to identify the
limits of such powers except by giving examples. 82 Nevertheless, most of these extraordinary
powers are related to the contract-enforcement or post-award phase rather than the pre-award
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phase of a public contract. The most common examples of extraordinary powers under French
and Egyptian laws, which would be instructive for Iraq, are:
-

“Allowing the contractor to exercise some extraordinary powers over beneficiaries
such as taking properties from individuals and seizing some properties of individuals
without their consent;

-

Referring contractors to follow certain conditions prepared by contracting agencies
for certain contracts;

-

Allowing contractors to directly participate in providing public services” 83

-

Allowing contracting agencies to directly enforce the provisions of a contract in case
the contractor fails to perform its contractual duties, such agencies can issue
administrative orders to claim what they spent in enforcing the contract without any
judicial procedures. 84

Regardless of the controversies surrounding the elements of public contracts especially
the existence of extraordinary powers in the benefit of the government, there are specific
contracts that are always considered administrative contracts mostly specified by law and
regulations. These contracts include: concession of public service, construction works, supply of
goods and services, and public debt. 85 Most of the Arab countries identified through legislation
three of these contracts, concession, construction works, and supply of goods and services, as
administrative contracts. 86 On the other hand, most of public contracts are specifically defined by
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law and courts have the sole jurisdiction to label them as ordinary or administrative under the
three criteria mentioned above.
Public contract law has seen a major development in the last forty years. This
development occurred mostly as a result of opening up the market of public procurement to
regional and international competition based on public procurement agreements such as the
WTO/GPA, UNCITRAL, and EC Directives. 87 Procurement agreements generally require more
transparent and more accountable procurement process in the member states of each
congregation. 88 Consequently, contracting agencies lost too much of their discretion in
regulating various aspects of the procurement process especially in awarding government
contracts. 89
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the new procedures of awarding public
contracts overcome the problem related to the distinction between public and private contracts in
civil law countries. The scope of the application of these agreements is to cover all contracts of
procuring of goods, services, and construction works conducted by public agencies. Under
Article 1 of the WTO/GPA, the agreement applies to procurement by any contractual means such
as purchase and lease for obtaining any combination of products and services. 90 Similarly, the
2011 UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates that it applies to all public contracts for acquiring
goods, services and construction works. 91 Under Article 7 of the EC Directive 2004/18, the
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directive applies to public contracts which are not excluded pursuant to the exceptions provided
for in Articles 10, 11, and 12-18. 92 It states that public contracts are defined to be contracts
concluded between a government agency and contractors for procurement of public works,
supply and services and also to contracts regarding the utility sectors; waters, energy, transport,
and postal sectors. 93
None of these agreements uses the phrase “administrative contract” to refer to
government or public contracts. They intended to avoid the controversies that existed in the
French civil law traditions regarding public/private contract law. Contracts that are subject to the
award procedures of these agreements are mentioned to be any contracts for acquiring goods,
services, or construction works. Similarly, in Iraq, Order 87 does not involve itself with the
problems associated with the concept of “administrative contract”. It states that “procurement is
the acquiring by contract with public funds of goods, services or construction services by and for
the use of the government through purchase or lease.” 94
If these agreements and Order 87 mentioned only “public or administrative contracts”
instead of “contracts of acquiring goods, services, and construction works”, the scope of their
application would have been very ambiguous in countries that follow civil law traditions
including Iraq. Agencies and contractors would have been ambivalent to identify precisely
whether the contract is administrative thereby subjecting it to special award procedures or
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whether it is a regular contract that the agency can award without following the required
administrative procedures.
In addition, contracting agencies also could have avoided the award procedures required
by the procurement laws and obligations and award the contract without competition. In other
words, the transparency and integrity of the process would have been jeopardized by ignoring
award procedures which have been adopted to reduce corrupt opportunities in the procurement
process. The only option left to contractors in such cases is the courts in order to challenge,
under the three major criteria mentioned above, that the contract in question is administrative.
These uncertainties would have negatively affected the public procurement process which
requires fast, simple, and clear procedures. 95 More importantly, the procurement systems
currently seek to avoid judicial proceedings to overcome problems associated with judicial
review. Judicial proceedings are complicated, costly, and cause delays in resolving controversies,
resulting in interruption in providing services to the public. 96 Many procurement systems now
recognize the mechanism of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) including the Iraqi system to
settle disputes between the contractors and procuring agencies without recourse to the courts. 97
Thus, Order 87 took the right direction by not mentioning the term of art “administrative
contracts” when it determined the scope of application of the order. This approach overcame the
controversies of public/private contract law in the legal system and created much more clarity in
the application of the public contract laws and regulations. In addition, it reduced huge dockets
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of cases in the courts that might have been brought in order to decide the nature of a contract in
question. Court proceedings will have delayed the conclusion and enforcement of public
contracts creating problems to the provision of services to people affected by these contracts.
However, there is a real concern regarding the applicability of Order 87 and its
implementing regulations to contracts of public service concession. There are no indication in
Order 87 and the IRGC regarding their applicability to concession contracts. Service concession
contracts are defined, under civil law traditions, as:
An administrative contract under which an individual investor or a firm or a group
of contractors or firms undertake to provide a public service to the people on the
contractor or contractors’ expenses instead of the state or one of its agencies and
according to restrictions and conditions set out by the state or one of its bodies in
exchange for allowing such a contractor or contractors to exploit the project for a
specified period of time and to earn the profit from the service fees paid by the
beneficiaries. 98
Under concession contracts the private party provides the public service instead of a government
agency. There are two types of contractual provisions or conditions in contracts of concession of
public services: regulatory contractual provisions, which normally govern the methods of
providing the service to the public 99 such as the price of a service unit, and the area that should
be covered by the contract. The public agency has the right to amend these regulatory provisions
any time without the consent of the service provider. 100 This rule can be interpreted as a form of
extraordinary powers granted to the public agency in administrative contracts that distinguish
them from ordinary contracts.
In addition, public service concession contracts contain another set of provisions that are
known as non-regulatory contractual provisions or simply contractual provisions. Non-regulatory
98
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provisions consist of financial obligations between the public agency awarding the concession
and the contractor. 101 These provisions are subject to the rule pacta sunt servanda according to
which the public agency cannot amend them without the consent of the contractor providing the
service. 102 In other words, these provisions are subject to private contract law. Examples of these
contractual provisions include; provisions related to the period of the concession and how the
concession should return to the public agency.
Section 1 of Order 87 does not mention concession contracts as it applies only to
contracts of procuring goods, services, and construction works. The contract of concession of
public service is a term of art under the Iraqi administrative law. This means that as long as the
concession contract has not been mentioned specifically in section 1 of Order 87, the application
of the order cannot be extended to such contracts. The Iraqi legal system follows a rigid
positivism that does not allow judges to engage in a type of statutory interpretation 103 that
extends the application of Order 87 on concession contracts.
Awarding concession contracts under civil law traditions has its own procedures.
Concession contracts are usually awarded without competition as the contracting agency
determines the contractor and involve in negotiations on the provisions of the contract. 104 The
EU Public works Directive also does not require specific procedures for awarding concession
contracts except for advertisement. 105 The contract is awarded for a long period of time
sometimes up to 30 years. 106 Thus, there is a great chance that awarding contracts of public
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service concession would be subject to corruption and abuse by government officials. Basically
the award of the contract occurs without competition.
1.6.3 Order 87 and Its Implementing Regulations
Currently the public procurement process in Iraq is governed by Order 87 and its
implementing regulations known as the Implementing Regulations on Government Contracts No.
1 (2008) (IRGC). Order 87 issued by the CPA in 2004 and abolished all previous Iraqi laws and
regulations on government contracts. 107 It is established after the United States procurement
models. Section 2 of the order established the Office of Government Public Contract Policy
(OGPCP) within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. 108 The OGPCP issued
in 2007 the first IRGC, but it was superseded by the 2008 IRGC.
In addition, the scope of application of the order includes contracts concluded by the
government of Iraq through ministries, regions, governorates, and all other subdivisions of the
state of Iraq that may commit public funds for procurements of goods, services, or public
construction works. 109 Further, it applies to the contracts of procurement of goods, services, or
construction services entered into by Iraqi State-owned enterprises that are directly financed by
the government of Iraq. 110 Yet Order 87 also states that “every governmental unit or agency shall
designate a contracting office that shall be responsible for the contracting activities of the
governmental unit or agency.” 111 It is not clear what the order means by “governmental unit or
agency” because it can be interpreted either as a ministry or general directorate; however, the
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IRGC interprets “governmental unit or agency” to mean every ministry, the main office of any
other public institutions that are not connected to ministries, or a governorate council. 112
However, it, further, states that “the authority to obligate government funds, award and
sign government public contracts, enter into and authorize material modifications to such
contracts, and authorize the payment of invoices and claims, shall rest solely with a qualified
government agency or a committee duly appointed under the authority of this Order.” 113 It is thus
ambiguous whether contracting offices are deemed as a “qualified government agency or a
committee duly appointed under the authority of this order” to be empowered to sign contracts.
With respect to opening up the Iraqi procurement market to regional and international
competition, there is no specific provision in Order 87 that directly allows non-Iraqi contractors
to participate in tenders to obtain public contracts. However, the order implies the participation
of international contractors in tender procedures while identifying the requirements of
publication of notices of tenders. It requires that such notices be published at a minimum in the
Arabic and Kurdish languages 114 as well as other languages when it is anticipated that other
contractors outside Iraq will be participating. 115 To eliminate doubts with respect to this issue,
the IRGC specifically mentions that non-Iraqi contractors may participate in tender procedures to
obtain government contracts. 116
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1.6.4 The Office of Government Public Contract Policy (OGPCP)
Under Order 87, the head of the OGPCP “shall report directly to the
minister of planning.” 117 The OGPCP is responsible for:
(i) Coordination of public contract policies for all ministries and public agencies;
(ii) Issuance of the implementing regulations to Order 87 after following notice
and comment requirements to receive feedbacks from the interested parties;
(iii) Establishment of the Independent Administrative Tribunal (IAT) to have
jurisdiction over settling disputes arising under the procedures of awarding public
contracts;
(iv) Recommendations for amendments to order 87 and other public contract
rules;
(v) Development and adoption of standard government contract provisions and
providing trainings for procurement staff. 118
The OGPCP has a specific section on the website of the Ministry of Planning (MOP) which
consists of several subsections titled government contract law and regulations, other guidelines,
workshops and trainings, investments, field visits, annual planning of the office, and blacklist of
offerors violated procurement law and regulations. 119

The OGPCP consists of five major

divisions; Secretariat and Correspondences, Coordination and Follow-up, Counseling and
Trainings, Tendering and Contracts, and the Administrative Tribunal. 120
Under the Order, the OGPCP has enormous powers for organizing public procurement
activities in the country through issuing public procurement regulations. However, one of the
major problems of public procurement law and regulations in Iraq is the rapidly-changing public
contract regulations. The OGPCP in 2007 issued the implementing regulations to Order 87, but
after only one year issued the 2008 IRGC. The rapid changes of the IRGC created confusions

117

Order 87, Sec. 2 (1) (a), supra note 5.
Id., at Sec 2, supra note 5.
119
The Website of the Ministry of Planning: the Directorate of Government Contracts, available in Arabic at,
http://www.mop.gov.iq/mop/index.jsp?sid=1&id=589&pid=580&lng=ar. The English version of the website does
not include any information.
120
Id.
118

41

among ministries and other public agencies regarding which IRGC to apply and generated
uncertainty to interested parties as well.
In a questionnaire prepared by the OECD Middle East and North Africa (MENA) section,
representatives from Iraq’s private sector expressed that in the same agency certain public
officials used procurement regulations from the CPA period while others used the 2007
regulations. 121 The coexistence of various public procurement regulations was a major concern
of the World Bank report in 2006 about rebuilding Iraq. 122 Further, the MENA questionnaire
showed that awareness of the 2008 regulations was very limited among Iraqi public agencies. 123
The MENA report suggested that the limited awareness was partially because the Iraqi Official
Gazette published the 2008 Regulations only in May, 2008. 124
The OGPCP is interestingly required to follow some types of notice and comment
procedures before issuing the IRGC. 125 This obligation is based on the US notice and comments
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 126 Regardless of this notice and
comment requirements in Order 87, there is no evidence that the OGPCP has communicated with
the interested parties affected by the IRGC before its issuance. Perhaps the reason behind that is
the fact that Iraqi administrative law is not familiar with the requirements of notice and
comments.
1.6.5 The 2008 IRGC
As mentioned above, the OGPCP is required under Order 87 to issue the implementing
regulations. As a result, it issued the 2007 and 2008 IRGC in rapid succession. The IRGC is
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much longer than the Order and it contains much more detailed provisions. It consists of 25
articles covering many issues starting from the scope of application, purposes of the regulations,
procedures of preparing tender documents, methods of tendering, publication of tenders,
procedures regarding the formation of agency-level bid protest, and other issues. The IRGC has
been issued only in the Arabic language.
The IRGC does not only interpret and implement Order 87 it also complements it. Some
commentators have criticized this complementary role of the IRGC because implementing
regulations should usually have only an interpretive role to facilitate enforcement. Implementing
regulations are not supposed to have a complementary role under the Iraqi legal system. 127 This
situation has been considered a shortage and failure of Order 87. 128 For instance, order 87
requires the existence of an independent tribunal to review bid protests from unsatisfied offerors,
but it leaves the details to the IRGC including the composition of the tribunal, its members, and
procedures of resolving these protests. These important issues should have been covered by
Order 87 itself not the IRGC.
1.7 Principles of the New Public Procurement System
The new public procurement system is based on several principles. Those principles
include “International standards of transparency, predictability, fairness and equality of
treatment.” 129 They also include full, fair, and open competitive tender procedures through
publication of bidding opportunities, objective evaluation of bids and using electronic tendering
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process. 130 They assert the integrity of the procurement process through raising ethical standards
and reduce the conflict of interests. 131 More importantly, availability of bid protest or bid
challenge mechanisms to settle disputes in a timely fashion arising from bidding procedures is
one of the key principles. 132 These principles will be discussed in detail throughout this
dissertation.
With respect to the publication of bidding opportunities, which is now an international
requirement in the public procurement area, the order requires that the OGPCP issue the details
of the publication of notice of tenders. 133 Advertisement of procurement opportunities is one of
the applications of the principle of transparency in the field of government contracting. Order 87,
however, identifies several major requirements for the OGPCP to follow in issuing the
regulations regarding publications of notices including:
1. Notices of tenders shall be published at a minimum in the Arabic and Kurdish languages
and in other additional languages where it is expected that firms outside Iraq will
participate in bidding for a specific contract. 134
2. “The notice shall provide potential offerors with sufficient information, including but not
limited to, standard terms and conditions, the statement of work and a delivery schedule,
to reasonably respond to the tender. In this regard, all tenders shall also contain the
factors upon which offerors shall be evaluated, and the failure of the government to
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evaluate an offer against the stated evaluation factors in the notice shall be a basis for
filing a tender protest pursuant to this Order.” 135
3. The notice shall provide perspective bidders enough time to respond. 136 It shall also allow
potential bidders to request clarifications regarding the tender and extensions of time to
respond to the tender. 137
4. The notice shall provide for the deadline for submitting bids and determine those
circumstances where late offers can be accepted. 138
In addition, the Order states that the IRGC shall specify exceptional circumstances where
notice of tenders is not required. 139 The requirement of notice of tenders under the IRGC is more
specific. The IRGC requires that notice of tenders be published in three widespread domestic
newspapers provided that one of them is the gazette of the Ministry of Finance. 140 In case the
gazette of the ministry of Finance has stopped publishing for any reason, another widespread
newspaper shall be used. 141 The winner of the bidding process shall pay the fees of publication
of notices except for those bids that are related to importing foods and medicine. 142
1.8 Methods of awarding Public Contracts under Order 87 and Its Implementing
Regulations
This dissertation will not focus extensively on the methods of awarding government
contracts. However, these phases of the public procurement process are strongly intertwined and
cannot be dealt with completely separately. There are several methods of awarding government
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contracts with quite different procedures and various level of openness and competition. Under
Order 87, the general rule for awarding contracts by government agencies is through full and
open competition. 143 The order does not explain what “full and open competition” means. It only
states “to the maximum extent practicable, government public contracts shall be awarded on a
competitive basis.” The CPA, which issued Order 87, borrowed exactly “full and open
competition” from the USA Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Under the FAR, “full and
open competition” include
(a) Sealed bids.
(b) Competitive proposals. If sealed bids are not appropriate under paragraph (a)
of this section, contracting officers shall request competitive proposals or use the
other competitive procedures under paragraph (c) or (d) of this section.
(c) Combination of competitive procedures. If sealed bids are not appropriate,
contracting officers may use any combination of competitive procedures (e.g.,
two-step sealed bidding).
(d) Other competitive procedures.
(1) Selection of sources for architect-engineer contracts in accordance with the
provisions of 40 U.S.C. 1102 et seq. is a competitive procedure (see Subpart 36.6
for procedures).
(2) Competitive selection of basic and applied research and that part of
development not related to the development of a specific system or hardware
procurement is a competitive procedure if award results from—
(i) A broad agency announcement that is general in nature identifying areas of
research interest, including criteria for selecting proposals, and soliciting the
participation of all offerors capable of satisfying the Government’s needs; and
(ii) A peer or scientific review.
(3) Use of multiple award schedules issued under the procedures established by
the Administrator of General Services consistent with the requirement of 41
U.S.C. 259(b)(3)(A) for the multiple award schedule program of the General
Services Administration is a competitive procedure. 144
It is not clear whether “full and open competition” under Order 87 includes the same methods as
those of the USA under FAR or whether it has a different meaning under Iraqi law. It seems that
Order 87 takes a different direction from that of the USA and implies that “full and open
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competition” denotes what is known in USA as sealed bidding, in other jurisdictions as formal
tendering, or open tendering under the WTO. This implication comes from the fact that Section 5
of the order sets forth the exceptions to the “full and open competition” as “other than the lowest
price” or “negotiated procedures”. 145 In Iraq this method is named in the IRGC as public
tendering which will be discussed below.
Government agencies may award contracts in “other than full and open competition”
while certain restrictions apply. 146 Thus, awarding contracts in other than full and open
competition is an exception. Government agencies may use other than full and open competition
in the following circumstances:
(a) When the goods or services required are only manufactured or supplied by a particular
supplier or by a limited number of entities for technical or artistic reasons. 147
(b) When there is extreme urgency caused by events beyond the discretion of the contracting
authority whereas the public interest does not allow awarding the contract on a
competitive base. 148
(c) When the goods to be procured are replacement for goods purchased under an existing or
previous contract or the goods are interchangeable with existing goods purchased from
the original source who supplied the existing goods. 149

145

Order 87, Sec. 5 (2)(a), supra note 5.
Id., at Sec. 5.
147
Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(a).
148
Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(b).
149
Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(c).
146

47

(d) “When the use of other than full and open competitive public contracting procedures is
necessary to promote economic or institutional development among certain population
sectors or geographic regions of the State of Iraq or of Iraqi state-owned enterprises.” 150
(e) When international agreements or treaties (bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral) to which
the state of Iraq is a party require the use of other than competitive bidding by explicit
terms or by implication. 151
(f) When the value of the contract to be awarded is below certain monetary threshold
determined by the IRCG which is to be known a streamlined procedure for public
procurement. 152
Since Order 87 allowed the OGPCP to identify other situations that justify procuring
agencies to contract through other than full and open competition, 153 The OGPCP added through
the IRGC some other exceptions to those mentioned in Order 87. The IRGC added the following
exceptions; when a contract requires secrecy in its contracting procedures and execution, when
there are security reasons, or when there is no firm willing to participate in a bidding procedure
publicized for the second time. 154 However, many of these exceptions are problematic because
they are very broad and can contribute to increase the discretion of the officials in contracting
agencies to limit competition. This issue will be raised again in subsequent chapters.
Although Order 87 identifies only two major methods of contracting for government
agencies, the IRGC specifies six various contracting methods. Contracting agencies may select
the method of contracting they prefer, but their discretion is limited by the restrictions placed on
150
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using other than full and open competition mentioned above. The methods of contracting under
the Iraqi procurement law and regulations are as follow:
1.8.1 Public Tendering
According to this method, the government agency shall announce to the public the
specifications of the product or service requested by the agency and specify a period of time for
receiving written offers from interested firms or contractors. 155 The announcement of the tender
usually includes instructions of how to prepare bids. The offers of the firms shall usually include
the price and other terms for the supply of the product and service required. 156 Then the agency
opens all tenders publicly and awards the contract to the lowest bidders. 157
In other words, every interested party may submit a tender, and price is the sole
determinant for selecting a successful bidder. However, under the IRGC, the contracting
agencies are not obliged to award the contract to the lowest bid because they have to consider
other factors. 158 Notice of tenders for public tendering is subject to the general rules of
publications set forth in the IRGC that was mentioned above. Public tendering may be used for
any contract worth Iraqi Dinars (ID) 50,000,000 159 or more. This method is known as “sealed
bidding” in the United States.
1.8.2 Restricted Tendering
Under the IRGC, contracting agencies shall advertise to the public any contract worth ID
50,000,000 or more to all interested parties in two stages. 160 First, in this stage interested firms
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submit documents that prove their technical and financial capabilities to execute the contract to
be evaluated by a specialized committee in the contracting agency to select qualified offerors. 161
Second, the contracting agency asks those who have been selected as qualified contractors to
submit their bids provided that the number of the invitees is not less than six firms. 162
1.8.3 Two-Stage Tendering
Contracting agencies may use the two-stage method when the contract is complex and it
is difficult to determine precisely the technical and financial specifications in the tender
advertisement. 163 Under the IRGC, there is a pre-qualification stage for this method exactly like
the one in the restricted tendering. In the first stage the agency invites the firms to submit their
technical specifications as the preliminary design of the project. 164 In the second stage, those
who have been selected in the pre-qualification stage and whose technical offers have been
accepted are invited to submit their bids. 165
1.8.4 Direct Invitation
Under the IRGC, in the direct invitation contracting method, there are no prequalification stages for the bidders by the contracting authority. Instead, the contracting agency
directly sends invitations to no less than five firms or interested parties with necessary technical
and financial qualifications. 166 The discretion of the contracting agency to use this method is
restricted to availability of certain conditions. The direct invitation method is justified in case of
necessity, when the contract requires special capabilities, when the contracting procedures and
execution demand secrecy, security reasons, urgent situations such as natural disasters, or in case
161

Id.
Id.
163
Id., at Art. 4 (3)(a).
164
Id., at 4 (3) (b).
165
Id..
166
Id., at Art. 4 (4).
162

50

where no firms showed interest to participate in the tender procedure after advertising the
contract twice. 167
1.8.5 Sole Source Contracts
Under the sole source method, the contracting authority invites only one firm to execute a
contract that has a monopolistic nature based on necessity grounds and other justifications.168
The IRGC requires several conditions to be met if a contracting agency decides to award a
contract using the least competitive method which is the sole source. The requirements are:
a) The contracting offices in the ministries and other public agencies shall inform the Central
Contracting Committee (CCC) in the General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers about
awarding a contract using this method with detailed justifications for such a decision. 169
b) Financial powers of the contracting authorities shall be observed carefully in awarding sole
source contracts. When the head of the contracting authority lacks financial powers to decide
over the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee to award or not award the contract, such
recommendation shall be sent to the CCC in the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers for final
action. 170
c) If the Central Committee in the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers fails to make a
decision approving or rejecting the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee to award a
contract within 14 business days from registering the request for approval, such failure is
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considered an approval of the recommendation and the contracting authority concerned may
initiate the award procedures.

171

1.8.6 Small Purchase Committees
Contracting agencies are allowed to enter directly into contracts with whomever they
want, even without any competition procedures for contracts under ID 50,000,000 for purchasing
small items that are necessary for the day-to-day operations of government agencies such as
stationary or furniture for office use. 172 However, the Council of Ministers according to Order
Number 56 (2012) raised the price of contracts to be subject to Small Purchase to ID
100,000,000. 173
1.9 The Significance of the Bid Protest Process to the Public Procurement System
For a public procurement system to function properly it is not sufficient that effective
laws or rules are in place. There needs to be a mechanism through which these rules are
enforced. 174 Bid protest processes are viewed as providing systemic transparency by allowing
unsatisfied offerors or other interested parties to examine procuring agency records and
decisions. 175 Such protest procedures foster contractor participation in the procurement process,
obtaining better goods and services for the government. 176
According to UNCITRAL, an effective bid protest system makes the model law more
“self-policing and self-enforcing.” 177 It also strengthens public confidence in the procurement
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system and functions as a deterrent by discouraging violations of procurement laws and
regulations. 178 In addition, competent bid-challenge procedures make procuring officials use
their discretion carefully in awarding contracts that maximize the benefits government receives
from procurement spending. 179 Private-sector actors in public procurement activities act, in
essence, like private attorneys general. 180
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires signatory
members to adopt “an effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of
appeal, to ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or procedures established
under the convention for the procurement process are not followed.” 181 Iraq has ratified this
convention through the Accession Law No. 35 (2007). 182 In addition, in a Conference of the
States Parties to the UNCAC, member states emphasized the role of effective oversight on the
integrity of the procurement system. 183 They specifically called for more robust oversight
mechanisms including, among others, an effective audit system on procurement activities and “a
functioning review or challenge mechanism, in that losing suppliers are good watchdogs.”
Regional and international agreements do not cover the form or procedures of the bid
protest process but to a limited extent. Thus, for details regarding the form and function of the
bid protest system, researchers have to examine the administrative and judicial structure of a
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particular country. Nonetheless, there are, in general, two major categories of bid protest
mechanisms used in the various jurisdictions. The first one is a protest review that is internal to
the procurement organizational structure, because it is conducted by the procuring agency. This
system is known as agency-level bid protest in the United States.
The second one is an external review, conducted either by an independent body or by the
judiciary, sometimes by a specialized court, or by both. This means that in some countries there
are three types of reviews; the agency-level, an independent body, and the judiciary. For
instance, the United States offers three venues for unsatisfied bidders: the contracting agency, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), acting as an independent body, and the Court of
Federal Claims (COFC), as the judicial forum.
Two types of review are available to unsatisfied bidders in Iraq. There is an internal
review mechanism at the agency-level or ministerial-level which is less formal in terms of
procedures used in reviewing protests submitted by interested parties. 184 There is also an external
review mechanism represented by a specialized administrative tribunal, the IAT. The review in
the tribunal is formal as the IAT must comply with the procedures set forth in the Law on Civil
Procedures (LCP) for ordinary civil trials. In addition, there is an appellate review for the
decisions of the IAT conducted by the Federal Supreme Court (FSC).
1.10 Costs and Benefits of the Bid Protest System
There are basically two major groups of scholars involved in examining the pros and cons
of the bid protest process. The first group can be called pro discretion scholars who are against
stricter bid protest system. The second group is pro oversight scholars who tend to support

184

Under Article 10 (a) of the IRGC, there is no agency-level bid protest mechanism in the Iraqi procurement
system; rather it is a ministerial level.

54

stricter bid protest procedures. The latter group usually emphasizes the benefits of a bid protest
system, while the pro discretion group examines the costs and negative impacts of the bid protest
on the entire procurement system. In fact even the opponents of the bid protest system do not ask
for the removal of the bid protest process; rather, the difference of opinion centers on the extent
of that oversight on the procurement system. The section examines the arguments of both sides,
specifically in light of the American experience.
1.10.1 The Importance of Discretion in the Public Procurement System
In the 1990s the Clinton Administration adopted the National Performance Review, a
broad reaching effort to reinvent government by making it more businesslike. 185 Reforming
public procurement was one of the most successful programs within this effort. 186 The
procurement reform was supervised and conducted by Harvard Professor Steven Kelman, who
re-shaped the procurement process according to his vision in Procurement and Public
Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance. 187
From 1993 through 1997, Kelman served as Administrator of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget. During his tenure as
Administrator, he played a lead role in the Administration's "reinventing government" effort. 188
He led Administration efforts in support of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and
the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995. 189 Although this analysis is related to the American
experience, it works to a reasonable extent to other procurement system in other contexts
because it tackles the major controversy of discretion versus oversight.
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Kelman examines how the federal government buys computer technology, including
computers, networks, applications, and support services. 190 The book states that lessons derived
from problems with computer and computer-related purchasing can be applied to some extent to
the functioning of the government procurement system generally. 191 It concludes that the fear of
allowing procurement officials discretion to exercise good judgment in the purchasing process
prevents agencies from selecting the best contractor and inhibits the performance quality of the
contractors selected. 192
Kelman states that the goals of the regulations of the public procurement are: (1) equity,
fair access to government contracts; (2) integrity, limiting corruption in the procurement process;
(3) economy and efficiency, acquiring goods and services at the lowest possible price. 193 To
achieve these goals, procurement regulations require that government contracts be awarded
based on “full and open competition.” He states, further, that competition lowers prices; hence, it
promotes economy. 194 It also allows all contractors to participate in the procedures of obtaining
government contracts. 195 Finally, full and open competition prevents corruption in the
procurement process because it is harder to bribe an official and easier to detect considering the
fact that the lowest price is the crucial winning factor. 196
Kelman also suggests that historical background had had an impact on introducing the
“full and open competition” criterion because Americans do not trust government. 197 In addition,
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the USA was born in an armed struggle against government tyranny and many Americans
emigrated from their countries to escape the power of government. 198 This distrust in
government, in Kelman’s view, spills over into the regulation of the contracting powers,
therefore people are suspicious that the contract award process can be tainted with corrupt
practices such as cronyism and bribery. 199 Furthermore, procurement officials are not necessarily
motivated to acquire good products with the lowest possible price because they are not spending
their own money. 200
Thus, the best procedure to achieve “full and open competition” is contracting using
sealed bidding under which the contract is to be advertised to all comers and the owner of the
lowest price will win. 201 This procedure was a response to the efforts of congressmen to secure
contracts for friends in the nineteenth century. 202 During the twentieth century government
agencies awarded contracts by receiving proposals from contractors explaining how they plan to
perform and for what price as an alternative to sealed bidding. 203 However, this alternative was
controversial because of the degree of discretion it allows as to how often this method can be
used. 204
In the 1940s Congress amended the procurement law that continued favoring sealed
bidding, but allowed other contracting methods as exceptions. 205 Several years later, the
exceptions became so common that only 10 to 15 percent of contracts, considering the dollar
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value, were awarded using sealed bids. 206 Finally, in 1984 Congress passed the Competition in
Contracting Act removing the statutory preference for sealed bids and both sealed bids and
competitive negotiations were considered “full and open competition.” 207 The legislative history
showed that the exceptions allowed to the sealed bidding under the previous law were often
applied inappropriately to justify the use of sole-source. 208 Thus, the Competition in Contracting
Act is designed to limit to the minimum the use of sole-source method. 209
The sole-source method is allowed as an exception provided that certain restrictions are
applied. First, there must be a written justification by the contracting officer for the use of other
than full and open competition and a certificate by the technical and requirements personnel
supporting the necessity of using such a method. 210 The justification must include information
including a description of the goods and services required, the statutory bases that allow this
exception, and a determination that the proposed cost will be fair and reasonable. 211
Second, the justification must be approved by officials determined according to the dollar
value of the contract. For instance, for contracts not exceeding US$ 550,000 the approval of the
contracting officer suffices, but the approval of the competition advocate for the procurement
activity is required for contracts over US$ 550,000 but not exceeding US$ 11.5 million.212
Contracts over US$ 11.5 million but not exceeding US$ 57 million the approval of the head of
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the procuring activity and contracts over US$ 57 million requires the approval of the senior
procurement executive of the agency. 213
Although Kelman admits that the competitive proposal or request for proposal to award
government contracts provides theoretically for greater discretion of officials, in practice there
are real limitations on this discretion. 214 He identifies three major limitations which are the rules
and practices establishing the government’s requirements; the criteria by which proposals from
vendors are evaluated; and the information that may be used in evaluating proposals against
those criteria. 215
According to Kelman, requirements are specifications of what the government wants to
purchase such as how much computing capacity, what sorts of application, and so forth. 216 Under
the FAR, “agencies shall specify needs in a manner designed to promote full and open
competition.” 217 In addition, “specifications may include restrictive provisions or conditions only
to the extent necessary to satisfy the minimum needs of the agency.” 218 If specifications are
tailored to prefer a product or services of a specific vendor, such specifications violate the FAR
and trigger protests. 219
On the other hand, in establishing criteria to evaluate the proposals of contractors,
agencies are granted considerable discretion. 220 Price or cost to the government is included as an
evaluation factor in every source selection, but the award need not be made to the lowest
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bidders. 221 Although it appears that agencies have huge discretion in determining evaluating
factor, such discretion is limited too.222 Evaluation criteria are related to agency need based on
its statutory mission as determined by Congress. 223
Furthermore, all evaluation criteria are identified in the Request for Proposal (RFP). 224
Officials may not use other evaluation criteria after they have seen the proposals even if they
discover a crucial criterion in a particular proposal which has been neglected in the solicitation
documents, because doing so is considered favoring one of the contractors. 225 The purpose
behind the obligation of identifying evaluation criteria in the RFP is to make sure contractors
know in advance on what criteria they will be judged in the competition. 226
Finally, another limitation on the discretion of the procuring officials is that contractors
must be judged only on their written proposals submitted in response to the RFP. 227 Officials
may not evaluate a proposal based on information they have obtained on their own initiative, on
communications with other bodies and agencies that have past experience with the contractor, or
on reviews from other sources regarding the performance of the potential contractor. 228 If
officials do not comply with this requirement, their decision will be considered void and
corrupt. 229 In fact, this requirement emerged from procurement practices and not from
contracting regulations. 230
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On the other hand, Kelman’s major complaint about the old procurement system was that
agencies or buyers were not allowed to use past performance as a crucial factor in the evaluation
process to identify the winner. 231 Past performance was given only little weigh in evaluating
contractors’ proposals. 232 The reason for ignoring past performance was the requirement that
agencies evaluate offers based solely on elements found in the contractor’s proposal. 233
However, currently extensive regulations and guidance requires agencies to formally weigh the
past performance of contractors on existing or previous contracts for future works. 234
Thus, Kelman’s major criticism is that the procurement environment became highly
regulated in a way that officials do not have enough discretion to exercise judgment in selecting
the winning contractor. 235 He does not deny the importance of rules in defining, directing, and
coordinating the behavior of large numbers of people and describes rules as one of the greatest
achievements of the human experience. 236 Rules, according to Kelman, allow a complex tax to
be divided into parts and coordinated because each person knows that others follow the rules. 237
Kelman, however, states that rules do not work for all times and situations and existing
rules became inappropriate when the environment changes. 238 He suggests that in such an
environment officials have to be given greater discretion. 239 He believes that over-reliance on
rules to be enforced in situations that require more than blind application of such rules
suppresses creativity and striving for excellence. 240 He calls for a balance between discretion and
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rules in the public management arena. 241 The over-reliance on rules, according to Kelman, came
from the Americans’ doubtful perception of government previously discussed. 242 Government
agencies became rule-based not because such rule dominance is the best way to achieve better
performance, but because it was required to avoid scandal. 243
Thus, clearance points are multiplied as additional checks with the aim of limiting
malfeasance. 244 Kelman believes that a bias against discretion exist in the American political
science literature. 245 He notes that researchers frequently point out, as a problem, that there is
still some discretion left to lower-level officials. 246 He comments that the self-same problem of
little discretion is common in the procurement process. 247 Kelman believes that organizational
rules serve to prevent disasters but at the cost of stifling excellence, adding that excellence
requires the ability to demonstrate distinctiveness, while rules imply uniformity. 248 Discretion is
limited to reduce the incidence of misbehavior, but this limitation reduces outstanding
achievement. 249
Kelman argues that the environment of public procurement changes more rapidly than the
rules governing it, and the procurement process is too complicated to be translated into simple
rules. 250 In such an environment, a decision-making process that depends heavily on rules is
untenable. 251 He suggests that not only do rules need to change, but the system that relies too
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much on rules itself needs to change. 252 Kelman believes, again, that the existing rules might
serve the limited goals of equity, integrity, and economy, but they are not suitable to achieve
excellence in performance. 253
Kelman basically implies that a plethora of rules restricts the discretion of officials to
exercise judgments in awarding public contracts and generates more disputes and protests,
because rules increases the bases of complaints. In addition, more rules broaden the boundary of
oversight especially to third-party observers, which are potential or actual bidders. Further, rules
undermine the spirit of distinctiveness and innovation of procurement officials, while exercising
their authorities. Kelman expresses disappointment and dissatisfaction towards bid protests or
the idea of oversight generally especially by third parties.
Professor Kelman believes that bid protests are time-consuming and expensive. 254 In
addition, when agencies lose the protest they have to pay bid preparation costs and legal fees
from taxpayer’s money. 255 He believes that the time and monetary cost are only the direct impact
of bid protests, while the indirect costs are even more disappointing. 256 For instance, bid protests
open the door to some companies to win government contracts not by satisfying contracting
agencies but through litigation. 257 This phenomenon is in contrast with to the principles that
govern commercial relationships in the private sector. 258
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In addition, civil servant’s career could be jeopardized when an agency loses a protest
because the loss is a blot on his or her record. 259 According to Kelman, the direct and indirect
costs of the bid protest system result in pernicious effects on the entire procurement process. 260
For instance, bid protests make contracting agencies excessively risk-averse and slow in source
selection. 261 In addition, agencies start producing redundant documentation and objectification of
every decision in order to be able to defend themselves in a potential protest. 262 “Better choose
the wrong vendor, many appeared to believe, than to choose the right one based on ‘subjective’
or less than exhaustively documented grounds.” 263
Kelman continues in showing the negative impacts of bid protests. The bid protest system
has a devastating effect on a partnership between the government and contractors. 264 Building a
partnership relationship with a particular contractor creates grounds for protests based on corrupt
acts such as favoritism and the system forces agencies to inter into business relationship with
companies who protested at every procurement opportunity. 265 Partnership ultimately increases
the quality of the goods and services government receives from contractors.
Kelman praises highly that two major IT companies that did not protest the award of
public contracts which they lost. 266 He considers the decisions of Lockheed Martin and AT&T
not to protest as an announcement of the end of the bid protest era and a birth of a more
constructive government/contractor relationship. 267 In such a relationship, the purchasing process
focuses on choosing the winning contractor based on who can deliver results, reasonable prices,
259
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and the ability to establish good partnerships to achieve those results. 268 He urges agencies to
take their share of responsibility for reducing reliance on bid protests. 269
Kelman believes that the era of “procedural trivia” and the bureaucratic process that
involved contracting agencies in unreasonable decisions in source selection is “happily gone”.270
Nonetheless, he suggests that the need for common sense and an open mind in decision-making
remains regarding which contractor represents the deal for the government, not only to avoid
protests but to make the best business decision for the government as well. 271 He also encourages
contractors to take other steps to eliminate the culture of bid protests through voluntary promise
not to protest an award decision, as one contractor did. 272
Finally, Kelman states that “the sooner we stop worrying about litigation and start
focusing on delivering value for the government's IT investments, the better off government and
vendors will be.” 273 The main purpose behind Kelman’s reform of the public procurement is to
reinvent government, according to the NPR program, by making it more businesslike. 274 The
comparison Kelman makes is about how the private sector purchases computer and IT-related
services and how the government acquires them. According to Kelman, the US government
procurement currently functions in a more businesslike fashion through adopting businesslike
concepts including customer satisfaction and efficiency. 275
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1.10.2 The Role of Oversight in Public Procurement Processes
On the other hand, other scholars prefer stricter oversight on the discretion of public
officials including contracting officers. One of the most extensive responses to Kelman regarding
the idea of bid protests, or third parties oversight, is Steven L.Schooner’s article Fear of
Oversight: the Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. 276 Schooner advocates for
more oversight on the discretion of the agencies when they make contracting-related decisions.
Schooner’s views are outlined below. Schooner’s major disagreement with Kelman is on the
discretion of officials. Schooner praises Kelman for his effort to make the procurement process
functions more efficiently. 277 Nonetheless, Schooner disagrees with Kelman who “views less
litigation as a public good because it enhances transaction efficiency.” Public procurement to
Schooner is not just about administrative efficiency and he refuses to consider administrative
efficiency as a fundamental goal of the procurement process. 278
To Schooner “less litigation cannot be a public good unless the procurement system’s
traditionally robust third-party monitoring is replaced with increased internal government
oversight.” 279 Interestingly, reduced oversight, as Schooner points out in the public procurement
field, was not deliberate but it was inadvertent to the acquisition reform efforts. 280 The
elimination of oversight or the imposition of restrictions on private attorneys general and other
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third-party monitoring, was not even an argument in the reform effort. 281 Whether reduced
oversight was intended or not, the outcome is unfortunate to Schooner.
Schooner first starts with Kelman’s objection to litigation by quoting a scholar who states
that ““If the Government’s trains are running on time at the expense of oversight, due process,
and access to litigation, it would not be at all surprising. After all, the system was remodeled by a
man who is known to detest lawyers.” 282 For the reasons mentioned above with respect to the
costs of litigation, Kelman rejects the mechanism of the private attorney general in the
procurement process. 283 According to Kelman “government over time, albeit unconsciously,
increased its reliance on the contractor community to fulfill its duty and it seemed comfortable
with the concept of third-party monitoring.” 284
In contrast, Schooner replies to Kelman by listing the benefits of third-party oversight on
public procurement. First, Schooner points out that even Kelman himself does not deny the
importance of the concept of oversight. 285 Kelman states that any loosening of the regulatory
restrictions should be accompanied by increased resources for corruption investigations to
investigate misbehavior inside and outside the agencies responsible for procurement. 286 Thus,
Schooner suggests that from a policy standpoint, Kelman should welcome the idea of the private
attorney general. 287
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Schooner asserts that opponents of litigation cannot identify a more cost effective,
requiring less enforcement regimes, than the bid protest system. 288 In addition, contractors doing
business with the government have traditionally played the role of the private attorney general
either as legitimate interested parties or, more recently, as opportunistic interested parties. 289 In
addition, Congress has implicitly deputized actual and potential contractors as private attorneys
general to monitor the procurement process. 290 Courts have acknowledged explicitly this
monitoring of government activities by the private sector. In Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer 291
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “prospective contractors, injured by arbitrary and
capricious government actions, should be able to sue or protest to vindicate their real interests,
while at the time furthering the public interest.” 292
Furthermore, bid protests help to reinforce the impartiality of the procurement system. 293
They serve to correct rare incidents of inadvertent or worse, illegal, arbitrary, or capricious
actions of the contracting agencies. 294 Contractors now become strangely quiet in monitoring the
procurement process because of the reforms Kelman conducted. 295 If contractors relinquish their
right to monitor the procurement system to ensure its integrity, and the policy makers implicitly
or explicitly urge this abdication, the entire procurement process suffers. 296 Nonetheless,
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Schooner emphasizes that litigation is not the optimal method to resolve problems that arise in
the marketplace precisely because it is inefficient. 297
Another major criticism to the bid protest system is that contractors take advantage of the
system by delaying the procurement process through submitting frivolous protests. 298 Schooner
believes that some scholars have stereotyped the private attorney general so badly that they fail
to exclude those offerors that meet the standing requirement and serve the public interest by
coming forward to challenge contract award decisions. 299 Thus, the concept of the private
attorney general includes three various types of groups. 300 The first one are those contractors
who take advantage of the regulatory bureaucracy to obtain some attorney fees. 301 The second
group is the social advocate group which considers litigation as a form of pressure group
activity. 302 Finally, the third group is actual or honest private attorneys general that already meet
the standing requirements for submitting protests. 303 Schooner calls the third group “accidental
private attorney[s] general” to include those interested parties who serve the oversight function
through bid protests in the course of conducting their routine business transactions.” 304 He
suggests that these contractors should be encouraged to protect their rights more aggressively. 305
Schooner believes that notions of taking advantage of the bid protest system comes from
the concentration of the exploitation of bureaucracy by lawyers, akin to the ambulance-chaser
stereotype, which assumes that fees motivate attorneys to bring law suits. 306 Nevertheless, he
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does not advocate attorney-initiated litigation, but contractor-initiated litigation. 307 According to
Schooner, “for the accidental private attorneys general, bringing suit must make business sense
(from the business’s standpoint, not from outside council’s) in light of the pending dispute and
not based upon a prospective windfall.” 308
On the other hand, another benefit of the bid protest process is not related to oversight, as
Schooner states. Clarification of procurement regulation and standard contract clauses that bind
the government is another important benefit. 309 Furthermore, precedent has a substantial value in
a highly regulated system subject to frequent congressional modification. 310 Since buyers,
sellers, and counsel frequently utilize various provisions of solicitations and contract clauses,
publication of procurement precedent by protest forums informs agencies and contractors to
modulate their behavior. 311
The drafters of the FAR avoided introducing extensive guidance to the published
regulation. 312 As a result, the protest decisions published by protest forums provide necessary
interpretation to the terms and provisions of procurement regulation to those involved in
procurement activities. 313 Also, “judicial opinions can reduce uncertainty regarding the validity
and meaning of a term and the interaction of the term with relevant legal requirements…..this
reduction in uncertainty reduces the expected costs of corporate planning and of litigating
disputes regarding a contract term.” 314 For instance, corporate lawyers know that the GAO
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strictly applies the rule “late is late” because of the publication of bid protest decisions, so that
counsel advise their clients to file their protests on time. 315
On the other hand, reduced oversight threatens public trust. Kelman himself anticipates
and warns against diminished oversight as a consequence of procurement reform. 316 He claims to
“take very seriously the goal of keeping the level of corruption in government low.” 317 He states
that “corruption can devastate the ethical tones of society as a whole and decrease the inclination
of citizens to behave ethically in their everyday life.” 318 But, he doubts that corruption is
widespread in the procurement process, believing that there is much exaggeration about it. 319
Kelman believes that broad procurement reform should be accompanied by increased oversight
mechanisms to ensure compliance by buyers and contractors with the revised rules. 320
Nevertheless, corruption in the procurement system should be tackled through other methods
such as investigative techniques, including undercover agents and wiretaps. 321 Thus, Kelman
also suggests that the fight against corruption should be removed from the procurement
regulatory system. 322
In contrast, Schooner strongly disagrees because “his implementation efforts failed to
recognize that oversight generally, and third-party monitoring specifically, could add significant
value to this flexible, discretionary, and rapidly evolving buying regime.” 323 Yet, Kelman
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himself states that “one need not sacrifice equity and integrity to obtain better substantive
procurement performance.” 324
With respect to undermined public trust, Schooner argues that Kelman, as a public policy
scholar, knows that reduced oversight threatens fundamental norms of the public procurement
system. 325 The procurement system is based on competition, individual and institutional
integrity, and transparency, all of which are crucial to maintaining public trust. 326 When
interested parties exercise their due process rights through bid protests, they intentionally or
inadvertently strengthen these major policies. 327 Without competition in the procurement
process, the elements of price and quality of goods and services cannot be achieved, especially as
it has long been established that procurement officials are less motivated to maximize
competition. 328
Furthermore, recent procurement reforms resulted in reduction of the procurement
workforce that changed the balance from full and open competition to increased efficiency. 329 It
is true that government can save agency resources including time, energy, and money when
fewer contractors compete for a public contract. 330 Still, less competition makes it very difficult
for the government to obtain the best value in its contract activities. 331 Schooner believes that the
balance between efficiency and competition is the ultimate hurdle facing the acquisition reform
program. 332
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Schooner states that when the public loses confidence in how agencies spend its money,
when contracts are awarded based on favoritism rather than rules, or when competing contractors
believe that they are not in an equal position with incumbent contractors, the system suffers. 333
According to Schooner, Kelman himself acknowledges the role that public trust plays in public
procurement. 334 In this context Kelman states that the general public observes and perceives
corruption as a major problem because frequent corruption scandals in municipal and in federal
procurement suggest that payoffs are an endemic problem in procurement. 335
However, Schooner states that “Kelman’s reform largely ignores the transparency issue
and his reform initiatives frequently come at the expense of transparency.” 336 In addition, as
transparency in public procurement is characterized by clear rules and by means to verify that
those rules are followed, the direction to increase the discretion of procurement officials could be
considered antithetical to certain perceptions of transparency. 337 According to Schooner, this
trend does not trouble Kelman because his reform or model are inspired by the function of the
private sector. 338 In the private sector transparency is not considered an optimal goal. 339 Reduced
oversight more likely uncovers less legality, less non-compliance, fewer errors in judgment, and
less sloppiness. 340
Another major criticism that Schooner relies on to challenge Kelman’s philosophy
regarding public administration is the basic fact that government is different from the private
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sector. 341 First and foremost, government does not have a profit motive and should operate with
more transparency. 342 Further, both of them serve different ends that ultimately create distinct
cultures and norms. 343 The government is also not in an equal position with the contractors that
buys from them. 344 Although some claim that when the government enters into a commercial
relationship it will be subject to the same laws that governs the relationship between private
parties, this myth is being slowly diminished. 345
Furthermore, businesses get most of their money from customers while governments get
most of their money from taxpayers. 346 Businesses are usually driven by the principle of
competition, while the governments are monopolies. 347 Government is democratic and open and
it moves more slowly than business because government’s fundamental goal is to do good not to
make money. 348 In addition, government is under obligation to treat everybody equally. 349 These
differences demonstrate that government cannot be administered like a business. 350 Even peoples
advocating for governmental reinvention admit that there are limits to a business model in
governance. 351
Thus, this difference in the philosophy of how each sector functions, as Schooner
suggests, makes it difficult to model the government after the private sector. Schooner gives an
example regarding how public and private sectors utilize rules in their daily tasks. A
businessman who deviates from rules is considered to be flexible. Rules are highly general and
341
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allow scope for individual initiative in the pursuit of profit. 352 In contrast, a civil servant
deviating from relevant rules is considered to be guilty of misconduct. A rule book provides
officials with some discretion in their dealings with the public, but at the same time they must
avoid arbitrariness. 353
1.11 What does the empirical data tell us?
Daniel Gorden, in an empirical study, responds to the misperceptions that are extant
regarding the bid protest system. He corrects some misunderstandings that lead to negative
judgments regarding bid protests. In particular, Gorden responds to two major problems often
triggered against the protest process by those who advovate limiting the opportunity of
challenging contracting agencies’ decisions by unsatisfied bidders. The first misperception is that
bid protests are more common in the procurement system than they really are. 354 The second one
is that many believe that protesters use the system as a business tactic to obtain contracts from
the government. 355
1.11.1 Protests are rare
Gorden compares the numbers of protests to the numbers of contracts that the US federal
government enters into annually. He states that contracting officers believe that bid protests are
frequent over the years he or she worked in the procurement arena. 356 Yet, if the same
contracting officer is asked how many contracts he or she processed, the number of contracts
would outweigh the number of protests by far. 357 Thus, to identify the frequency of bid protests
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to contracts awarded, there are difficulties in determining precisely both the number of bid
protests and the number of federal contracts. 358
There are no accurate data regarding the number of federal government contracts that are
conducted every year. 359 A study by RAND Corporation of Air Force procurements that were
protested to the GAO showed that approximately 20,000 contracts were awarded by the Air
Force in 2008 representing approximately $63 billion. 360 On the other hand, the overall
procurement spending of the Federal Government in 2008 was over S500 billion which is eight
times the amount spent by the Air Force. 361 Thus, this calculation suggests that the number of
contracts awarded was approximately 160,000. 362 However, Gorden suspects that this number is
lower than it actually is, so an accurate estimate would be more than 250,000 contracts. 363 Thus,
for the purposes of the study Gorden conducted, he assumed that the number of contracts and
protestable orders awarded in 2008 is 200,000. 364
With respect to the number of protests, there is confusion caused by the way the GAO
counts the protests it receives. 365 The GAO counts protests in a way that may exaggerate the
numbers of protests. 366 When a contractor files a protest against the provisions of a solicitation,
the GAO assigns it a docket number which begins with a “B”, known as “B number” (for
example, B-123456). 367 If the unsatisfied bidder reveals new grounds for a protest and files a
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supplemental protest of that same solicitation terms, the GAO will register that as B-123456.2.368
If another unsatisfied offeror submits a protest to the same solicitation terms, the GAO will
docket the initial protest of that offeror as B-123456.3 and its supplemental protest (in case filed)
as B-123456.4. 369 These are examples of pre-award protests. If the agency awards the contract,
an unsatisfied bidder might protest to the award decision and this protest would be docketed as
B-123456.5. 370 Finally, if another losing offeror files a protest against the same award decision,
the GAO dockets it as B-123456.6. 371 Thus, in this example, the GAO’s record shows 6 or more
protests for one procurement transaction. 372 Gorden states that 6 protests for one procurement is
unusual, but two or three protests for one procurement is routine. 373
This method of recording protests suggests that the reported number of bid protests by the
GAO substantially overstates the number of procurements actually challenged. 374 Although the
GAO reports that for the fiscal year 2008, there were 1652 protests, elsewhere the GAO reports
that 1027 protests were filed in that same year. 375 As a result, the GAO indicates that, on
average, there were approximately 1.6 docket numbers assigned to each protested contract. 376
Considering this ratio, the 2353 protests filed in the fiscal year 2011 represented only 1470
procurement transactions actually protested. 377
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Obviously, the number of federal procurements was not the same in fiscal year 2008 and
2011. 378 If, however, it is assumed that there were approximately 200,000 procurements based
on the RAND Corporation data in those two years, that would indicate that 0.51% of
procurements were protested in fiscal year 2008 and 0.74% were protested in fiscal year 2011. 379
Accordingly, these numbers indicate that approximately 99.3% and 99.5% of procurements were
not protested. 380 These data show that only a very low percentage of contracts result in protests,
as compared to the number of procurements conducted by the Federal government.
Again, 99.5% of the Air Force procurement transactions were processed without being
protested to the GAO in Fiscal Year 2008. 381 Even assuming that the number of protests filed
against procurements of other agencies is double the number of the protests filed against the Air
Force procurements (there is no reason to believe that that is the case), it would still be true that
99% of government procurements of these other agencies awarded without a bid protest. 382
These numbers are specific to the GAO because the RAND Corporation studied only bid protests
submitted to the GAO, though there are two other fora that receive bid protests: the contracting
agency and the COFC.
Gorden suggests that even including the protests submitted to the COFC would not
change the umbers substantially. 383 The COFC only receives less than one-tenth the number of
protests that the GAO receives each year. 384 On the other hand, contractors can also file protests
to the contracting agencies. According to Gorden, there are not accurate statistics on the number
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of protests submitted directly to the Air Force in order to conduct a more correct data analysis. 385
Nevertheless, he does not believe that the number of agency protests would increase the total
percentage of the protested Air Force procurements much above 0.5%. 386
Gorden then examines the allegation that the increase of the number of bid protests is a
problem. 387 He admits that it is true that the number of protests filed to the GAO has
substantially increased over the past few years (2006-2011). 388 However, even if the numbers
doubled, from 0.5% of protested procurements to 1%, it would still mean that approximately
99% of procurements are processed without being protested. 389 In numbers, the number of
protests received by the GAO has increased from 1327 in Fiscal Year 2006 to 2353 in Fiscal
Year 2011, which is more than 70% increase. 390
Adjusting the number of protests according to the ratio of the actual number of protests
filed with the GAO to the number of protests the GAO routinely reports which is mentioned
above, the increase in protests is approximately from 830 in 2006 to 1470 in 2011. 391
Nonetheless, Federal procurement spending also increased during the same period from $432
billion in 2006 to $537 billion in 2011.392 In other words, in 2006 there were approximately 1.92
protests for each billion in federal procurement spending, while in 2011, there were 2.74 protests
per billion. 393
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These assessments, 1.92% and 2.74% protests per billion dollars, match those numbers
that the GAO provided in a report to congress in 2009. 394 In that congressional report, the GAO
stated that the number of protested procurements in the Department of Defense procurement
spending ranged from 1.4 to 1.9 per billion dollars during 2004 to 2008. 395 Although the figure
has increased in Fiscal Year 2011, the number of protests per each billion dollars in federal
spending is still extremely low. 396 Even with considering the 2011 increase, the number is still
fewer than three protests for each billion dollars spent by the Federal Government. 397
1.11.2 It Is Rare for a Protester to Win a Protest
Gorden states that the GAO also utilizes a misleading methodology for counting the
success rate of protesters. 398 The GAO uses the term “sustain rate” in its reports to indicate
occasions when the GAO issues a decision in favor of the protester. 399 The sustain rate between
2007 and 2011 has ranged from 16% to 27% which shows that protesters have a great chance to
win a protest. 400 Nonetheless, the situation actually does not look that favorable to protesters.401
First, the sustain rate has been decreasing nearly consistently from 27% in 2007 to 16% in
2011. 402 Second, the GAO’s annual report states that the sustain rate is only for those protests for
which the GAO has issued a decision on the merits. 403 According to this method, the GAO did
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not sustain 19% of the 2299 cases received in 2010, rather it sustained 19% of 441 decisions on
the merits. 404
Third, the sustain rate is also distorted by the GAO’s methodology of counting multiple B
numbers because protests that are sustained usually have more than one B number compared to
protests denied. 405 For instance, in 2010 the GAO issued 441 decisions on the merits of which 82
were reported as sustained protests. 406 However, counting the actual decisions, counting every
decision as one even though it has received multiple B numbers, showed that there were only
282 decisions on the merits rather than 441. 407 In addition, form the 282 decisions, only 45 cases
were sustained while the GAO reported that it sustained 82 protests. 408 Thus, the sustain rate is
16% rather than 19% as the GAO reported. 409
The above data demonstrate that among the hundreds of thousands of contracts the
Federal Government conducted in 2010, the GAO sustained only 45 bid protests. 410 The
interesting question Gorden triggers is what happened after the GAO sustained those 45
protests. 411 Did the protester that was successful in the GAO litigation succeed in obtaining the
protest? 412 The answer is rarely. 413 Gorden uses the 2010 data to determine whether contractors
that were successful in those 45 protests finally obtained the contract because sufficient time has
passed for the final action that normally follow a protest. 414
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The GAO did not recommend any corrective action in four of the 45 decisions because
the contract had already been performed or for other reasons. 415 In another three decisions, the
GAO recommended corrective actions, but the agency declined to follow the GAO’s
recommendation. 416 In another 23 cases, the GAO recommended corrective actions and the
agency followed the GAO’s recommendation, but the agency did not award the contract to the
protester as it awarded it to the initial winner or took some other actions such as cancelling the
procurement entirely. 417 In only eight cases did the protester obtain the contested procurement
and in another case the agency did re-solicit the procurement using the size standard requested
by the protester. 418 Finally, the rest of the sustained protests, six decisions, have not yet been
finalized. 419
On the other hand, the GAO also reports a high “effectiveness rate” which demonstrates
that protesters receive favorable result. 420 The effectiveness rate was reported to be 42% for the
Fiscal Year 2010, 2011, and 2012. 421 However, this rate includes the sustained protests
mentioned above as well as cases where agencies took voluntary corrective actions without
intervention by the GAO so that the GAO closed the case without issuing a decision. 422 In
addition, the GAO reported that there is no publicly available information on those cases that the
agency voluntarily awarded some form of relief to the protester. 423
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In particular, it is more difficult to identify cases where the protesters obtained the
contract at issue based on voluntary corrective actions form agencies. 424 Further, determining the
outcome of procurements protested in which the contracting agency voluntarily took corrective
actions is not easy because the GAO does not disclose any information about such cases. 425
However, there is no reason to believe that an agency would be more likely to award a contested
contract to a protester whose case resolves without a GAO’s intervention than after the GAO
rules in a protesters favor. 426
1.12 What Really Works Best: More Discretion or More Oversight
The previous examination of the literature regarding the significance of both discretion
and oversight is not conclusive in making simple statements of the suitability of one concept
over the other in the public procurement process. The literature is divided between the supporters
of more oversight which is conducted externally and internally. The bid protest process is one of
the main internal methods of oversight that constrains the discretion of procurement officials in
the administration of public procurement. However, discretion is also very important for
procurement officials to obtain the best value from the procurement transactions. Thus, the main
obstacle to the relationship between discretion and oversight is maintaining a balance between
the two.
To create a balance between the discretionary powers and the bid protest system, there
should be a specific study for identifying the level of discretion of procurement officials and the
impact of the bid protest system on the efficiency of the procurement process in every
jurisdiction. Such a study is in no way easy because it requires extensive theoretical and
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empirical studies to measure the discretion and the impacts of protests on the procurement
activities. It also requires surveys among procurement officials, contractors, and even the public
of how they see the problem.
Studies such as the one Gorden conducted are quite helpful to examine the greater
pictures of the situation of third party monitoring on the procurement process. In addition,
examining the underlying procedures of the bid protest procedures provides further guidance for
determining the restrictive impacts of the bid protest on the discretion of officials. In other
words, designing the bid protest system should always be accompanied by the study of discretion
of procurement officials and vice versa. Discretion should not come at the expense of integrity
and oversight and the bid protest process should not squeeze the discretion of procurement
officials.
Regardless of the difficulties surrounding the issue of balancing the impact of discretion
and oversight over public procurement, one of the concepts may be preferred over the other.
Generally speaking, in developing countries where the level of corruption is unacceptablly high
and more importantly the parliamentary, judicial, and administrative oversight is weak,
increasing the level of oversight is always taken into consideration in reforming the public
procurement system. On the other hand, developed countries are mostly concerned about the
delay that the bid protest process causes and complicating the procurement procedures.
In addition, this dissertation suggests the principle of oversight appropriateness.
According to this principle, there should not be a single set of oversight mechanisms for all
procurement activities. Instead, a separation between important, large, or complicated and simple
contracts should be made. Such separation suggests exercising stricter scrutiny over large and
complicated contracts. On the other hand, such separation suggests exercising less oversight on
84

the contracting agencies in awarding simple contracts and releasing their discretion in order to
avoid burdening the procurement activities with delay and unnecessary constraints.
Procurement transactions vary to a great extent because there are contracts that worth
hundreds of millions of dollars, while there are other contracts that worth hundreds of thousands
of dollars. Subjecting these different contracts to the same oversight mechanisms is not
reasonable. Furthermore, the notion of procedural appropriateness is not in contrast to the
principles governing public procurement activities. In fact, many procurement systems and
regional and international agreements recognize simpler procedures for awarding contracts based
on their monetary values. 427 For instance, contracts below certain dollar value are subject to
simplified acquisition procedures under the US procurement law. 428 Under the Iraqi procurement
laws, contracts below ID 100,000,000 are under complete discretion of contracting agencies to
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contracts.”
428
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aggregate amount of which does not exceed the simplified acquisition threshold (see 2.101). Subpart 13.5 provides
special authority for acquisitions of commercial items exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold but not
exceeding $6.5 million ($12 million for acquisitions as described in 13.500(e)), including options. See Part 12 for
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award it with or without competition. 429 In addition, there are some exceptions in many
procurement systems regarding the applicability of procurement rules with respect to contracts
related to defense and security. 430
The question is on what bases should the procurement laws and regulations identify large
and simple contracts. The bases on which contracts can be classified could be the sensitivity of
service or goods that the contract is about to acquire or the total price of the contract. This
dissertation suggests that the best standard to be utilized for classifying contracts is the monetary
value. Many of public contracts that involve large amounts of money are related to sensitive
services such as health or irritation. Accordingly, the discretion of contracting agencies in
contracts worth large amounts of money should be subject to stricter oversight in all stages of the
award process, while oversight over the discretion of contracting agencies could be reduced in
contracts involve small amounts of money.
What this dissertation means by introducing stricter oversight mechanisms with respect to
contracts with high monetary value is adding previous oversight measures to the current
subsequent oversight process. Previous oversight may include an extra review or scrutiny on the
award of public contracts before they are conducted. The bid protest process, subsequent
oversight, exercises scrutiny mostly after the award of a contract and only when a unsatisfied
protester challenges the award decision. However, there are several important stages precede the
award of a public contract including the need base assessment, selection of contracting methods,
writing provisions of a tender document, evaluation and selection of tenders, and the award
decision.
429
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This extra review should be automatic and without requiring a bidder to initiate a claim.
Such review can be conducted internally by the OGPCP, which is the major institution
responsible for organizing public procurement activities in Iraq. 431 It can also be conducted by an
external institution such as the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), which is the highest independent
auditing agency in Iraq, 432 or by the Commission on Public Committee (CPI), which is the major
anti-corruption institution in Iraq. 433 In addition, it can be conducted by a committee that consists
of several members selected from the above institutions. The involvement of other institutions in
the oversight process will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
For contracts with a low-monetary value, the regular protest mechanisms, subsequent
oversight, with the improvements that are suggested in this dissertation should be sufficient. The
point is not to leave simple contracts without oversight, but it is to prevent burdening the
procurement process with complicated scrutiny procedures that causes delay in providing
services to the public. Examples of the improvements that we will suggest in subsequent chapters
is broadening the right of challenging the decisions of contracting agencies to include not only
participant bidders in a specific tender but also other competent contractors in that sector as
interested parties. In addition, considering some institutions as interested parties to challenge
award-related decisions such as a consumer protection agency or anti-corruption agencies will be
helpful. Further, Allowing interested parties to challenge the provisions of a tender because
contracting agencies may limit competition by the terms they use in the solicitation document.
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In addition to the previous oversight mechanisms, the subsequent oversight, regular bid
protest mechanisms, should also be available for large and complicated contracts. Thus, by
distributing the rigidity of oversight according to large and simple contracts, the procurement
process will be released from unnecessary burdens associated with the oversight process and
corrupt opportunities will be reduced in large public contracts if applied properly. The previous
oversight mechanism might create some difficulties to the public procurement activities
including delay and routine. Nonetheless, these difficulties can be mitigated, for instance, by
introducing strict time limits or using electronic means for communication.
1.13 Challenges in establishing an effective bid-protest system
Generally “reforming public procurement systems have proven to be quite difficult”. 434
This proposition is true, too, for establishing an effective bid-protest system regardless of the
level of a country’s political and economic development. 435 Even some developed nations have
not been quite successful in having a competent bid-protest process. 436 For instance, the national
protest review system in Canada known as the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) has
been regularly criticized by contractors and government agencies for its failure to resolve bid
protest cases. 437
Reforming or improving bid-protest mechanisms in developing countries is more
challenging. Practical and political constraints may often prevent the creation of a protest review
mechanism which is truly effective. 438 The major challenge with respect to developing countries
is the lack of traditions of respect for the rule of law and transparency in government decision434
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making. 439 Another obstacle is the deeply vested interests of the participants in the public
procurement process including public and private sectors in keeping the status quo. 440
Further, lack of competent staff to undertake the process is another major problem
because procuring officials have to pose “a combination of good legal skills and substantial
knowledge of good procurement practices and procedures.” 441 Enforcement of procurement laws
and regulations is also one of the major impediments to establishing an effective bid-protest
system. 442 Incentives should be offered to officials involved in the review of the bid protests in
the form of protection from retaliation, financial credits, promotion, and many others.
These challenges are all present in the case of Iraq. However, there are other challenges
such as the lack of culture of challenging the decisions of contracting agencies by bidders,
mostly because of fear of retaliation. The bid protest system is not effective enough to deter
corruption and mismanagement by procurement officials. Reasons of this problem could be the
political intervention in the procurement process as government contract sometime involves
large amounts of money. Furthermore, many public officials view their public duties as an
extension of their personal privilege or property. If they are challenged, they may regard such a
challenge as a personal attack. These issues and proposed solutions will be addressed in
subsequent chapters.
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1.14 The Bid Protest System under International and Regional Instruments; WTO/GPA,
UNCITRAL, and EU Directives
One might ask why these agreements and model laws on public procurement are
important for the case of Iraq. They are important because many bid challenge procedures all
over the world are based on these legal instruments. Further, Order 87 states that the OGPCP
shall be guided by international standards and best practices in preparing the implementing
regulations especially those adopted by the UNCITRAL Model Law, Procurement Directives of
the European Union, and the WTO/GPA.443 Finally, these legal instruments affect each other.
For instance, the WTO/GPA bid challenge system is modeled on the EC Remedies Directives. 444
With respect to the WTO, government procurement was excluded from the scope of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 445 Since government procurement constitutes
a considerable percentage (10-15%) of the GDP of many countries, the exclusion represented a
significant gap in the GATT. 446 Furthermore, public procurement has been used as a
discriminatory measure favoring domestic contractors and has ultimately become a barrier to
international trade among the members. 447 Consequently, the first GPA was signed in 1979 and
entered into force in 1981. 448 However, this earlier version of the agreement did not obligate
member states to establish bid protest mechanisms through which contractors or suppliers can
directly protest against violations of WTO/GPA provisions. 449
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Before the 1994 GPA, suppliers or contractors were forced to recourse to the ordinary
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSM) of the WTO to enforce the GPA rules. 450 Under the
DSM, only WTO members, not private parties, may raise complaints regarding the application
by other members of the WTO. 451 This approach was considered ineffective because of the
limited functionality of the DSM in dealing with individual breaches of the GPA. 452 Thus, the
current GPA included a requirement for states to provide for national bid-protest mechanisms to
bidders. 453
Article XX.2 GPA states that “each Party shall provide non-discriminatory, timely,
transparent and effective procedures.” 454 This provision mandates four principles for national bid
challenge mechanisms; non-discrimination, timely resolution, transparency, and effectiveness. 455
The GPA requires only one forum to be available to unsatisfied suppliers for reviewing bid
protests. 456 Article XX.6 requires that protests be heard by a court or by an independent review
body. 457 Nevertheless, “the GPA allows a party to establish a tiered national review system.”458
Multiple forums permit unsatisfied bidders to choose the forum for potential protests. 459
Several model laws on public procurement have been issued by UNCITRAL in the last
two decades. The most important ones on public procurement are the 1994 and the 2011 models.
Both models emphasize the importance of bid protest mechanisms through requiring states to
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provide for bid protest review procedures. 460 Under the models, three various forums might be
available, according to the legal structure of the enacting state, to contractors or suppliers to
challenge the decisions of the procuring agencies. These forums are agency-level protest review,
an independent administrative body, or the regular courts. 461 However, UNCITRAL does not
impose this three-tiered protest system on enacting states because states have different legal and
administrative structure. Unlike the WTO/GPA agreement, neither model identifies major
principles that should govern the bid protest process.
The EU public procurement system has two different Remedies Directives which govern
the bid protest process: Remedies Directive for the utilities sector, Remedies Directive for the
public sector. 462 These directives coordinate national protest review systems by incorporating a
set of common standards to ensure availability of rapid and effective review procedures in all EU
countries for the violations of EU procurement directives. 463 The EU Commission justifies the
existence of two directives by the fact that the rules governing the utilities sector are more
flexible. 464
“The Remedies Directives are based on three Fundamental principles: the principle of
effectiveness, the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of procedural autonomy.”465
Since the EC directives on public procurement have a regional application, there are two
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arrangements under the Remedies Directives for ensuring compliance with procurement
directives; national arrangement and community level arrangement. 466
The Remedies Directives do not require specific forums to be used by member states
nationally to implement the community law. 467 It states that member countries shall take
measures necessary to ensure that decisions of contracting agencies are reviewed effectively and
rapidly in case of violations of EC procurement directives. 468 The directive stipulates only
necessary measures be taken to ensure compliance. On the other hand, the bid protest review on
the community level is vested to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Furthermore, other regional agreements also require the existence of national review
procedures to facilitate the implementation of procurement rules, such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement of 1992 (NAFTA). Under Article 1017, each party is required to adopt
and maintain bid challenge procedures through a review body with no substantial interest in the
outcome of the procurement process. 469 In contrast to the EU, the decisions of the review body
under NAFTA are not binding because it can only issue recommendations. 470
1.15 Prerequisites or Elements of a Successful Bid Protest System
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of a bid protest system adequately or identify
precisely elements or principles that make a protest process successful. However, one of the
measures might be the confidence of unsatisfied bidders that their protests to decisions of the
contracting officers will be worthwhile. 471 In other words, the bid protest process should create
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an environment of trust among contractors or suppliers that their protests will receive reasonable
review resulting in meaningful remedies in case of meritorious protests. 472 An effective bid
challenge process also helps foster public confidence in the procurement system as a whole. 473
WTO/GPA and the EU Directives indicate some fundamental requirements for the bid
protest mechanisms. The WTO/GPA requires all member states to provide for “nondiscriminatory, timely, transparent, and effective review procedures to suppliers.” 474 The EC
Remedies Directives require that national review systems provide for the requirement of
effective and rapid review, ensure the independence of the reviewing body, and empower the
reviewing body to make specific remedies available to unsatisfied contractors or suppliers. 475
Similarly, the UNCITRAL Model 2011Guide (2011 Guide) identifies almost the same elements
as requirements for the bid protest system of the enacting states. 476
On the other hand, under Order 87, the requirements of the bid protest system in Iraq are:
rapid resolution of protests and availability of effective remedies to unsatisfied bidders or
contractors. 477 Based on the above review, every effective bid protest mechanisms should have
these fundamental elements or requirements in order to be effective: effective and speedy review,
independent review, and finally meaningful remedies. Accordingly, the following chapters
examine the underlying procedures of the bid protest process in achieving the elements of an
effective bid protest system.
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Chapter II
2. The Reflection of the Principle of Transparency in the Procedures Used in the Resolution
of Bid Protests by Review Forums
2.1.1 A General Overview about the Principle of Transparency
The concept of transparency has been considered in recent decades as an essential
element in the efforts of combating organizational and individual irregularities such as corruption
and fraud and in promoting good governance in organizations, whether public or private. 478
Transparency has a broad meaning which covers many fields including; organizational
transparency, accounting and budgetary transparency, administrative transparency, and
documentary transparency. 479 “Transparency rests upon a non-negotiable right to know made
explicit in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 480 It has been defined in
various ways, the most common definition being “opening up of the internal organizational
processes and decisions to third parties, whether or not these third parties are involved in the
organization.” 481 Or “it is defined as the open flow of information.” 482
Transparency is a weapon against secrecy regarding how officials administer public
agencies. According to the New Economics of Organizations (NEO), “governmental actors take
advantage of information asymmetries.” 483 In other words, government organizations are
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monopolies with respect to information because the execution of policies through civil service
creates spaces that are protected from political oversight. 484 In the NEO’s view, public agencies
that provide services monopolistically have little interest in responding to the people
concerned. 485 More importantly, bureaucrats and politicians view secrecy not only as a way to
escape from accountability and punishment but also as an opportunity to serve their private
interests. 486
The NEO examines this asymmetry of information in organizations under the principalagent theory, which has been the most widely used economic model for the analysis of
transparency. 487 In the public procurement area, the principal-agent theory treats the procuring
official as the agent who supposedly works for the principal. 488 The principal may change from a
country to another; in the United States, taxpayers, the executive, or Congress may be viewed as
the principal, while in a monarchy the principal is probably the king. 489
Thus, transparency can be understood as the ability of the principal to observe how the
agent behaves and the consequences of that behavior. 490 This interpretation or understanding of
transparency brings the concept of accountability into the relationship between the principal and
the agent. The purpose of demanding transparency is to hold institutions, even markets,
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accountable for their policies and performance. 491 This strong correlation between transparency
and accountability is likely the reason that they are often considered together.
On the other hand, this concept of openness has also been emphasized in the relationship
between governments and citizens. 492 In other words, widespread transparency in the
performance of public agencies strengthens the trust of the citizens towards such agencies’
honesty. 493 Trust has been defined in numerous ways by scholars. From an organizational
perspective, “trust is a collective judgment of one group that another group will be honest, meet
commitments, and will not take advantage of others.” 494 Another definition of trust is “one
party’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the confidence that the latter party
is (a) benevolent, (b) reliable, (c) competent, (d) honest, and (e) open.” 495
Other scholars argue that “trust in public institutions is enhanced through their
administrative rules, standards, laws, and regulations relating to provision of services and
information.” 496 However, secrecy is a norm in government agencies that makes it difficult for
the people concerned to have information regarding how power is exercised by public officials.
Thus, trust and transparency is an essential indicator for constituents’ satisfaction in the
relationship between citizens and government. 497
The above definitions and explanations indicate that transparency has been mostly
defined to mean the availability of information to the citizens regarding the functions and
491
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performance of public agencies. However, the scope of transparency has been expanded by some
scholars and international organizations to include issues other than the flow of information or
availability of information to the people.
2.1.2 The Principle of Transparency and its Impact on the Decision-Making Process of
Administrative Agencies
Oliver R.W. argues that “transparency in an organization is not only about what is
communicated externally, but about what is right on the inside.” 498 This definition covers also
the impact of transparency on the internal procedures and structures of organizations. He, further,
argues that organizations are under huge pressure to respond to the demand of disclosure of
information which makes them changes the way they operate. 499 As a study about access to
information by the public in Uganda shows, citizens were able to demand certain standards from
officials. 500
In the same context, the NEO suggests a specific strategy to assist in achieving better
transparency in organizations and agencies. First, introducing exogenous motivations for
enhancing transparency, and second, initiation of reforms and improvements in the procedures
and structures of organizations involved in providing services. 501 Finally, the NEA suggests
changing the organizational behaviors in a way that promotes transparency. 502 Their suggestions
require working on the structures and behavior of organizations too, rather than relying only on
the public’s demand for information.

498

Id., at 256.
Id.
500
Supra note 491, at 11.
501
Supra note 483, at 1033.
502
Id.
499

98

In other words, they suggest that for transparency to be promoted, an external
mechanisms requiring availability of information to the public when requested is not sufficient, if
there are not some internal organizational measures in the operation of agencies that translate the
elements of transparency to reality. Although one of the natural consequences of following the
requirement of providing information to the public is perhaps making organizations or agencies
change their behaviors in the long-term, introducing transparency-prone measures internally is
crucial.
Furthermore, international organizations also expand the scope of the concept of
transparency. The WTO adds the enforcement element of laws and regulations to the meaning of
transparency. It stipulates that ensuring transparency in international business agreements
includes three fundamental requirements: (1) availability of information about laws, regulations,
and other policies to the public; (2) notification to interested parties about the changes that occur
to laws and regulations; and (3) ensuring that laws and regulations are administered in a uniform,
impartial, and reasonable manner. 503
Furthermore, the ADB defines transparency as “the availability of information to the
general public and clarity about government rules, regulations, and decisions.” 504 This definition
adds an important element to the concept of transparency which is clarity of the functions and
rules of the public agencies. In addition, according to the IMF, transparency in monetary and
fiscal policy is the “environment in which the objectives of the policy, its legal, institutional and
economic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to
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monetary and financial policies and the accountability of the policymaking body are provided to
the public in an understandable, accessible and timely basis.” 505
2.1.3 The Meaning of Transparency in the Field of Public Procurement
Since transparency has generally several various definitions and meanings, it has also
different meanings and an ambiguous scope in the public procurement field. A scholar describes
transparency in public procurement as “the general idea that procurement should be conducted in
accordance with clear rules which are known to interested parties, and some means of
verification of those rules should be provided.” 506 Transparency under the European Union
procurement regime, the WTO/GPA, and the NAFTA generally means adopting measures to
eliminate discrimination in awarding government contracts through restricting the broad
discretion of procuring officials in a way that prevents discriminatory practices. 507 Under these
treaties, elimination of discrimination is achieved through opening the procurement market by
maximizing competition to allow foreign bidders to participate. 508On the other hand,
transparency under national procurement systems means ensuring fulfilment of core objectives,
including value for money and probity. 509
Although it seems that transparency has different meanings from the perspectives of
national and international procurement systems, the goal is the same to a certain extent, which is
establishing an efficient and clean procurement system. Both systems require competition in
505
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awarding public contracts as a requirement of transparency. More importantly, public
procurement rules have become almost unified because of the WTO/GPA, the EU Directives,
and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Various countries have adopted these three agreements into
their national procurement law. In addition, these agreements also affect each other making them
similar in some major issues.
Thus, as can be seen from this brief overview, the meaning and scope of transparency
means different things in different contexts. However, such ambiguity is more obvious in the
area of public procurement system. Transparency in other fields has been mostly interpreted to
mean the availability of information about the functions of organizations. However, in the public
procurement area it has been interpreted to mean the availability of clear rules and regulations
that govern the procurement sector including some enforcement mechanisms to ensure the
implementation of such rules.
The point of the above discussion regarding the meaning and scope of transparency is to
limit the ambiguities surrounding this term among academics and professionals. When there is a
debate about reducing corruption not only in the public procurement systems but also in the
entire public sector, the first solution is strengthening transparency. However, one cannot easily
determine what kinds of reform and solutions are meant by strengthening transparency. The
academic literature should be more specific about the meaning and scope of this term.
If transparency and rule of law are designed to engender clear rules and regulations for
procurement process, it is necessary to examine the underlying procedures governing public
procurement. There is a widespread consensus among academics and professionals that
enhancing the efficiency and integrity of a procurement system requires increased transparency.
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What has not been examined extensively in the literature is the reflection of the elements of the
principle of transparency and rule of law in the bid protest procedures. In other words, what does
constitute a transparent bid protest system?
The dissertation covers this important issue through examining the underlying procedures
of the Iraqi bid protest system. There are many details involved in the procedures available in the
process of reviewing bid protests that need particular attention because they have an impact on
the effectiveness of the protest mechanism. Most international agreements and model laws leave
detailed rules regarding the national procedures to be supplemented by members according to
their legal traditions and policies. 510 Examples of these details include the discretion of officials
involved in the review process, time limit for submitting and settling a protest, ease of access to
the reviewing bodies, access to documents related to the procurement activity in question, and
the quality of the review. The procedures of reviewing protests by the contracting agency and the
IAT in Iraq will be considered in this dissertation. It will also examine shortages in these
procedures and recommend solutions based on the experience of the United Sates and other
countries.
As discussed in the first chapter, a major requirement of a successful bid protest system
is a speedy and meaningful review of protests. There are two major types of problems with
respect to the bid protest process in Iraq that affect the quality and speediness of the system:
structural problems and procedural problems. Some of the problems are related to the structure
and composition of bodies responsible for reviewing the protests of interested parties. Others are
associated with the procedures that are used in the review process. We will discuss these
problems in the following parts of this chapter.
510
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2.2.1 Structural Problems of the Bid Protest Forums
Structural obstacles are meant that bid protest forums, the CRC, which is widely known
as the agency-level, and the IAT, which is the judicial mechanism for the settlement of bid
protests, are largely centralized because they are all available in the capital city of Baghdad. 511
There are two mechanisms for protest review; one is internal to the procurement system, agencylevel, and the other is external, judicial review and/or independent body. Interestingly, Order 87
does not require the existence of any type of an agency-level bid protest system as it only
requires the establishment of the IAT, the judicial forum, by the OGPCP. 512
The IRGC, however, requires that there should be an agency-level mechanism to accept
protests from unsatisfied bidders. 513 The dissertation analyzes the structural problem in two
separate parts. The first part examines advantages and disadvantages of having multiple protest
forums and the structure and composition of each protest mechanisms in Iraq. The second part
examines the centralization of the bid protest review systems and its potential impact on the
effectiveness of the review process.
2.2.2 Multiple Forums for the Resolution of Bid Protests
The structure of the forum review to determine where to locate the review and whether to
establish a tiered review system or a main forum has a great impact on the function of the system
because different options have different advantages and disadvantages. 514 Many jurisdictions
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recognize the existence of multiple forums for reviewing bid protests. 515 Generally speaking,
there are three major forums for the resolution of bid protests; agency-level, independent
administrative review, and judicial review.
In addition, regional and international organizations that deal with the public procurement
issues also recognize the multiple review forums. The UNCITRAL Model Law suggests a threetiered review system, while the WTO/GPA and the EU require only one level of review, but they
allow member states to have additional forums. 516 The availability of multiple protest review has
been debated in the literature of public procurement studies. There are advantages and
disadvantages of the multiple protest forums.
Several advantages of having multiple protest forums can be identified. First, it is
creating competition between various forums in reviewing bid protests. 517 Each forum tries to
resolve the protest in the best way it can in terms of ease of access, providing for cheap and
simple procedures, quality of review, and rapid issuance of protest decisions. Second, the
suggested competition among rival forums might engender innovation in the procedures used in
the resolution of the protests in order to make each forum more attractive to protesters. 518
Third, multiple forums provide choices to protesters to seek review from the forum that
best suits its need. If protesters do not feel that the agency-level, for instance, is independent
enough and they want to avoid a lengthy and costly judicial review, they have an option to file
515
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their protest to the independent administrative body. In contrast, when protesters believe that
their protest might get an answer from the contracting agency, they can file their protest to the
agency especially the agency review is very simple and quick. In addition, if they want an
independent review with an enforceable decision, they can seek the courts for review.
There are, however, three basic disadvantages to the availability of multiple protest
forums. First, it leads to an increase in government’s spending for administering and maintaining
these forums, including hiring staff and buildings for offices. 519 Second, “maintaining numerous
dispute venues increases the possibilities for confusion among offerors and government
purchasing agencies as multiple forums apply differing jurisdictional standards.” 520 For instance,
there will be various time limits, different rules for the review, and different time frame for
making decisions on the protest. Finally, the possibilities of issuing conflicting decisions on the
same issues would be much higher than in a one-forum jurisdiction. 521
2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Forum
Several important advantages can be identified for the agency-level protest mechanism.
First, as the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL points out, the agency level provides an
opportunity to the procuring entity to correct its wrongful decision with minimum disruption of
the procurement process. 522 In some instances, the contracting agency may be quite willing to
correct a defect because it might not have been aware of the problem in the first place, especially
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before the award of the contract. 523 For instance, the contracting agency can correct a problem in
the technical specifications that resulted in wrongfully excluding some bidders. 524
Second, informal procedures for the resolution of protests and ease of access by
protesters do not require specific forms and paying fees as in the case of the judicial forum.
Third, the non-adversarial character of the agency level mechanism is the basis for its
efficiencies and carries the capability of circumventing concerns of potential suppliers about
taking on their governments in litigation. 525 This character is very helpful for the unsatisfied
supplier because if a problem can be fixed in a simple and quick way, the contractor may
continue to participate in the competition.526 “It is also helpful for the contracting agency to
create images of open, responsive, and accountable government by remedying its mistakes by
itself as quickly as possible.” 527 Further, both protesters and the government save resources,
including both time and money. 528
The agency-level mechanism has some disadvantages, however. First, the fundamental
criticism of the agency-level mechanism is lack of independence and impartiality of the review
process, which is quasi-judicial. 529 Unsatisfied bidders may believe that it is difficult for the
contracting agency to admit that there were improprieties in the procurement, 530 “either to keep
prestige or authority or because of [the] procurement officer’s corruption.” 531 Second, the
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procuring agency acts like a judge and interested party at the same time. 532 Thus, this practice
could constitute a breach of the duties of avoiding conflicts of interest.
On the other hand, the advantages of an independent administrative body are
multifaceted. First, such a body enjoys a much higher degree of independence and impartiality
which can be reassuring for bidder’s intent on filing a protest. 533 Second, if the potential
administrative body has no responsibilities except for procurement matters, it may bring
expertise to the bid protest review process making its decisions be efficient and respected by the
parties. 534 In contrast, the disadvantage of an independent review body is additional cost to the
government and the possibility that the administrative body might be weaker than the contracting
agency it is meant to supervise. 535 This could make it difficult for the administrative body to
collect the documents and facts necessary to resolve the protest or to enforce its decision. 536
Advantages of the judicial review are both independence and ability of enforcing its
decisions. 537 The judicial review involves extensive procedural rules and guarantees, including
access to all proceedings, both sides being heard, publicity of the review, and the ability of both
parties to present witnesses. 538 In addition, there is also a requirement for the submission of
evidence which allows the court to compel the contracting agency to provide relevant
documents. 539 This power is essential in resolving procurement disputes because contracting
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agencies usually possess important documents and sometimes decline to provide them to the
review body. 540
Yet, the judicial forum has its own problems or disadvantages. First, although the
procedural requirements or guarantees required in resolving cases enhance the independence of
judicial review, such elaborate and complicated procedures make the review costly, slow, and
time-consuming. 541 Second, a court with general jurisdiction may have little experience in public
procurement matters which can slow down the resolution of protests. 542 Finally, the
confrontational nature of judicial review may lead to sensitivities in the relationship of the
parties. 543
2.3.1 Centralization of the Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism in Iraq
Under the IRGC, there is in every ministry, non-cabinet agency, provincial councils, or
regions 544 a CRC granted the power to receive and review bid protests. 545 This central committee
reports directly to the minister concerned, the head of the agency which is not a cabinet
department, or the governor. 546 Indeed all Iraqi ministries along with major agencies that are not
part of the cabinet are headquartered in the capital city of Baghdad. This means that there are
several CRCs according to the number of the ministries, other non-cabinet agencies, and
provinces in Iraq.
The agency-level bid protest mechanisms available to interested parties are all in
Baghdad, except for the existence of a CRC in every province. This centralized bid protest
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system might be explained by the fact that Iraq was historically a highly centralized state,
notwithstanding the administrative decentralization and self-governing for the Kurds that were
adopted since the 1970 Interim Constitution. 547 Without regard to this theoretical
decentralization, all the powers were entirely in the hands of the officials in Baghdad. These
provincial units and the self-governing administrations were in fact merely an image of the
central government, despite the constitutional provisions regarding the political and
administrative systems.
Although the 2005 Constitution replaced the centralization with a federal and
decentralized system, the influence of actual centralization for decades is still widespread in the
day-to-day activities of government institutions. In other words, federalism and decentralization
has been adopted formally by the constitution, but centralization is still highly practiced on the
ground. Officials in all Iraqi ministries and government agencies do not have sufficient
experience with a federal and decentralized system and how it really works.
Nonetheless, not all of the CRCs are centralized according to the IRGC. As discussed
above, there are other CRCs formed in the offices of Provincial Councils in every province. 548
These CRCs are decentralized and deal with protests that are brought to the council regarding
government contracts awarded by such councils under their special budgets. The Provincial
Councils in Iraq have their own budget which is different from the budget that is spent by
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ministries of the federal government. 549 Thus, for the contract award controversies conducted by
the Provincial Councils, the agency-level bid protest system is decentralized because unsatisfied
bidders do not need to submit their protests to the CRCs at the headquarters of various ministries
in Baghdad. However, unsatisfied bidders protesting to procurement activities conducted by
Provincial Councils still need to seek the capital for submitting protests to the IAT.
2.3.2 Problems Associated with Centralization of the Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism
The centralized system of protest review creates a couple of problems that discourages
unsatisfied bidders from filing protests by ignoring meritorious protests. The centralized system
makes access to protest review mechanism difficult. If a contractor decides to challenge an
award decision of a government contract in Basra, it has to go to Baghdad, almost 600 km from
Basra, to the ministry responsible for the award to submit its protest. Although one might argue
that submission of protests can be performed through mail or electronic means such as email and
fax to mitigate the access problem, in person submission of protests is highly likely because of
three major reasons.
First, Iraq does not currently have an efficient and active postal service that can be relied
upon, especially for sensitive issues and documents like bid protests. The postal system suffers
from chronic delays and inaccessibility and lost packages are quite common. Sending packages
from one city to another can take from 10 days to three weeks, if they arrive at all. While the
time limit for submitting protests to the CRCs is only 7 days from the date of the award
decision. 550 On the other hand, there is a special communication method usually used in Iraqi
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public institutions to contact other agencies or the private sector when it is necessary. This
method is a formal postage system in which a specific official is being appointed as the postman
for the agency (Agency Postman). 551
Government agencies dispatch their formal letters to other public institutions or private
sector through the Agency Postman. Formal letters are not sent immediately after they have been
prepared. Instead, a government agency awaits until it collects enough letters and then sends
them all together. This is true especially when the parties concerned in those letters are in
another city. Yet, even this mechanism has proven to be inefficient because there are always
problems with it, including denial of the concerned agency named of receiving the letter.
However, the Agency Postman system is better than the government postal service. There are a
few private postal companies, but their capacities are still very limited and expensive.
Second, little reliance on technology for communication is one of the major reasons that
exacerbate the issue of accessibility. The method of communications among agencies in Iraq is
still traditional. Receiving the actual official letterhead is a requirement for someone or agencies
to pursue their regular works before a public agency. Even sending official letterhead through
emails or fax will not be accepted by public agencies in Iraq. Formalities are still strictly allowed
to. Nevertheless, sometimes in some agencies electronic communications are accepted among
their branches but they reject to accept that from a different agency or from individuals and
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firms. However, even in the case that formal letters have been sent electronically to a particular
agency, an actual original letter is still required later on. 552
Reasons for little reliance on electronic communications could include the lack of
availability of good internet services except for ministries and other major agencies that have
reliable connections to electricity. There are several internet providers in the country, but speed
and performance is really poor. Another reason is that most high level officials are unaccustomed
to internet and other modern electronic equipment. The only way of formal communications for
them is through formal letterhead. In addition, the government has not passed comprehensive
laws and regulations requiring government agencies to use electronic means in formal
communications. Thus, in the absence of a legal framework for utilizing electronic
communications in the official arena, the binding effect of those communications is questionable.
Thus, agencies are reluctant in relying on them. Finally, corruption and abuse of power are of the
reasons that make it difficult to rely on postal services and electronic means for submitting
protests. Even assuming that government agencies accept protests submitted by emails or postal
services, one needs to pursue a personal follow-up for each stages of the process of transferring
the protest to the right committee. The majority of government officials do not perform their
duties with loyalty and seriousness.
Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, it should be noted that many officials are
not motivated to work properly for several reasons. These include poor salary, lack of
accountability, and/or intervention of politicians and senior officials in the day-to-day work of
agencies. In addition, officials prefer direct contact with visitors in order to have a chance to
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obtain bribes, gifts, or any other benefits or favors from contractors. Even if officials are honest,
they still have no motivation to be efficient. Thus, personal intervention is required from
interested parties to government agencies to finish their paper works. This phenomenon is true
almost for all public institutions in Iraq.
2.3.3 The Relationship between Centralization and the Distribution of Procurement Powers
The reason that lawmakers adopted a centralized bid protest system is probably related to
the structure of the distribution of administrative powers generally and public procurement
powers specifically. Order 87 states that the power to “obligate government funds, award and
sign contracts shall be vested either with a qualified government agency or a committee within
each governmental unit or agency duly appointed under the authority of this order.” 553 In fact,
the IRGC implements the requirement of Order 87 as every contracting agency is required to
establish a procurement department called the Public Contract Division (PCD). 554
The PCDs, according to an administrative order from the OGPCP, are responsible for the
implementation and follow-up of public contracts awarded by government agencies. 555 The
PCDs consist of two major committees: the Tender-Opening Committee (TOC) and the
Evaluation and Analysis Committee (EAC). 556 The TOC’s role is to publicly open the tenders
submitted after the deadline for submitting tenders is passed in the presence of the offerors that
competed for the contract. 557 In addition, the TOC is required to prepare a comprehensive report
to the EAC. Such a report includes, for instance, ensuring that the deposit has been paid for every
tender submitted and checking the numbers of papers of each tender. It also ensures that each
553
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page of the tender is signed by the offeror as required by the procurement law and regulations,
and stamps all pages of the tenders. 558 Finally, it forwards the comprehensive report to the EAC
to select the winner. 559
On the other hand, the role of the EAC is crucial because it has the power to remove
tenders from the competition that do not meet the requirements and excludes contractors with
bad performance based on previous experience. 560 It can also determine the financial and
technical capacity of the offeror, and identify the best tenders submitted as well as the contractor
that should be awarded the contract. 561 As mentioned above, the EAC only has the power to
recommend which contractor should be awarded the contract. 562 The final decision to select the
winner is vested with the head of the agency concerned such as ministers, heads of non-cabinet
agencies, or governors. 563
The IRGC is silent on the details of the duties of the PCDs and does not grant the PCD
the power to enter into contractual relationship. Nevertheless, the PCDs are allowed to sign
contracts, but only after the head of the agency approves the award of such a contract selected by
the EAC. 564 This process is problematic and delays the contracting procedures because
sometimes it takes a long time to get the approval of the head of the agency: ministers, heads of
independent agencies, governors and so on. It is an unnecessary step that undermines the efforts
of the EAC to examine all tenders and evaluate them.
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For example, a contractor who submitted a tender to a contract with the Ministry of
Industry and Minerals and won the competition still had to challenge the decision of the Ministry
to force the contractor to sign the contract through a judicial decision. 565 The contractor refused
to sign the contract because under Provision 19 of the solicitation, the offer was to be valid at
least until after three months from the date the agency was supposed to close the competition
which was 04/26/2010. 566 Indeed, the agency closed the competition on 04/26/2010 and the EAC
recommended on 05/30/2010 that the contact be awarded to the current protesting contractor. 567
The reason behind the refusal of the protesting contractor was that the agency received
the approval of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals on 09/21/2010 and then the agency
notified the contractor about the award decision and asked it to come forward to sign the
contract. 568 The contractor rejected to sign the contract based on Provision 19, mentioned above,
because the notification came late. 569 Accordingly, the agency imposed some severe sanctions on
the contractor including blacklisting, which prevent the contractor from participating in any
procurement. 570 As a result, the contractor brought a lawsuit against the agency before the IAT.
The IAT agreed with the contractor, but decided that the court cannot demand the
contractor to come forward and sign the contract. 571 It stated that the agency should have
contacted the contractor by no later than 07/26/2010 based on the provisions of the tender.572
Furthermore, the court stated that after the date 07/26/2010, the contractor is not bound by its
offer even though the award was issued to it and it cannot also be forced to sign the contract
565
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except voluntarily. 573 In addition, the IAT disagreed with the agency that the delay of having the
approval decision of the head of the agency is common. 574 The court stated that such delay
should not affect the right of the contractor under the tender provisions. 575 The Federal Supreme
Court (FSC) sustained the decision of the IAT. 576
The IRGC does not rely on Order 87 in determining which official or committees have
the contracting power. Instead, it relies on the Implementing Regulations of the Iraqi Budget
Law of 2013 (IRIBL) which is usually issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the
MOP. 577 The IRIBL identifies the rules and procedures of public spending that all public
institutions must follow. Article 3 of the IRGC requires every agency to follow the financial
powers set forth in the IRIBL when they decide to contract for the procurement of goods and
services. 578 Further, it states that the head of the agency’s approval is subject to the financial
power set forth in relevant regulation. 579 Although the IRGC does not mention the IRIBL
specifically, it is clear that these financial powers are solely mentioned in the IRIBL as
complementary or interpreting regulations for the annual budget law.
The IRBIL states that relevant ministers, heads of non-cabinet agencies or region,
governors, or presidents of provincial councils have the power to authorize spending public
funds from the budget, including, among other things, the purchase of goods and services. 580
Although the text does not mention the contracting authority clearly, the purchase of goods and
services always conducted by government agencies through public contracts. In other words,
573
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entering into contractual relationships to obtain goods or services is a form of spending public
fund.
The IRGC, by implementing the provisions of the IRIBL with respect to awarding
contracting authority, contradicts Order 87. Thus, the IRGC violates the major principle of
hierarchy of the legislative sources which are: (a) constitution, (b) treaties, (c) parliamentary
statues, (d) government regulations. 581 The principle of hierarchy, which is an important aspect
of the French civil law system adopted by many countries, including Iraq, dictates that a norm
lower in the hierarchy must comply with the higher norms. 582
In other words, parliamentary statues cannot contradict a provision of the constitution or
government regulations cannot contradict with parliamentary statues. In the case of the IRGC,
the IRGC, which is considered government regulations, contradicted Order 87, which has been
enforced as a parliamentary statue. The IRGC complied with the IRIBL which is considered
government regulations instead of Order 87. This contradiction should automatically make the
IRGC’s provisions granting contracting power to the head of the agencies void.
The IRGC by contradicting Order 87 strengthens the centralization of powers in public
procurement activities especially in the bid protest procedures. Order 87 intends to decentralize
the power to enter into contracts by vesting it “solely with a qualified government agency or a
committee within each governmental unit or agency.” 583 Furthermore, Order 87 does not
mention heads of the agencies to be granted the power to conclude public contracts. The IRGC
plainly centralizes the process. Order 87 cannot be a mistake on part of the CPA.
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In compliance with the centralized pattern of distribution of bureaucratic powers, the
decisions of the CRCs formed in every ministry under the authority of Order 87 to settle protests
filed by unsatisfied bidders are not binding. Such decisions are recommendations subject to the
approval of the “head of the agency.” 584 Consequently, the agency-level bid protest mechanism
is also centralized in its structure and function. Considering the way procurement powers are
distributed, centralization might be the only logical consequence.
As long as the lower-level officials are not allowed to enter into or conclude public
contracts, they cannot make a decision about a protest. In other words, the authority allowing
rejection or approval of a protest is probably considered to be subsidiary to the power to enter
into contractual relationships. Thus, the official who has the power to conclude public contracts,
she or he presumably has the power to decide bid protests unless there is delegation.
On the other hand, the officials of the OGPCP might have been influenced by the
UNCITRAL Model Law in making the agency-level bid protest system centralized. Order 87
states that the OGPCP is to be guided by the recognized principles and practices adopted in the
UNCITRAL Model Law, the EU Directives, and WTO/GPA in preparing the IRGC. 585 Under
the UNCITRAL Model Law 1994, a bid protest must be submitted to the head of the procuring
entity at the first instance. 586 However, if the complaint is based on an act or decision that is
subject to approval by another authority, the protest must be submitted to that approving
authority as the case may be. 587 It seems that the UNCITRAL Model Law intends to embrace
this process as an acknowledgement of the phenomenon of centralized distribution of power in
some member countries.
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2.4 The Structure of the Agency-Level Bid Protest under International and Regional
Agreements
None of the WTO/GPA and the EU Directives covers in detail the underlying structure
and procedures of the agency-level bid protest system. Article XX of the WTO/GPA stipulates
that, in the event of a protest raised because of a breach of the agreement, the contractor is
encouraged to seek first resolution of the problem through consultation with the procuring
agency. 588 Thus, there is no requirement for the existence of an agency-level bid protest
mechanism as a complete system with detailed procedures. Instead, the GPA just encourages
recourse to the procuring agency and leaves the existence of the agency-level protest mechanism
to the discretion of member countries. In addition, it does not define what “the procuring
agency” is in order to give some guidance in this regard.
With respect to the EU rules, there are two EC Remedies Directives: (1) Directive 89/665
on the coordination of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to the
application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, and
(2) Directive 92/13 coordinating the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to
the application of Union rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,
energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors (EU Remedies Directives).
Similar to the WTO/GPA, both of the Remedies Directives require member states to
“ensure that the review procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States
may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular
contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.” 589 As seen from
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the text neither of the Directives requires the existence of an agency-level bid protest mechanism
in the member states. Instead, they leave the form of domestic review procedures, including the
agency-level, to the legal and administrative systems of the member states. What is required
under the two Directives is the existence of a review system that is based on three fundamental
principles; the principle of effectiveness, the principle of non-discrimination, and the principle of
procedural autonomy. 590 The last principle leaves member states with wide discretion as to the
creation of appropriate forum to receive complaints against the decisions of procuring agencies
that violate the Union laws on procurement.
2.5.1 Delegation of Contracting Authority
FAR33.103 states that “contracting officers shall consider all protests and seek legal
advice, whether protests are submitted before or after award or whether filed directly with the
agency or the GAO.” 591 In addition, FAR stipulates that all protests submitted directly with the
agency shall be addressed to the contracting officer or other officials designated to receive
protests. 592 Nonetheless, protests are mostly submitted to the contracting officer. 593 Who a
contracting officer is under the United States law must be defined. Under the FAR “contracting
officers have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related
determinations and findings.” 594 The contracting officers are to be determined to the public based
on the fundamental rule that the United States government is not bound by unauthorized acts of
its officers or agents. 595
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Similar to Iraq, the power to enter into contractual relationships is mainly vested to the
head of the agency. The FAR 1.601 states that “unless specifically prohibited by another
provision of law, authority and responsibility to contract for authorized supplies and services are
vested in the agency head.” 596 However, the agency head may establish contracting activities or
sections and delegate broad authority to heads of these contracting units.” 597 Thus, contracting
officers may bind the Government only to the extent of the authority delegated to them.” 598
As a result, “contracts may be entered into and signed on behalf of the Government only
by contracting officers.” 599 In some agencies, a relatively small number of high level officials are
designated contracting officers solely by virtue of their positions.600 Nevertheless, contracting
officers below the level of a head of a contracting unit may be selected and appointed
under 1.603. 601 Thus, there are two groups of officials with the power to enter into contractual
relationships. At the upper level of the agency, in secretarial positions or as heads of the
contracting units, officials have contracting authority by virtue of their positions.602 Although
these high-ranking officials have full contracting authority, they do not exercise it themselves
except on special circumstances. 603 Other contracting officers are called designated contracting
officers that are lower-level officials appointed under 1.603. 604
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2.5.2 Delegation of Contracting Authority and the Power to Receive Bid Protests under the
Iraqi Procurement Law
In general, the distribution of administrative power in Iraq is still centralized. The
majority of administrative authorities is in the hand of the Ministers or Heads of non-cabinet
agencies. This fact is one of the reasons of the delay that the public suffer when they seek
services from the government. For instance, often an appointment application will not be
answered for months simply because the minister is on vacation or there are so many
applications that she/he cannot finish them on time. Every ministry has, at least, one or several
general directorates in every province to perform the works of the ministry in these cities and
each directorate is headed by a director general. 605 Similarly, non-cabinet agencies have a major
office in every province and headed by a director. 606
Directors general are usually authorized by ministries or heads of non-cabinet agencies to
make decisions regarding certain matters whether substantial, such as in administrative routines,
or insignificant, with respect to financial matters. Since the re-delegation is subject to the sole
discretion of the officials holding power, there are great disparities in the power each director
general possesses. In other words, it is not clear to what extent senior officials re-delegate their
powers to directors general especially the power to authorize spending from public funds through
contracting.
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Contracting authorities under the procurement system of the United States and Iraq are
vested in the first place with the head of the agency. 607 In the case of the Iraqi system, Order 87
does not mention “agency head”, “head of the contracting agency”, or any other words indicating
the same meaning in any of its provisions. The reason for the absence of these terms is related to
the fact that Order 87 does not grant contracting power to the head of the agencies. Instead,
Order 87 grants such power to the “contracting authority” that is to be a specially-qualified
government agency or a committee within every government agency. 608 Nonetheless, the
situation under Order 87 and the IRGC is complicated and confusing. 609
The confusion is caused by the conflict mentioned above between Order 87 and the IRGC
in awarding contracting powers. 610 Although the IRGC mentions the term “head of the
contracting agency” on several occasions, there is no specific definition of this term in the IRGC
in its provisions. In order to identify the officials that have contracting power, the IRGC adopts
the provisions of the IRIBL to determine which officials can authorize spending from public
fund including through contracting activities. Under the IRIBL, the agency head is defined to
mean exclusively high-ranking officials including; ministers, governors, heads of non-cabinet
agencies, and heads of Provincial Councils. 611
On the other hand, “agency head” or “head of the agency” has been defined, under the
FAR and it includes not only the top high-ranking officials such as secretaries, heads of
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independent agencies, or governors but also other senior officials working under the supervision
of these senior officials. 612 Furthermore, the principle under the FAR is delegation of broad
contracting authority from the head of the agency to other officials. 613 Thus, the United States’
procurement system distributes contracting powers through the provisions of the FAR as a broad
range of officials have been included in the definition of the head of the agency. In other words,
the FAR distributes or decentralizes contracting powers through delegation by force of law and
does not leave it with the sole discretion of the senior officials originally granted the power as in
the case of Iraq. 614
A general rule under the Iraqi administrative law system is that delegation is accepted
only where a relevant law or regulation allows the person holding the power originally to
delegate it to another official. 615 Any delegation that is not based on a law or regulation is void.
The IRIBL allows senior officials to delegate the power of spending public funds through
contracting to other officials. Nevertheless, the power to receive and review protests under the
IRGC is vested to the CRC without mentioning anything about delegation. 616
The IRGC is silent on the delegation of the power to receive and review protests by
CRCs. Thus, the CRC, according to the requirement of the existence of a law or regulation
allowing delegation, is not allowed to delegate its power to other officials. In addition, there is
another obstacle that does not permit delegation. The CRC is allowed only to review protests and
make recommendations to the head of the agency. Thus, the final decision to sustain or reject the
612
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protest is in the hands of heads of agencies. No official may delegate a power that he does not
have it in the first place.
There is another argument against the delegation of the power to review bid protests by
senior officials. The IRIBL allows senior officials to delegate only contracting authority to
lower-level officials. It is silent about delegation of the power to review bid protests. Thus, it is
not safe to assume that the delegation of contracting authority according to the IRIBL includes
delegation of the power to review bid protests from unsatisfied bidders. There is no specific way
to interpret this silence as permitting the delegation. It is safe to assume the contrary.
2.6.1 Centralization of the IAT or the Judicial Forums
Both Order 87 and the IRGC cover the procedures of how to submit bid protests to the
IAT. The IAT is also centralized as there is one IAT located in the capital. Order 87 is silent on
the issue of where the IAT is to be located and the possibility of having several IATs in the
country. However, there is, according to the IRGC, in fact only one administrative court for
reviewing bid protests which is the IAT. 617 In addition, the IRGC requires the IAT to be housed
in the building of the MOP in Baghdad. 618
In addition, the centralized bid protest system is more damaging to the protests
potentially brought to the IAT because the IAT is a judicial forum in the bid protest system that
must follow, according to the IRGC, strict procedures of the LCP in settling protests. Article 10
states that the IAT is to be guided by the LCP in any matter that has not been covered by the
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IRGC. 619 Except for the timeliness for the IAT to decide the protests, the IRGC is silent on all
other procedures the IAT must follow in settling a protest. 620
If a potential unsatisfied bidder files a protest to the IAT from another city, it will be very
difficult for such bidder to follow the case. It has to travel to Baghdad every time the IAT needs
a document, testimony, or any other request necessary for resolving the case. This difficulty can
be reduced through hiring a lawyer. Nevertheless, the way lawyers work in Iraq is very different
in terms of resolving disputes. In addition, relying on lawyers obviously increases costs,
especially for small businesses which do not have adequate resources.
2.6.2 Constitutional Problems in the Establishment of the IAT
Order 87 created the IAT as the sole judicial forum for protests raised by unsatisfied
offerors. The establishment of the IAT by Order 87 contradicts the Constitution and the laws
regulating the judicial branch. Under Article 90 of the Constitution, the federal judicial power is
comprised of the Higher Juridical Council (HJC), the FSC, the Federal Court of Cassation
(FCC), the Public Prosecution Department (PPD), the Judiciary Oversight Commission (JOC),
and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law. 621
The HJC is responsible for the organization of the judicial bodies and a special law
regulates its composition, jurisdictions, and the rules of its operation. 622 Parliament enacted the
Higher Juridical Council Law (HJCL) in 2012 which emphasized the supervisory role of the HJC
over the judicial bodies in Iraq from the administrative point of view. Thus, the HJC does not
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intervene in the decision-making process by the courts except administratively. 623 Its role is to
supervise the appointment, promotion, and suspension of judges, public prosecutors, officials of
the various courts, as well as establishment of the buildings and facilities of the judicial
institutions.624
Finally, the tradition based on the constitutional and the HJC provisions in Iraq was that
that the HJC is to be responsible for the establishment of any judicial institutions including
courts. 625 The mechanism is that the relevant body or agency must submit a request explaining
the purposes behind establishing a judicial body based on a relevant law that requires such an
establishment and the HJC decides on the matter. 626 Consequently, the establishment of a court
by the OGPCP, according to Order 87 and by the Minister of Planning under the IRGC, was
neither legal nor acceptable. 627
On the other hand, the establishment of a court by the OGPCP which is a department of a
specific ministry could jeopardize the principle of separation of powers. If the executive branch
is allowed to establish a body that has a judicial character, this step might be considered an
intervention in the affairs of the judicial branch. Although the IRGC determines that the judge of
the IAT shall be appointed by the HJC, the entire establishment of the tribunal vested with the
Minister of Planning.
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The only reasonable explanation as to why this power is vested with the OGPCP by
Order 87 is again the major problem that accompanied all Orders, Regulations, or Memorandums
issued by the CPA. This problem is lack of knowledge regarding the Iraqi legal and
administrative system on part of the CPA. Further, legal scholars, judges, law practitioners have
not been involved by the CPA in the enactment of its orders and regulations. However, the IRGC
exacerbated the problem by depriving the OGPCP from the power to create the IAT as Order 87
dictates and granting this power to the Minister of Planning. 628
2.6.3 What the CPA Should Have Done to Avoid a Conflict with Iraqi Legal System
It should not have been difficult or complicated for the CPA to decentralize the judicial
mechanism for bid protest settlements, in compliance with the existing judicial structure of Iraq.
The structure of the judicial system for the most part is decentralized. Under the Law of Judicial
Organization (LJO), there is one or more civil court for the first instance in every province or
town. 629 In fact, the Ministry of Justice has discretion to place a civil court in a district. 630 In
addition, one or more criminal court, again based on the minister’s discretion, can be established
in the center of each province. 631
Consequently, it was possible and more compatible with the Iraqi judicial system for
Order 87 to require the existence of an administrative tribunal in every province to review bid
protests. This solution conforms well to the new political system of the country as it adopted
federalism and decentralization.632 Under the federalism and decentralization, a considerable
amount of public fund is spent through the provincial councils. Under the Iraqi constitution,

628

See Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2.1(B) (ii).
The Law of Judicial Organization (LJO) No. 60 (1979) of Iraq, Art. 21(1).
630
Id.
631
Id., Art. 29(1 & 2).
632
The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 1, 116 & 122.
629

128

every provincial council has its own budget for providing services to the public within the
boundary of the province. 633
On the other hand, if the CPA had proper knowledge of the Iraqi legal and administrative
structure, it would have avoided establishing the IAT. The Council of State Law No. 65 (1979)
(CSL) established for the first time in Iraq the administrative court. The council of state has
several major functions such as administrative adjudication, checking the wordings, preparing,
analyzing and reviewing bills, and issuing opinions regarding legal issues facing public
institutions. 634 Thus, the Council of State is the major administrative consultation and
adjudication forum for the state of Iraq since 1979, and could have been used in the bid protest
system.
Under Article 7 of the CSL, there are two separate courts in the Council of State: first, the
Court of Administrative Adjudication (CAA); second, the Court for Public Officials’
Adjudication (COA). 635 The jurisdiction of the CAA is to review administrative decisions and
orders issued by government agencies where a party to which the complaint is directed has not
been identified by any law or regulations. 636 In other words, if a relevant law or regulations
determines specific procedures for challenging a government decision, the interested party must
follow these procedures and the CAA cannot decide such a complaint.
For instance, Order 87 and the IRGC set the procedures of filing a bid protest where an
interested party is not satisfied with a decision of a contracting agency. If an interested party files
633
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a complaint to the CAA regarding a decision related to the public procurement activity, the CAA
must refuse to decide the complaint because a particular law, Order 87 and the IRGC, determines
the party or body that can receive these kinds of complaints. On the other hand, the COA’s
jurisdiction covers only claims made by government officials against public agencies based on
the Civil Service Act (CSA) or any other laws that govern the relationship between a government
official and the agency working for. 637
Under Article 7, an administrative decision is void if it contains one of the following
problems:
(i) If the order or decision violates laws, regulations, or bylaws of the agency,
(ii) If the order or decision under question is issued in violation of the rules of
competence, defective in its form or procedures, or based on a defective reason or
subject,
(iii) If the order or decision contains a mistake in implementing laws, regulations,
or bylaws, or there is a wrongful interpretation of such laws or regulations.
(iv) If the order or decision is abusive or arbitrary. 638
The CSL does not mention government contracts as one of the bases of challenging
administrative decisions or orders issued by government agencies. This statement, however, does
not mean that all aspects of government contracts are beyond the jurisdiction of the CAA. There
are some preliminary steps in the formation of public contracts that are considered administrative
decisions. For instance, decisions disqualifying contractors from participating in tender
procedures, provisions specifying time limits for submitting tenders, the decision of selecting the
winning contractor, are some examples. 639
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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

In other words, the jurisdiction of the council or the CAA does not include in any way
disputes arising out of a public contract. Nonetheless, other disputes that do not arise from the
contract, which are mostly conducted unilaterally by the agency and before the conclusion of the
contract, is subject to the administrative court in both France and Egypt. 640 This approach is
639F

called “the doctrine of separate administrative actions.” 641 Since a bid protest is mostly related to
640F

the preliminary steps of awarding a public contract not the actual contract, it falls under the
category of administrative decisions and is thus properly subject to the jurisdiction of the
administrative court.
The point is that the CPA could have avoided establishing the IAT, if it had studied
carefully the legal and administrative system of the state of Iraq. The purpose of establishing the
IAT under the CPA was solely to receive and review bid protests made by unsatisfied bidders.
Unsatisfied bidders submit bid protests based on a decision of an agency regarding some steps
that occurs before the conclusion of the contract. Thus, the CAA that was already wellestablished in Iraq under the CSL in 1979 was a perfect vehicle as the judicial forum for the bid
protest review. Further, the CAA gained some good experience settling complains from
individuals and government officials against the government since 1979.
2.7 Procedural Problems
The theme of this dissertation is the role of procedures followed by government agencies
and courts for the resolution of bid protests in achieving the major requirements of successful bid
protest mechanisms. This part of the dissertation is dedicated to the examination of several major
procedures such as the form of bid protests, the parties that are allowed to submit protests, time
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limit for filing protests, and remedies available for unsatisfied bidders. By improving the
procedures of submitting and reviewing protests, the bid protest system can be more effective in
tackling corruption and abuse. However, it would be more logical to start with the issue of
alternative dispute resolution before involving in the details of bid protest forums.
2.8 The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Bid Protest System
In some jurisdictions, before the initiation of a bid protest, contractors are required to
seek first a solution to the problem from the contracting agencies. According to the US system,
“prior to submission of an agency protest, all parties shall use their best efforts to resolve
concerns raised by an interested party at the contracting officer level through open and frank
discussions.” 642 The UNCITRAL Model Law provides for a similar approach stipulating that
“unless the complaint is resolved by mutual agreement of the supplier or contractor that
submitted it, the procuring entity shall within 30 days after the submission of the complaint issue
a written decision.” 643
Thus, the Law Model points out that if the problem raised by the protester can be
resolved through mutual agreement between the parties, the agency does not need to go further
with the protest. Order 87 states that “in resolving all disputes (i.e., whether they are tender
protests or claims during administration of a public contract), principles of alternative dispute
resolution shall be used to the maximum extent possible, so long as both parties agree.” 644 The
IRGC, on the other hand, provides for alternative dispute resolution only for claims or disputes
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that arise in the administration of a public contract and is silent on the issue of resolution bid
protests through alternative dispute resolution. 645
This approach is helpful to avoid delay and costs associated with the formal resolution of
protests, but at the same time it seems problematic. What if the issue that has been raised by a
contractor relates to the integrity of the procurement system? The agency might seek to protect
itself by resolving the particular dispute informally, thus avoiding public disclosure of wrong
doing, since the resolution occurs only between the contracting agency and the protesting
contractors. Yet, in most procurement activities, it is not only the contractor that raised the issue
who has an interest in the procurement, but also all other competitive contractors.
Thus, ADR is helpful only when it is conducted in a transparent way, requiring informing
other contractors about the issue that has been raised and the content of the solution or agreement
that the agency and the protesting contractor are about to reach. Generally when there is a protest
agencies are required to inform other contractors about it. Thus, for this step to work, agencies
should be required to adhere to certain transparency measures such as informing other
contractors and providing for open and frank discussions to reach an agreement. Otherwise ADR
mechanisms might actually contribute to bidding corrupt practices.
2.9 The Form of Bid Protests
Since there are two different forums for reviewing bid protests under the Iraqi
procurement laws and regulations, the coverage of the procedures involved would be more
reasonable to be separate. The agency-level is a much simpler, cheaper, and faster process than
the judicial review conducted by the IAT. The IRGC does not require conditions for the form
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and content of the bid protest except that it should be in writing. 646 In addition, it requires that in
order for the protest to be accepted, the protester must not withdraw the deposit submitted as a
requirement to participate in the bidding process. 647 On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Model
Law only requires the protest to be in writing without setting forth other conditions. 648 The law
in the United States law requires that the agency protest shall include the following information:
(i) Name, address, and fax and telephone numbers of the protester.
(ii) Solicitation or contract number.
(iii) Detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds for the protest, to include
a description of resulting prejudice to the protester.
(iv) Copies of relevant documents.
(v) Request for a ruling by the agency.
(vi) Statement as to the form of relief requested.
(vii) All information establishing that the protester is an interested party for the
purpose of filing a protest.
(viii) All information establishing the timeliness of the protest. 649
The reason for not having complex and detailed requirements is the nature and design of the
agency-level bid protest mechanism. Under the FAR, “the agency should provide for
inexpensive, informal, procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of protests.” 650 The
agency-level mechanism is essential for an effective bid protest system. Having some detailed
requirements for the form and content of the protest would not be unreasonable, especially since
the protest can be about a complex contract.
Excessive simplicity might impede an effective review, for example, in the case where a
protester fails to provide clearly the bases of the claim. In addition, lack of requirements of the
form and content of the protest increases the discretion of officials and allow them to introduce
unreasonable conditions. This proposition is very important especially in the case of Iraq and
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other developing countries because abuse of discretion is quite common. Sometimes petitions
have been refused because they were not typed on a computer, even though there was nothing in
the law requiring that. 651
On the other hand, to avoid uncertainty and confusion, bidders also need to know what
they should include in the protest. The agency-level mechanism is quite time-sensitive. Thus,
some requirements about the protest form would help the timelines and simplicity of the process,
especially in countries where access to, and communication with, administrative agencies is
difficult. Finally, considering the centralized structure of the agency-level of Iraq, lack of such
requirements impose an additional financial burden on bidders as they need to be in contact with
the agency to correct potential mistakes or shortages in their protests.
With respect to the IAT, Order 87 is silent on the form and content of the protest that is to
be submitted to the IAT. As discussed earlier, the IAT is required to follow the CPL for anything
that is not covered in Order 87 or the IRGC. The IRGC requires that the protest be registered and
the required fee be paid. 652 There are several other requirements under the CPL for registering a
complaint for review by a relevant court. First, every claim must be in writing. Second, the claim
must also include the following information:
(i) the name of the court that is to receive the complaint;
(ii) the date of the complaint;
(iii) the names of both the defendant and the complainant, their jobs, and their addresses. If there
is not a known address, the last address the defendant resided in is considered sufficient;
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(vi) the location that the complainant prefers to receive notification;
(v) explaining the subject of the complaint, if it is tangible the category, type, value, and
descriptions shall be stated and if it is intangible or real property, the location, boundary,
number, and its order must be stated;
(vi) the facts of the complaint, its evidence, and the relief requested by the complainant;
(vii) the signature of the complainant or her/his agent provided that the agent is authorized
through a formal documents certified by a specialized agency. 653
(ix) payment of a fee based on the financial value of the subject of the complaint. 654
In addition, the complainant must attach as many copies as the number of the
defendants. 655 The claimant must provide a list of all documents that are relied upon including
copies with her/his signature or the signature of her/his agent confirming its compatibility with
the original copies on every single page of such documents. 656 The court then sends them to the
defendant. 657 Further, no complaint is accepted if it does not follow the previous requirements
unless the compliant is one that has to be submitted within a specific period of time and that time
is about to expire. 658
It seems that there are many prerequisites for a protest to be accepted by the IAT. The
effort that is required to meet these requirements by a protester would be difficult, expensive,
and time-consuming. However, there are almost no requirements to submit a protest to the
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CRCs, agency-level, except that the protest be in writing. The foregoing explains the difference
between the judicial review and the agency-level bid protest mechanism. Nevertheless, the
author suggests that some of the requirements of the CPL be added to the agency-level
mechanism such as the subject bases of the complaint.
2.10.1 The Jurisdiction of Iraqi Bid Protest Forums
First it is important to determine which agencies are subject to the jurisdiction of the
CRCs and the IAT. According to its own terms, Order 87 applies to all procurements of goods,
services, and construction services conducted by the state of Iraq through federal ministries,
regions, and provinces that commit public funds. 659 Thus, the jurisdiction of the IAT covers all
disputes related to the award of public contracts by the Iraqi government. In other words, Order
87 does not provide for any exception with respect to its application on procurements by the
government of Iraq.
However, in a decision by the IAT that was sustained by the Federal Supreme Court, the
procurements awarded by the Prime Minister’s Office have been excluded from the review by
the IAT. A unsatisfied bidder won a contract for the protection of the Baghdad International
Airport and the award was approved by the Ministry of Transportation and the Director of the
Civil Aviation Authority. 660 Nonetheless, the Prime Minister’s Office cancelled the award
decision and awarded the contract to another company. 661 The unsatisfied bidder filed a protest
to the IAT, but the IAT refused to review the complaint. 662
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As a result, the unsatisfied protester appealed the decision of the IAT to the Federal
Supreme Court. The FSC sustained the decision of the IAT based on non-applicability of the
jurisdiction of the IAT to the award decisions of contracts issued by the Office of the Prime
Minister. 663 The Court stated that the Office of the Prime Minister is an exception to the IRGC
because the jurisdiction of the IAT, according to the IRGC, is limited only to the award decisions
that are issued by ministries, non-cabinet agencies, regions, and provincial councils. 664
Thus, the court emphasized that the Office of the Prime Minister is not one of the
agencies mentioned as those that are subject to the IRGC. 665 The IAT also refused to review
another protest of a bidder who won the contract but the Prime Minister’s Office cancelled the
award and granted the contract to a firm whose tender has been rated below the winning
bidder. 666 The FSC also sustained the IAT’s decision based on the same reasoning as the above
decision discussed. 667 There are, however, problems with the analysis of the FSC in these two
decisions.
First, this reasoning of the court contradicts a constitutional principle, which states that
“It is prohibited to stipulate in law the immunization from appeal of any administrative work or
decision.” 668 Although the court did not state that the award decision is protected from the
appeal, it implied the existence of such immunity. If an unsatisfied contractor wants to challenge
an award decision of the Prime Minister’s Office, it has to seek review from regular courts
because the IAT does not review such an award decision. The regular courts in turn will transfer
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the complaint to the IAT, as it is required by the CPL, because it is the specialized court for
reviewing award decisions of public contracts. As a result, there is no review of the award
decisions of the Prime Minister’s Office.
Second, the court in its analysis relied on the provisions of the IRGC rather than Order 87
which is higher in terms of the legislative hierarchy. Order 87 clearly states that the Order
applies to all procurements of the state of Iraq and it does not expressly or impliedly exclude the
procurements of the Prime Minister’s Office. 669 Consequently, the IRGC should not under any
circumstances contradict the Order. If the IRGC mistakenly failed to mention the award
decisions of the Office of the Prime Minister, the court should have nonetheless relied on Order
87 and applied its provisions.
Under the IRGC, the jurisdiction of the CRCs is solely to receive bid protests with
respect to award decisions of public contracts issued by ministries, non-cabinet agencies,
governorates, and regions. 670 Accordingly, the CRCs cannot review the award decisions of the
Prime Minister’s Office because the text does not mention the Office. The IRGC violates Order
87 because it does not mention all award decisions of the state or government of Iraq as the
Order does. The role of the IRGC is supposed to be interpretive and explanatory or
complementary to, not deviates from, the text and spirit of the Order.
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2.10.2 Contract-Award Versus Contract-Performance Controversies
It is appropriate to begin with the jurisdiction of the CRCs because they are mandatory
before seeking review from the IAT. The jurisdiction of the CRCs according to the IRGC is to
receive protests from participant bidders on the award decisions of public contracts. Thus, the
CRCs may only deal with protests that are related to the formation of a public contract or what is
known as contract-award controversies. With respect to the jurisdiction of the IAT, Order 87
states that the IAT has “jurisdiction over complaints and disputes arising under or relating to the
award of public contracts by the government.” 671 The power of the IAT is also limited to
contract-award controversies.
Thus, any dispute that arises after the award of the contract or disputes based on a
contract between a bidder and the government is beyond the scope of the power of the CRCs and
the IAT. Although Iraq is a civil law country and has had an administrative court (CAA) since
1979, public contract disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the regular civil courts. Public
contracts in Iraq are beyond the jurisdiction of the administrative court, the CAA, which is rather
unusual for a civil law country, as seen below.
In contrast, the forum for the resolution of public procurement disputes in France relies
on the distinction between whether the contract is administrative or not. 672 If the contract is
concluded by a government agency, the subject of the contract is related to the provision of
public service, and the contract contains unusual clauses that cannot be found in regular contracts
between private parties, the contract is considered administrative. 673 The majority of public
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contracts fall under the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. 674 Nevertheless, a significant
proportion of contracts covered by the public procurement rules falls within the jurisdiction of
the French civil courts. 675
Generally, there is a fundamental difference between contract-award controversies and
disputes that arise under a public contract or controversies based on an awarded contract.
Contract performance controversies occur only between the parties to a contract. 676
Consequently, third parties must not challenge actions that happen during the performance of a
contract. 677 In Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, the court denied a bidder the right
to obtain an injunction requiring the contracting officer to terminate the contract for default
because the contractor failed to perform what has been proposed. 678 This principle has been
incorporated into the GAO’s bid protest regulations which states “the administration of an
existing contract is within the discretion of the contracting agency.” 679
2.10.3 Compulsory versus Voluntary Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism
Under the IRGC, a protester first submits its protest to the agency responsible for the
award of the contract in question. In other word, the review of the contracting agency in the first
place is mandatory. Although the IRGC does not specifically mention that the agency review is
mandatory, it implies it by its procedures because the IAT can only accept protests that have
been already decided by the CRCs. Protesters must not seek review of bid protests directly from
the IAT. The mandatory agency review is not a mechanism specific to Iraq. There are many
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countries around the globe, such as Spain and Portugal, 680 and some regional and international
agreements that require or, at least, allow the mandatory agency review, such as the UNCITRAL
Model Law, WTO/GPA, and the EU Directives respectively. 681 However, the UNCITRAL
Model Law (2011) does not require a mandatory agency review as it is optional for the protester
to choose to seek review from the agency, the administrative body, or courts. 682
Furthermore, the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law states that the
purpose of such an approach is to enable the contracting agency to correct defective procurement
decisions. 683 This method helps to “avoid unnecessarily burdening higher levels of review and
the judiciary with cases that might have been resolved by the parties at an earlier, less disruptive
stage.” 684 Finally, the contracting agency possesses more information about the procurement
activity than any other parties. 685
The dissertation suggests that the agency review should be made optional in Iraq because
some protesters are not satisfied with the fact that the agency itself has issued the decision and is
now judging its rationality and legality. The independence of the review is one of the major
criticisms directed to the agency-level bid protest mechanism. 686 In addition, bid protest
mechanisms should decide protests in the shortest period of time possible to avoid disruption of
the supply of goods or services to the public and agencies. Thus, requiring a review by the
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agency extends the suspension of award procedures mandated while protests are in progress
because protesters unsatisfied with the agency review usually seek the IAT for the final
review. 687 In such a case there will be two suspension periods to the contract award procedures.
In contrast, if the agency review is optional, protesters could have recourse directly to the
IAT without delaying the award procedures for the time period consumed by the CRCs.
Furthermore, the optional review saves some time and resources for the government that can be
used in an area of need of such resources. It saves time and resources for the bidders or
contractors as well because preparing a protest takes considerable financial and human resources
and that can be a problem especially for small local businesses with limited resources and
experience.
2.10.4 Types of Actions of Contracting Agencies that May Be Protested
Under Order 87, the IAT has the power to receive protests from an interested party “that
believes it has not received fair treatment in the award of a government public contract, or
believes that the provisions of a tender unfairly restrict full and open competition in a manner
that inappropriately excludes it from competing.” 688 There are two types of claims that can be
raised against contracting agencies. The first one is claims against the contract-award decision or
the decision of determining the winning contractor, also called post-award protests. The second
one is claims against the solicitation or the tender documents itself that are usually written by the
contracting agencies, also called pre-award protests.
In contrast, the IRGC does not mention that bidders may challenge the solicitation terms
or provisions of a tender issued by contracting agencies. Instead, it states that the CRC must
687
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receive written protests from unsatisfied bidders who participate in a tender and do not withdraw
the required deposit after 7 working days from the date the agency issues the award decision and
notifies tenderers. 689 Thus, there is no indication in the IRGC that bidders can protest the terms
of a tender.
More importantly, the IRGC eliminated the opportunity of bidders to challenge the
solicitation terms of a tender issued by contracting agencies under Order 87. Unsatisfied bidders
are required, under the IRGC, to first seek review from the CRC to challenge the award decision
and then if they are not satisfied with the decision of the CRC, they have the right to submit their
protests to the IAT. 690 Furthermore, the right to protest according to the IRGC starts only after
the contracting agency issues the award decision. There are no opportunities for bidders to raise
issues that affect their rights in obtaining a government contracts.
Only award decisions are reviewable and this approach contradicts with Order 87 because
the Order is clear that unsatisfied bidders have the right to challenge the terms of a tender. Thus,
the question is whether unsatisfied contractors have the right to file in the IAT directly to
challenge terms of a solicitation of a public contract without going back to the relevant CRC.
The answer is yes, because Order 87 expressly allows such a challenge. 691 But would the IAT
accept such a challenge? The problem is that the IAT might require the protester to first seek
review from the CRC, as required by the IRGC.
If the IAT refers a protester to the CRC concerned, the CRC might reject the protest
based on the IRGC because the IRGC allows only protests to the contract-award decisions and
not solicitation terms of a tender. Even in this scenario, the potential protester might seek an
689
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opinion from the Federal Supreme Court. Nevertheless, an unsatisfied bidder should initiate a
challenge of this type in order to make the IAT issue a clear opinion regarding protesting
provisions of a tender.
An important question emerges from the process of challenging the provisions of a tender
which is whether it includes protesting the decision of contracting agencies to choose a particular
procurement method. There are several contracting methods in every procurement system which
are public or open tendering, restricted tendering, tendering through negotiation, and sole source
method. 692 The most competition-friendly method is the public tendering and the least
competition-friendly is contracting through the sole source. Generally speaking, jurisdictions
require certain limitations in using the least competitive methods. Although contracting agencies
are restricted by some rules in selecting the contracting methods, they still have great discretion
to choose the method they prefer.
The purpose of challenging the terms of a tender under Order 87 is whether such terms
“unfairly restrict full and open competition in a manner that inappropriately excludes [an offeror]
from competing.” 693 Full and open competition is defined by Section 4 of Order 87 which states
“to the maximum extent practicable, government public contracts shall be awarded on a
competitive basis.” 694 It seems that the Order means by competitive basis public tendering or
sealed bidding according to which the tender is open to all offerors to submit a bid and the
government award the contract to the lowest price tender.
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Furthermore, Order 87 states that awarding a contract by using other than full and open
competition is an exception. 695 Thus, it appears from the Order that the intention is to allow
challenging the decision of contracting agencies to select the method of contracting before the
IAT. An offeror can make an argument against agencies that a proposed contracting method, for
instance, the sole source, unfairly restricts full and open competition in a manner that
inappropriately excludes the protester from competing.
The IRGC eliminated that right when it limited the right to protest solely to the award
decision. Providing immunity to decisions of contracting agencies about selecting the method of
contracting, limits the rights of protesters to challenge important actions of the procurement
process. Under Article 52 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, offerors cannot challenge the
decisions on choice of contracting methods. 696 “Article 52 was based on a blunt conceptual
distinction between discretionary decisions and duties, which had the laudable aim of preventing
review bodies from second guessing entities’ commercial judgments, but it is too broad.” 697 It is
possible, therefore, that the IRGC was influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Since the public procurement system in Iraq was designed after the US model, examining
the experience of the US in this area provides us with an answer. Under the US system, protests
to solicitation improprieties are very common and there is a fair amount of administrative and
judicial experience dealing with this issue. 698 With respect to the question of whether bidders
may challenge the choice of contracting agencies to choose the contracting method they prefer,
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the US system allows such a challenge as long as it is related to a procurement of goods and
services.
Under the US law,
Both the Unites States Court of Federal Claims and the district courts of
the United States shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an
interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or
proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a
contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a
procurement or a proposed procurement. Both the United States Court of Federal
Claims and the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
entertain such an action without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after
the contract is awarded. 699
The scope of the right to protest is very broad as it includes the entire procurement cycle and not
only the award decision. In the interpretation of “in connection with a procurement”, the Federal
Circuit held that “even though the protest did not involve review of a solicitation or award, it
involved a government decision not to conduct a solicitation and thus was a challenge to an
alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement.” 700 Furthermore, any
alleged violation of statute or regulation suffices for submitting protests as long as it is related to
a procurement activity. 701 The Federal Circuit held that “court does not lose jurisdiction over a
protest because an agency allegedly violated an APA, not a procurement statute.” 702
Thus, procurement has been interpreted very broadly in the American system by courts
that relied on a definition from 41 U.S.C. § 403 (2). 703 Procurement is defined, under this
section, as including “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with
the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with contract completion
699
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and closeout.” 704 Based on this definition, the Federal Circuit ruled that “when the government
issued an RFI to solicit information to determine the scope of services it required, there was
jurisdiction to review such pre-procurement decisions.” 705 Consequently, “the existence of an
actual procurement is not a prerequisite” 706 for filing a protest.
There are several examples that the GAO deals with protests that challenge the decision
of contracting agencies in determining the method of contracting. For instance, in Northeast
Constr., Co., the protester challenges the decision of the Department of the Air Force using
competitive negotiation rather than sealed bidding for construction work. 707 The contractor
argued that the Air Force is required to use sealed bidding method for this procurement. 708 The
GAO sustained the protest and recommended that the procurement be conducted through sealed
bidding procedures. 709
Challenging the contracting method selected by contracting agencies is not always
sustained. “Generally, we [the GAO] will not question the contracting agency's determination of
its minimum needs and the best method of accommodating those needs unless it has no
reasonable basis.” 710 In Eagle Fire Inc., the protester claimed that technical specifications and
discussions were necessary; accordingly, the contracting agency should have selected

704

Gabriel D. Soll, Tara L. Ward, “IN- OR OUT-”: The Jurisdictional Confusion Over Challenges To Agency
Decisions To In-Source Contracted Work, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 583, 608 (2012).
705
See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1765.
706
Robert A. Caplen, Turning Esch To Dust? The State Of Supplementation Of The Administrative Record In Bid
Protests Before The Court Of Federal Claims, 32 Whittier L. Rev. 197, 207 (2011).
707
Northeast Constr., Co., 68 Comp. Gen. 406 (B-234323), 89-1.
708
Id.
709
Id.
710
Eagle Fire Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-257951, 94-2.

148

competitive procedures rather than sealed bidding for the protested contract. 711 However, the
GAO refused such an argument and upheld the agency’s decision. 712
The point from the above examples is that the US system allows to a reasonable extent
contractors to challenge the decision of contracting agencies determining the method of
contracting. In fact, protests to methods of contracting are usually dealt with as protests to
provisions of tender documents 713 because provisions of tender documents identify the method
that has been selected for contracting. Since the Iraqi procurement system has been designed
after the US model, the US system is the best place to seek guidance on details of challenging
procurement methods determined by contracting agencies. Allowing protesters in Iraq to
challenge selection of contracting methods by agencies is crucial for limiting corruption in public
procurement.
2.11.1 Who May Initiate a Protest? Or Who Is an Interested Party?
Standing is an essential issue in the bid protest system because it determines who has the
right to request a review of the contracting agency decision from either the relevant
administrative agencies or the court. 714 Standing differs from jurisdictions according to their
legal and administrative structures. In addition, the level of transparency or corruption affects
standing. For instance, countries that enjoy a fair level of transparency define standing broadly to
include more parties that are able to challenge the decisions of contracting agencies. In contrast,
some jurisdictions limit that right through allowing only specific contractors to submit bid
protests.
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2.11.2 Interested Party under Order 87
One of the major questions of the entire bid protest process is who can or who has the
right to initiate a bid protest? Order 87 states that “an interested party is an actual or prospective
bidder or offeror that has a reasonable chance for award and whose direct economic interest
would be affected by the award of a public contract or by the failure to award such a contract.”715
The definition of the interested party is almost the same as that of the United States procurement
system.
Under the US system, an interested party is “an actual or prospective bidder or offeror
whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to
award the contract.” 716 The definition, under Order 87, includes an additional phrase which is
“….that has a reasonable chance for award ……” 717 Except for that additional part, the CPA
borrowed exactly the definition of the US procurement system. Even that part is taken from the
case experience of the US as will be discussed below.
The definition is ambiguous and there is no guidance or explanation in Order 87 and the
IRGC about the meaning of some of the phrases used. For instance, “actual or prospective
bidder”, “reasonable chance for award”, and “direct economic interest” are among those vague
phrases. Considering a number of the decisions of the IAT is available, none of these cases can
provide a clear answer as to how the IAT interpreted them. The IRGC should have provided
some guidance as one of the major roles of a regulation is to interpret terms and phrases of
relevant statutes.
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Nonetheless, since Order 87 is designed after the American procurement system, going
back to the experience of the various forums, agency-level, the GAO, and the COFC, might
provide some guidance with respect to the meaning of “interested party.” All of the forums
mentioned use the same definition to identify who can challenge an action of a procurement
activity. 718 According to the American system, a bidder seeks to challenge a decision of a
procuring agency has to show that; (1) he is an actual or prospective bidder, (2) he has a direct
economic interest. 719
2.11.3 Actual or Prospective Bidder
It is easy to determine actual bidders as they are those who submitted bids or proposals to
a tender by the government, but the problem is in determining whether a potential bidder is
considered a prospective bidder. 720 Under the GAO’s case-law experience, the term means “a
potential competitor for the type of work being procured.” 721 For instance, GAO decided that the
“protester did not bid but would have if specifications were not defective.” 722 In addition, parties
are not potential competitors, and, thus, are not interested parties, if they do not participate, or do
not have the capacity to participate in the market involved.” 723
In another case the GAO held that the protester is considered an interested party to
challenge a modification of the awarded contract that allowed the contractor to provide a product
that the protester is qualified to provide. 724 In contrast, prospective suppliers or subcontractors
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are not considered interested parties. 725 In U.S. Polycon Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec., the GAO
stated that “protester was only a potential supplier to the ultimate awardee” or the main
contractor. 726 The United States’ courts have also ruled on who is a prospective offeror or
bidder?
In Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, the court held that where the
claim is that the government should have used a competitive method for a particular contract, the
protester need not show that it would have won the contract, but rather it would have been a
qualified bidder. 727 In Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, the court stated that “plaintiff
currently supplied a competitive financial management system to DHS and clearly could have
competed for the contract if DHS had bid it out.” 728 In contrast, in Space Exploration Techs.
Corp. v. United States, the court stated that “plaintiff is not an actual or prospective bidder and
cannot qualify as an interested party with standing because it did not anticipate having full
launch capability until the following fiscal year.” 729
2.11.4 Direct Economic Interest
In order to have a direct economic interest, an actual or prospective bidder is required to
be in line for award or be able to compete for award if its position in the protest is
upheld. 730 The Federal Circuit reversed a decision of the General Services Board declaring that
the fourth lowest bidder in a sealed bid tender had a sufficient economic interest to protest.731
The court held in United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp. that "Congress intended the
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phrase ‘interested party’ to be a meaningful limitation on the authority of the board to
entertain" a protest. 732 It further stated that:
The board was troubled by the "logic" that would allow the award of a
questionable procurement to go unchallenged if the second-lowest bidder did not
file a protest. It believed this result would be "contrary to the notions of full and
open and fair and equal competition and would significantly undermine the
integrity of the procurement and protest processes." [Internal citation omitted].
But, as the Supreme Court has said in an analogous context, the requirement that a
party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely
affected does not insulate executive action from judicial review, nor does it
prevent any public interests from being protected through the judicial process. It
does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will
be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome. [Internal
citation omitted]. Congress has decided that the coincidence of a disappointed
bidder's "direct economic" interest with the public interest adequately
accommodates both. By striking a different balance more solicitous of the latter,
the board has upset this congressional scheme. Congress simply did not intend for
the board to entertain the protests of innumerable disappointed bidders who have
little or no chance of receiving the contract. 733
Determination of direct economic interest can be much more difficult especially in a negotiated
tendering procurement. 734 The GAO examined this problem and stated that “Determining
whether a party is interested involves consideration of a variety of factors, including the nature of
the issue raised, the benefit of relief sought by the protester, and the party's status in relation to
the procurement.” 735 However, a protester is considered an interested party if it claims that its
proposal was improperly assessed and that proper evaluation would put it in line for award. 736
Contractors that are ineligible for award are not interested parties unless they challenge
their ineligibility. 737 The GAO stated that “protester's drug had not been shown to be effective in
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the treatment of either of the two medical conditions identified in the solicitations.” 738 Such a
bidder, therefore, is ineligible to protest. 739 In addition, GAO stated that a potential competitor
has a direct economic interest in challenging the appropriateness of a sole source procurement. 740
However, once the sole source contracting is deemed to be proper, the potential competitor is no
longer an interested party. 741
The Federal Circuit uses the same test for direct economic interest as the one used by
GAO. In PGBA, LLC. V. United States, 742 the court stated that “proposal was fully within the
zone of consideration for a contractual award, and agency’s handling of the data- access element
showed unequal and unfair treatment.” 743 In contrast, the Federal Circuit in Homesource Real
Estate Asset Servs., v. United States, 744 stated that even if the protest of the plaintiff were
sustained there were eight vendors that did not receive any award and had higher technical
ratings than the plaintiff. Therefore, there was not a substantial chance that the plaintiff would
have received the contract. 745
In addition to these two phrases, Order 87 states that the offeror has to show a
“reasonable chance for award” in order to be considered interested party. There is also no
guidance in the Order or the IRGC to describe what a reasonable chance for award is.
Nevertheless, it seems that the drafter of Order 87 transferred this phrase form the case law of the
US procurement system so that the application of the definition to real cases would be easier. In
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other words, this phrase implies that an interested party is the one that has a reasonable chance to
win the contract.
As mentioned above, having a reasonable chance to win the award is the same as having
a direct economic interest under the US system. Although the word reasonable is still
ambiguous, bringing the phrase into Order 87 provides some clarity to the definition of an
interested party in the Iraqi case. This proposition is based on the fact that the experience of the
Iraqi public procurement sector is quite different and modest especially with these kinds of tests.
There is no further guidance in the cases of the IAT available that helps us identify how the court
interpreted these phrases.
On the other hand, interested party is not totally new to the Iraqi judicial process and it is
close to a term used under Iraqi administrative-law principles to provide the same meaning, i.e.,
determining who has the right to bring a complaint. The word in Arabic is “ ”ﺻﺎﺣﺐ اﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔor the
party or person who has an interest in a disputed matter. Every individual or legal person that
wants to challenge a decision of a government agency must have an interest. 746 The interest may
745F

be certain or probable and it can be in a form of a benefit obtained by the complainant or
damages that may be prevented by the complaint. 747
746F

There are several characteristics for interest under the administrative law of the civil-law
countries. First, there should be a direct personal relation between the interest asked to be
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protected and the person requesting it. 748 In other words, the complainant must have suffered
harm because of the government’s action. Second, the interest could be material or immaterial,
incorporeal. 749 Third, the interest could be actual, the harm having already occurred, or probable,
the harm has not yet occurred but possible to be inflicted. 750
The content of this term and its specifications is similar to the content of the definition of
interested parties under Order 87. It would have been more understandable if Order 87 used the
Iraqi test for determining who may initiate a claim because there are already legal principles that
govern this issue. It is not clear whether the IAT uses the concept of the interested party under
the Iraqi administrative law explained above because judges relied on this test in either civil and
administrative adjudications, or whether it follows Order 87 definition.
2.11.5 Interested Party under the IRGC
Not surprisingly the IRGC introduced a different definition of “interested party” than that
of Order 87. Interested party under the IRGC is a bidder or offeror that submitted a bid in a
tender and did not withdraw the deposit paid previously as a requirement for such
participation. 751 The IRGC does not recognize the definition of Order 87 with respect to who is
an interested party. This is not the first time that provisions of the IRGC contradicts with Order
87.
Thus, bidders that do not participate in a tender or withdraw the deposit they have paid to
be qualified to submit bids may not challenge the decisions of the procuring agency. The IRGC
should have interpreted the definition of interested parties of Order 87 to provide some guidance
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based on the experience of the US system and other regional and international agreement as
required by the Order. Besides that this approach contradicts Order 87, which is higher than the
IRGC in legislative hierarchy, it limited the scope of the term interested party.
2.11.6 Interested Party under Regional and International Agreements
Article XX of the WTO/GPA states that “each party shall provide non-discriminatory,
timely, transparent and effective procedures enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of
the Agreement arising in the context of procurements in which they have, or have had, an
interest.” 752 Neither the word “supplier” nor the term “interest” is defined by the Agreement. 753
Some might limit the meaning of “supplier” to a bidder that wants to be party to a government
contract. 754
However, Arrowsmith believes that the term in Article XX has a broader meaning and
includes any contractor supplying works, or services, whether as a main contractor,
subcontractor, or to any firm in the supply chain. 755 She further argues that Article XX aims to
ensure that the rules of the WTO/GPA are enforced. 756 In addition, this interpretation extends
enforcement rights to all those in the supply chain to ensure enforcement of some of the GPA
non-discrimination rules. 757 The US system, which is known for its generous authorization of
protests, does not allow sub-contractors to file bid protests.
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With respect to the term “interest”, parties are required to grant standing to those firms or
suppliers that have, or have had, an interest in the procurement. 758 According to Arrosmith,
parties are afforded great discretion in determining the meaning of the term. 759 However, since
the principle of effectiveness under Article XX is relevant in the definition of “interest”,
restrictions that make invoking the challenge procedures unduly difficult should not be
acceptable. 760 For instance, it would be considered a violation to Article XX to make standing to
suspend a procurement action conditional on the suppliers’ showing that it would definitely, or
even probably, have won the contract. 761
Article 52 of the UNCITRAL states that “Subject to paragraph (2) of this article, any
supplier or contractor that claims to have suffered, or that may suffer, loss or injury due to a
breach of a duty imposed on the procuring entity by this law may seek review in accordance with
articles 53 to 57.” 762 The Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), hereinafter
the Guide to Enactment (1994), states that the purpose of this article is to establish basic rights to
obtain review. 763 It also states that only suppliers and contractors, and not members of the public,
have the right to seek review of the decisions of contracting agencies. 764
Subcontractors have intentionally not been granted the power to seek review under the
Guide to Enactment. 765 The purpose behind this restriction is to prevent excessive degree of
disruption that might influence negatively the economy and efficiency of the public procurement
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process. 766 In addition, the UNCITRAL does not cover the capacity of contractors or the nature
or degree of interest that the potential contractor must have in order to be able to challenge
procurement actions. It left these issues to be dealt with in accordance with the legal and
administrative structure of the enacting members. 767
Regarding the EU procurement regime, “member States shall ensure that the review
procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to
any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been
or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.” 768 The Remedies Directives do not provide
for detailed procedures defining who may challenge procurement decisions and the meaning of
interest. They left that to the member states to establish who has standing according to their
domestic legal and administrative traditions. 769
However, member states do not have unfettered discretion to determine strictly who has
standing and what interest is for the purposes of implementing the Remedies Directives. The
discretion of the members is always restricted by the general principles of speediness and
effectiveness. 770 The application of these general principles provides effective methods for
limiting the discretion of member states even in those areas that the Directives grant a
considerable degree of discretion to the states. 771
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2.11.7 Third Parties or Specific Agencies as Interested Parties
One of the fundamental questions in establishing a bid protest system is limitation on the
right to challenge contracting agencies’ decisions. 772 Allowing only the bidder that claims it
should have received the contract seems in the first place reasonable. 773 Nevertheless, this
limitation allows only contractors to challenge decisions of contracting agencies. The limitation
in Iraq is stricter as it allows only contractors who submitted bids to challenge procurement
decisions, but not all contractors that might have an interest in the procurement that involve
illegal acts. This approach is problematic because if the agency decides to conduct a contract on
the sole source basis, no contractors except the one who has been selected has the right to
challenge procurement-related decisions.
On the other hand, the purpose of bid protest is to protect the integrity of the procurement
system and holding agencies accountable for their actions. 774 If that is the case, one might argue
that allowing anyone who alleges that the agency acted improperly should be taken into
consideration whether it be a potential contractor or subcontractor, a trade union, a member of
the press, a legislator, or a civil servant. 775 Yet, opening the door for anyone to protest the
decisions of the contracting agencies delays the procurement process because resolving a protest
takes time.
This dissertation suggests that there is not a single solution that fits all countries with
respect to the limitations that should be in place or to what extent standing should include
various elements from the business environment, the media, or the public. The expansion or
limitation of the right to protest should be determined according to the administrative and
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judicial traditions and the level of integrity of the procurement system in a particular state.
However, it seems logical that developing countries reduce the limitation on standing to include
parties other than contractors. Interestingly, many developed countries allow certain institutions
to challenge the decisions of contracting agencies. The nature and type of these bodies vary from
one jurisdiction to another. For example, the Chambers of Commerce in Austria may initiate a
challenge before the Control Commission, and trade organizations and public bodies listed to the
Annex of the Complaints Board in Denmark may initiate a challenge without showing a specific
legal interest. 776 Austria and Denmark are among the most transparent governments under the
CPI issued by the TI. 777
In Morocco, the General Federation of Moroccan Business may initiate the challenge on
behalf of companies or bidders that are unsatisfied with the decision of the contracting agency,
but that cannot initiate a challenge because of fear of retaliation by the agency. 778 Thus, the
identity of the bidder challenging a procurement-related action is not disclosed to the agency that
issued the decision. 779 Again, the major purpose behind broadening or expanding standing is
mostly increased oversight over the actions of contracting agencies with respect to public
procurement.
This dissertation suggests that this method be introduced to the bid protest system in Iraq.
Several reasons justify such an approach. First, the level of corruption in Iraq is one of the
highest among all countries of the globe, 780 and one of the most vulnerable sectors to corruption
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is public procurement. 781 Second, retaliation from an offeror that challenges the decision of
contracting agencies is quite common, especially through blacklisting. 782 Third, many officials
perceive their position as a personal sinecure. They view any challenge from bidders or
individuals as an attack on them personally.
Fourth, the culture of suing or complaining about the actions of government by bidders or
even by individuals for one’s rights is not widespread. People typically prefer to resolve their
disputes through informal means such as mediation or through social and religious traditions.
The length, complexity, and cost of formal mechanisms for resolving disputes are among the
reasons that people prefer not to utilize them. Fifth, the reputation of the effectiveness of formal
dispute resolutions, whether administrative or judicial, is not quite impressive in the eye of the
public, especially administrative processes.
In the Iraqi context, several questions arise. As in the Moroccan example, should some
agency be allowed to bring complaints that challenge the decisions of contracting agencies?
Would this potential agency be allowed to intervene when a bidder seeks assistance or it is to be
empowered to challenge every procurement decisions on behalf of the public? Considering the
practical and cultural issues mentioned above accompanying a challenge to government
decisions, the dissertation suggests that empowering an ant-corruption agency as an interested
party might help reduce the rampant corruption. There are agencies in Iraq that have gained
experience in the fight against corruption.
There are several watchdog agencies in Iraq under the anti-corruption system including
the Integrity Commission (IC), the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), and the Inspectors General
781
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(IG). 783 Such agencies could act on behalf of complainants in order to avoid the deterrence of
retaliation on challenging decisions of procuring agencies. The best agency among those
mentioned to be given the status of interested party in contract-award controversies is the CPI.
The CPI is the major anti-corruption agency with general jurisdiction to investigate corrupt
practices in the actions of the government of Iraq.
The IC should be allowed to challenge the decisions of contracting agencies on behalf of
the public and contractors. The public has a large stake in the integrity of the public procurement
system. In addition, fighting corruption in public institutions is the major duty of the IC and it is
granted significant investigative powers to conduct such duty. If contractors and members of the
public are aware of corruption in a public contract, they might not have the courage to reveal that
formally, but they could seek to inform the IC anonymously about that potential corruption. 784
2.12.1 The Time Limit for Filing Protests by Protesters and the Resolution of Them by
Review Forums
A timely resolution of the bid protest is an essential element of an effective bid protest
system whether it be agency-level, independent administrative review, or judicial forum. 785
Although all regional and international procurement agreements leave many details of the rules
of bid protests to the domestic legal jurisdictions of the members, they all have specific
provisions for the regulation of the time limit. Under the WTO/GPA, “each party shall provide
non-discriminatory, timely, and effective procedures.” 786 The EU Remedies Directives requires
that member states shall ensure that the decision of contracting agencies “may be reviewed
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effectively and as rapidly as possible…” 787 still, timely and as rapidly as possible are at best
ambiguous, especially as there are different views among those involved in the procurement
activities about the time limit according to their interests.
The most important time limits in the bid protest procedures are the time period for filing
a bid protest and the time that the review body has to issue a decision on the protest. 788 Timely
resolution is important because the contract will be awarded and the contractor will start working
quickly following the conclusion of the contract, making it difficult to correct the breach once
the review forum has heard the case. 789 What constitutes timeliness varies considerably from
country to country and the types of forums available even in a single jurisdiction. There are
significant consequences, advantages and disadvantages, to a long time period for filing a
protest. 790 The advantage of a generous time limit is that it provides contractors with more time
to prepare and submit their protests. 791 In contrast, if the time limit is strict or short, significant
procurement violations might escape scrutiny so that the transparency and accountability of the
system are compromised. 792
Protesters generally prefer generous time limit, but this generosity also has costs.793
Protests delay the award of the protested contract, adding a cost to the contracting agency. 794 In
addition, expanding the time limit by allowing protests to be filed months after a bidder is aware
of defects extends the disruption that protests inevitably bring. 795 On the other hand, short time
limits may damage protesters because preparing a protest consumes considerable amount of time
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especially when the contract in question is complicated. Thus, protesters might need more time
to file an effective protest.
2.12.2 Time Limit for Filing a Bid Protest
Generally speaking, jurisdictions specify the time limit for submitting a protest. Order 87
requires the IAT to rule on the protest within the shortest period of time practicable. 796 However,
the Order does not specify what constitutes the shortest period of time, leaving that to the
IRGC. 797 The IRGC requires the unsatisfied bidder to submit its protest to the CRC within 7
working days from the date of issuance of the award decision and notification of such a decision
by the agency to contractors concerned. 798
This provision might cause problems in terms of when the limitations period starts to run.
There could be several various start dates of the deadline because the time limit starts from the
moment the contractor receives the award-decision notification. Except for sole source
contracting, public contracting always includes tens of bidders, as in public tendering method, or
at least several bidders, as in restricted tendering procedures. Since the use of electronic means is
very limited in Iraq and the presence of controversies about the legal effect of electronic
communications is still an issue, it is possible that contractors will not receive the award
notification at the same time. Proving when such a decision was received can also be quite
problematic in Iraq.
Furthermore, since filing a protest to the CRC is mandatory, the failure to file with the
CRC within the time period prohibits the unsatisfied bidder from accessing the judicial forum. If
there is no protest within the 7 working days, the agency may start executing the contract. When
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the contract is concluded, the remedies for a procurement violation would be limited to damages
in the form of bid preparation costs. Thus, a meritorious protest might not get the chance to be
checked by the IAT, a judicial forum, which has a stronger independence status than the CRC.
On the other hand, the excuse of receiving the notification of the award decision after the
time limit has passed can easily be used by unsatisfied bidders as a trick to delay the conclusion
of public contracts. It is not difficult for a contractor to deny that the notification has reached its
office in the absence of an effective electronic means or delivery verification by postal services
or by the Agency Postman. Thus, the consequences of running the time limit from the date the
contractor receives the agency’s decision will dramatically affect the predictability of the public
procurement process.
The solution for this problem is to remove the requirement that the commencement of the
deadline from the time the contractor receives the award notification with the extension of the
deadline as discussed below. According to this solution, the running of the time limit should start
from the time the agency issues the award decision provided that the contracting agency ensures
that the contractors receive the notification through electronic means and the postal services. The
IRGC can also require confirmation from bidders that they have received the award notification.
However, this solution could create problems considering the difficulties associated with
communication between contractors and government agencies. Regardless of the reality of this
concern, contractors have an interest in potential procurement activities that is sufficient for them
to follow the award decision attentively. In addition, this approach has the advantage of
strengthening the use of electronic means through which agencies and contractors can ensure
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they have effective communications. This proposed solution also provides some predictability in
terms of the running of the time limit.
With respect to the IAT, since the agency-level or protesting to the CRC is mandatory,
protesters unsatisfied with the decision of the CRC must submit their protest to the IAT within 7
working days from the date the head of the relevant agency approves or rejects the
recommendation of the CRC. The deadline here will not start running from the date the
contractor receives the decision of the head of the agency that rejects the recommendation of the
CRC. Instead, it starts from the date the agency head issues the decision. Consequently,
contractors must ensure they know when the head of the agency issued the decision. In two
decisions, the IAT rejected protests because they were submitted after the seven working days
required for filing a protest and the FSC sustained it. 799
The dissertation suggests that 7 working days is not a sufficient time for preparing a
protest by the unsatisfied bidder, especially if the tender procedures are for a complicated
contract. In addition, protesting to the contracting agencies and the IAT in this current form is
new to Iraqi contractors that have poor experience with the bid protest process. Finally, since the
agency-level is compulsory and centralized, except for contracting activities of provincial
councils, protesters likely lose precious time in traveling to reach the CRC. It is suggested that
15-20 days is a much better choice than 7 working days considering the functionality of the
public procurement process in Iraq and the potential difficulties of life there.
Another solution would be to allow some exception to accept protests submitted after the
deadline considering some issues that are not the fault of the contractors or when the protest
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raises corruption issues. Such an exception should be very limited and strictly applied. The US
system might provide another solution which is also an exception from the general time limit
requirement. Contracting agencies can still accept a protest that has been filed after the 10 days
specified has passed for good cause shown or where the protest raises issues significant to the
agency’s acquisition system. 800 Again the terms good cause shown and the protest raises issues
significant to the agency’s acquisition system are too broad, especially in Iraq’s positivist system.
Besides the time limit of submitting a bid protest to the CRCs and the IAT, there are
other time limits according to the IRGC and the Iraqi CPL. Under the IRGC, decisions of the
IAT is subject to appeal before the FSC within 30 days from the notification date of the IAT
decision. 801 On the other hand, there is another appeal according to the CPL which is known as
the rectification of the cassation decision. 802 Under this procedure, the decisions of the Cassation
Court and the Appellate Court acting as Cassation Court cannot be appealed except through the
procedures of the rectification of the cassation decision before the court that issued the decision
intended to be rectified. 803
Rectification of an appealed decision is only allowed when: (1) there is a legal reason that
affects the approval or rejection of the decision, but the court failed to examine it in its initial
decision; (2) the appealed decision expressly contradicts a provision of law; (3) the appealed
decision contradicts itself in some of its parts or a previous decision of the Cassation Court
issued in the same case without any change in the parties involved. 804 However, the rectifying
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court may not examine legal issues other than those requested by the party seeking the
rectification in its complaint. 805
The request for rectification is only accepted once from one of the parties and there is no
rectification available for a decision issued on a previous rectification request. 806 More
importantly, the time limit for filing a rectification request is seven days following the
notification date of the appellate decision. 807 In all other cases the time limit lapses after six
months from the date the decision intended to be rectified has been issued. 808 Request for
rectification is common, with approximately 25% of the decisions of the FSC are subject to the
rectification procedures. 809 These figures demonstrate that rectification requests under the Iraqi
CPL increase the delay of the procurement process.
In some jurisdictions and under some agreements, the time limit starts running not from
the date the agency issued the award decision or the date the contractor receives the decision, but
it relies on the knowledge of the protester of the problem. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law,
the protester is required to file a protest in 20 days of when the supplier became aware of the
violation or defect giving rise to the complaint or of when the contractor should have become
aware of those violations, whichever is earlier. 810
The WTO/GPA and the EU procurement regime leave the details of the time limit to the
member states to specify. The WTO/GPA states that the time limit may specify the time from
when the protester is aware or should have been aware of the basis of the complaint, but the time
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limit should not be less than 10 days. 811 The US system takes a similar approach as “protests on
any other ground, other than protests against solicitation terms, are required to be filed at GAO
within ten calendar days after the basis of the protest is known or should have been known,
whichever is earlier.” 812 In addition, there is a different time limit in the US for filing pre-award
protests or protests challenging the terms of a solicitation. Protests that challenge alleged
improprieties in a solicitation must be submitted before the bid opening or the closing date for
receipt of proposals. 813
In contrast to the UNCITRAL Model Law and the WTO/GPA, the EU Directives take an
approach similar to the IRGC. The EU regime requires that the protest be filed before the expiry
of the time specified by a member. 814 However, it requires that this time limit not be less than 10
calendar days from the date on which the decision of the contracting agency is sent to the
contractor if fax or electronic means are used. 815 If other means of communications are used, the
time limit must not be less than 15 calendar days or 10 days from the date the contractor receives
the decisions of the contracting agency. 816

2.12.3 Time Limit for Resolving a Protest by the Review Bodies
There are also two other important deadlines other than those related to filing a protest.
They are the time limit under which the CRC and the IAT must make a decision on the protest.
Order 87 does not specify a time limit for the IAT except by stating that it should decide within
the shortest period of time. Thus, the time limit is left to the IRGC. 817 The time period for the
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CRC to make a recommendation on the protest is 15 days from the time the protest has been
submitted to the contracting agency. 818 The head of the agency is also required to make a
decision whether approving or rejecting the recommendation of the CRC in seven days. 819 It is
not clear when the seven-day time limit starts running.
There should be some clarification regarding the start date of the time limit for the head
of the agency to decide on the recommendation of the CRC, otherwise bidders will be confused.
It can mean that it starts from the date the CRC issues its recommendation or it can mean it starts
from the date the head of the agency receives the recommendation of the CRC. Furthermore, in
case the head of the agency fails to make a decision on the CRC recommendation, the IRGC
states that this failure is tantamount to a rejection of the recommendation. 820 The IRGC was right
in providing for the presumption of rejection of the CRC recommendation by the head of the
agency in case of no decision in 7 days.
After the passage of the seven days, the unsatisfied bidder may start filing the protest
before the IAT without waiting for the decision of the head of the agency. If there were not such
a presumption, the bidders could have had to wait a long time as it is usually not possible to
receive a decision by heads of agencies in such a short time period. In a centralized system,
heads of agencies are overwhelmed by thousands of petitions from individuals and affiliated
agencies. Getting a response form the agency heads takes, at least, more than a month or,
sometimes, up to 3-4 months. The case works confirms such delay in obtaining a decision from
agency heads.
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In one decision by the IAT, the contracting agency announced in a tender solicitation that
the offer of the agency is valid for three months after 04/26/2010, which was the tender closing
date. 821 The protester in this procurement won the award, but refused to sign the contract because
the approval of the award reached it on 09/21/2010 or after the validity of the offer. 822 Although
the Evaluation Committee evaluates tenders and determines winning contractors, the approval of
the award decision is solely in the hand of the agency head. The agency tried to make the
protester agree to sign the contract and imposed some penalties on it such as blacklisting. 823 The
protester filed a complaint in order to get a decision declaring that the award was not
enforceable.
In this case, the head of the agency approved the award recommendation on 09/21/2010
whereas the Evaluation Committee issued its recommendation on 05/30/2010. 824 Accordingly,
the approval of the Minister of Industry and Minerals took three months and 22 days to reach the
Ministry’s subdivision. The agency argued that getting the approval of the heads of agencies on
the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee is common and the protester should have
known that. 825 However, the court disagreed with the contracting agency and declared the award
decision void. 826 Obviously, this presumption provided by the IRGC encourages the head of the
agency to make a decision sooner.
The IAT is required to make a decision on the protest no later than 120 days starting from
the time the complaint is registered and the appropriate fees paid. 827 The 120-day time limit is
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reasonable for a protest decision to be made in a judicial forum because generally judicial
resolution is lengthy and can take more than a year in some countries. However, even 120 days is
a little long considering the consequence of the suspension of the award and conclusion of the
procurement required by Order 87 while a protest is in progress. 828 The following chapters will
consider the suspension of the award in detail.
The decisions of the IAT are reviewable, according to the IRGC, before the Federal
Supreme Court. There is no time limit according to the CPL for the FSC to issue its decision. In
other words, contractors and procuring agencies might face more delay in case an unsatisfied
bidder appeals the decision of the IAT. In fact, the numbers demonstrate that appealing the
decisions of the IAT is very common in procurement complaints. From the 41 cases available to
this author, 28 of them have been appealed to the FSC which is approximately 70% of the IAT’s
decisions. 829
2.12.4 The Time Period Needed in Total for Bid-Protest Resolution
This dissertation demonstrates the actual length that resolving a bid protest takes from the
point the unsatisfied bidder files the protest to the agency, or the CRCs, through the appeal
process. The majority of the cases available do not provide clearly all the dates for filing a
protest to the CRC, the date the CRC made its decision, the date the protester registered its
complaint to the IAT, or the date the FSC received the appellate petition. Still, it is possible to
estimate based on the time of the cases that do mention such dates. In addition, the estimate is
also based on the time limit required by the IRGC for filing and resolving a protest. Obviously,
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this does not mean that all protests require the same time period for resolution in the various
forums. However, it does provide a clearer illustration of the length of a bid protest process.
The cases available for review involve only the decisions of the IAT and sometimes the
FSC. Decisions of the CRCs resolving protests are not available. The cases examined for the
purpose of this section are those that mention most of the relevant dates. Most of the times, the
Courts, the IAT and the FSC, do not determine the exact dates the protester filed its complaint.
However, it is easy to specify approximate date on which, for example, the protest was filed or
the forums issued their decisions because there is a time limit for every procedure and the court
states in the decisions that the complaint has been filed within the specified deadline.
In one of the cases, the agency issued the award decision on 09/21/2010, but there is no
indication of the date of filing the protest by the bidder to the CRC. 830 The CRC, according to the
IAT case, issued its decision on 12/06/2010. 831 The decision does not mention the date the
protester filed the complaint to the IAT, but it states that the protester filed within the time limit,
which is seven days from the date the head of the agency issued its decision on the
recommendation of the CRC. Otherwise the protest would have been rejected by the IAT. For
the sake of the analysis, it is assumed that the protester filed its complaint to the IAT on
12/13/2010.
The IAT has 120 days to resolve the protest, but in this case the decision was made on
02/02/2011, less than two months. 832 Then the protester filed an appellate petition to the FSC.833
Although the FSC does not mention in its decision the date on which the protester filed its
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appellate petition, it does state that the petition has been submitted within the time limit.834 The
time limit for submitting the appellate petition is 30 days from the date the IAT issued its
decision and the parties has been notified of that decision. It can beassumed again that the
protester filed the petition on 03/01/2011. Considering that the FSC issued its decision on
03/27/2011, 835 the overall time period of the resolution of this bid protest took more than six
months.
In another case, the unsatisfied bidder filed a protest to the CRC on 02/21/2011
challenging an award decision of an agency. 836 Again, the case does not specify the date of the
award decision. The protester has to file its protest within 7 working days from the date the
award decision has been issued and communicated to the parties. Accordingly, the date the
agency issued the award decision, was no later than 02/14/2011. The head of the agency failed to
decide on the recommendation of the CRC within seven days. 837 In such cases, the IRGC
provides for a presumption of rejection by the agency head.
Since the protest was presumed rejected by the provision of law, the protester then sought
review from the IAT. 838 The IAT does not typically mention the date of filing the complaint, but
it always determines the date it has issued a decision on the protest, which was 04/13/2011 in this
case. 839 Finally, the bidder appealed the decision of the IAT and the FSC, which issued its
decision on the appeal on 05/15/2011. 840 Thus, working backwards, the contracting agency
issued the award decision on 02/14/2011, and the protest was resolved on 05/15/2011. The
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protest resolution, in this case, took much shorter time, to be settled, approximately three
months.
On the other hand, the majority of the cases take much more than three months to be
settled. There are cases that took from nine months to one year to be resolved. For instance, in
one of the cases, the protest resolution took approximately six months, 841 and in another the
resolution took approximately nine months. 842 The protest resolution in one of the cases reached
all the various forums and appeals and took approximately one year to be settled. 843 Other than
the first appeal, there is a second appeal available, the Rectification of the Appellate decision
mentioned above. As a result, it can be concluded that the average time period necessary to
resolve a protest is from four to seven months. This period is long considering the delicacy of the
public procurement process especially budget issues.

2.13 Standards of Review and the Enforcement of the Decisions of Review Bodies
Under Order 87, the standards of review varies according to whether the protest
challenges the terms of a solicitation, pre-award protests, or whether it challenges the award
decision, post-award protests. The standard for pre-award protests is whether the terms of a
solicitation “unfairly restrict full and open competition in a manner that inappropriately excludes
it from competing.” 844 However, there is no guidance with respect either to what is unfair, or
what is inappropriate. Full and open competition is defined as contracting through the open
tendering procedures as a general rule and, as an exception, provided that certain restrictions
applied, through other restricted tendering. 845 More importantly, the burden of proof is always on
841
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the protester to show that a particular method of contracting restricts unfairly open and full
competition, although it is not mentioned in the Order because this issue is subject to the Iraqi
Evidence Law (IEL). 846
For instance, when a contracting agency decides to award a contract through a restricted
contracting method, such a decision is more vulnerable to be reversed than a decision to award a
contract using public tendering. The burden of proof in this case would be easier for a protester
to show that awarding contract through restricted procedures prevents full and open competition.
Unfair can mean using restricted tendering that exclude automatically several contractors from
competition. Unfair restriction of competition can occur when a contracting agency crafts the
provisions of an open tender that is in favor of certain major bidders through requiring specific
standards that can be found only in the products of those favored bidders. Although the
contracting agency uses public tendering, which Order 87 considers as providing full and open
competition, it restricts the competition through other means. Thus, the provisions of a tender
may be unfair if they inappropriately excluded some bidders from competition. Moreover, it is
still necessary for the issuance of standards on this issue by the IAT or the IRGC.
With respect to post-award protests, the standard is that a potential protester “has not
received fair treatment in the award of a government public contract.” 847 Again the meaning of
fair treatment is not clear and there is no guidance from the IAT or the IRGC explaining what
constitutes fair treatment. This broadness might be seen useful from the perspective of the
protester, but is a problem from the perspective of the contracting agencies or the awardees.
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Thus, there should be some judicial principles that explain these terms in order to provide for
more certainty to the procurement process.
Again the US experience is illuminating in determining the standards of review, though
obviously US cases do not have a binding effect on the Iraqi courts. The standard of review of
the agency-level is whether “a solicitation, proposed award, or award complies with the
requirements of law and regulation.” 848 This standard is not broad enough because the agency
should also consider whether the actions of the contracting officer are reasonable. Thus, the latter
standard has been developed by the GAO and the courts. 849
Indeed, the standard of review by the GAO is similar to the agency-level bid protest
mechanism. “The protester must show that the contracting agency has prejudicially violated a
statute or regulation or has taken a discretionary action without a rational basis.” 850 The GAO,
however, grants agencies considerable discretion in applying rational basis. 851 The GAO in one
of its decision stated that where “the Request for Proposal (RFP) provides that technical
considerations will be more important than cost, source selection officials have broad discretion
in determining the manner in which they will make use of the technical and cost evaluation
results.” 852 In another decision it allowed the “award to higher-priced offeror in order to obtain
better staffing and lower risk of poor performance.” 853
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Similarly, the standard of review of the COFC is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), 854
which states that “the court shall set aside the agency action if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 855 Under this standard, an award may be
set aside “if either (1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis, making it
arbitrary or capricious, or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of statute or
regulation.” 856 Of course, “the arbitrary and capricious standard is highly deferential.” 857
Examples of arbitrary and capricious decisions include where the government acts in bad
faith or the decision of the contracting agency lacks a rational basis. To prove bad faith, the court
requires the protester to show that “the agency acted with specific intent to injure it.”858 On the
other hand, in a claim that agency decision is irrational, “the court will determine whether the
contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion,
and the bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” 859
Another test that is applied by both the GAO and the COFC is the prejudice test.
According to this test, “the protester must establish that but for the agency’s action, it would
have had a substantial chance of receiving the award.” 860 In one decision, the GAO stated that
“the protester did not demonstrate that it was prejudiced because the agency relaxed
specifications for commercial flight services for one offeror.” The courts also applied the test as
in Allied Tech. Group, Inc. v. United States, 861 in which the court stated “assigning higher
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technical rating would not have affected award as evaluated price was at least 218% higher than
awardee’s.” 862
The arbitrary and capricious and the violation of law and regulation standards both exist
in the general principles of administrative law of countries following the French legal traditions,
including Iraq. Article 7 of the CSL determines the bases of challenging an administrative
decision by affected persons, natural or legal. It identifies a broad range of issues that include
whether an administrative decision violates a law or regulation, contradicts the rules of
competence, is defective in its form, procedures, subject, or includes an error in applying or
interpreting a law and regulation or is arbitrary and capricious in exercising powers. 863
Thus, if the IAT applied Article 7 of the CSL in reviewing protests, the standard of
review would be very broad. However, based on the numbers of cases available, it is not clear if
it uses the same bases of challenging administrative decisions in the resolution of bid protests.
Even if it does use these bases in the review process, it is hard to see that in the reasoning of the
decisions of the IAT to know how the court interprets arbitrary and capricious. In fact poor
reasoning is one of the subjects to be covered below.

2.14 The Enforcement of the Decisions of the Review Bodies
Under the IRGC, the decisions of the CRC have no binding effect on the contracting
agencies. 864 It states that the CRC decisions on bid protests are recommendations subject to the
approval of the head of the agency concerned. 865 As seen above, CRCs are in every ministry,
every provincial council, and the main offices of independent bodies. The heads of agencies are
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ministers, governors, and heads of independent bodies, unless there is delegation of the approval
power to one of the lower-level officials or possibly to the CRC itself. Only the decisions of the
heads of the agencies are binding on the contracting agencies. There are, however, no guidelines
as to how the head of the agency should use his or her discretionary power to approve or reject
the decisions of the CRCs. This approval power is nearly unfettered, allowing the head of the
agency to reject or approve it seemingly at will. The dissertation suggests that it was a mistake
for the IRCG to consider the decisions of the CRCs as mere recommendations. This mistake
should be corrected by making the decisions of these review bodies binding on the agencies.
There is no basis to grant the heads of the agencies the power to approve or reverse the
decisions of the CRCs. The CRCs are presumably more knowledgeable of the details of the
protest, and reviewing protests is their only specialization. In addition, the head of the agency
might review the protest again in order to obtain some information about it, meaning that the
protest is reviewed twice. Further, this step strengthens the centralization of power in the hand of
heads of the agencies which is in contradiction to the spirit of Order 87. Moreover, the approval
of the heads of the agencies should be eliminated since granting his/her this power increases the
likelihood of corruption in a country such as Iraq.
The approach of granting the status of recommendation to the decisions of review bodies
is known in the public procurement systems. For instance, decisions of the GAO have no binding
effect on the contracting agencies, 866 as are decisions of the Review Body of the Hong Kong. 867
Yet, there is deterrence for contracting agencies not following the decisions of the GAO. The
GAO prepares a report every year to Congress making a summary of each instance in which a
866
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federal agency did not fully implement the GAO’s recommendation. 868 Consequently, agencies
are encouraged voluntarily to follow GAO’s recommendation and there are only a few instances
of contracting agencies not following its recommendations. 869
Of course, the decisions of the IAT are binding on the contracting agencies and every
other party because the IAT is a court. This means that the IAT’s decision can be enforced by
law on the parties in a bid protest. In some countries administrative review bodies’ decisions are
also binding as they function like a tribunal or court. 870 However, protesters cannot directly seek
review from the IAT. They have to submit their protest first to the CRCs and only if they are not
satisfied with the decision of the CRC can submit their protest to the IAT. 871

2.15 Conclusions

2.15.1 One Size Fits All, Does not Work
One of the major problems the dissertation examines is the importance of the underlying
procedures involved in the organization of public procurement. However, the role of the
underlying procedures has not been properly addressed in the literature and practice of public
procurement. It seems that the literature fails to make a reasonable distinction among various
types of contracts and provide a different set of procedures to organize them according to the size
of the contract, its importance and price. It is not logical that a contract with a monetary value of
hundreds of millions of dollars and another contract with a relatively nominal value should be
dealt with under the same set of procedures.
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The importance of a contract is also very crucial, which is often related to the types of the
services or goods to be procured by the agency. It is not logical to apply the same set of
procurement rules to solicit for a security contract and another contract for buying furniture. Or
between two types of contracts one is to provide foods for the entire nation, such as the Oil-ForFood Program, and another is to purchase decoration for the New Year celebration. Another
example could be the complexity or the time span of a specific contract as some contracts are
extremely complex and others are long-term.
The point is to advocate for tightening oversight on the public procurement process
especially in developing countries where the integrity of the procurement system suffers from
serious problems. There are several safeguards under the current procurement system in Iraq to
enhance the integrity of the procurement system. The existence of the bid protest mechanism,
including both the agency-level (CRC) and the judicial forum (IAT), is the most prominent
example to detect violation of laws and regulations.
The purpose behind the full and open competition requirement is to give the opportunity
to any bidder who wants to participate in getting a public contract and simultaneously prevent
the agency from abusing their contracting power. There are also restrictions with respect to
reducing the organizational conflict-of-interest. Furthermore, there are also other criminal and
disciplinary actions against public officials who are involved in the procurement process in case
of violation of law and regulations with respect to their duties as officials.
There are still many gaps in the above oversight mechanisms that can facilitate corruption
and abuse. First, the most fundamental problem is that these mechanisms do not function
properly in a country like Iraq. For instance, the bid protest system is subject to several shortages
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explained throughout this dissertation. The bid protest mechanism works when an unsatisfied
contractor initiates a protest, but it is useless where contracts are awarded without competition
through corrupt practices without any protest. Examples of such practices are when the
contracting agency awards the contract on a sole source basis or when the provisions of a tender
favor one of the bidders. None of these instances can be challenged under the current
procurement system. In addition, bid protest is only accepted within a very short time, while
allegations of corruption are typically revealed after a much longer time period. It does not also
function when protesters are hesitant to challenge procurement-related decisions because of
agency retaliation. Thus, if there is previous oversight, corrupt opportunities might be reduced
and revealed beforehand.
Full and open competition through public tendering is not a strong strategy to tackle
corruption and irregularity of the procurement system because it is easy for the agency to use its
discretion to avoid this method and utilize other more restrictive contracting methods such as
direct invitation or sole source. On the other hand, the criminal and administrative measures
available for disciplining public officials when they violate law and regulation are strict under
the Iraqi law. However, the application is limited because accountability is weak and riddled
with favoritism and intervention from politicians and senior officials. Thus, based on the above
assessment, the dissertation suggests that there should be different procedures for important,
high-value, and/or sensitive contracts.
This dissertation suggests incorporating proportionality of procedures in awarding
contracts depending on the complexity and importance of projects or goods that are to be
procured. The best mechanism to serve that purpose is previous oversight for future contracts,
especially for complex and high-value contracts. Previous oversight is a preventive measure to
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avoid an illegal act or procurement defects before it happens. One of the most successful
strategies of fighting corruption is preventive measures. 872 Still complex questions arise, such as
which agency or officials should perform the previous oversight mechanism, what kinds of
contracts should be subject to such oversight, and what kinds of measures should be successfully
designed to achieve previous oversight.
This dissertation suggests that two Iraqi independent bodies are qualified to perform this
oversight: the CPI and the BSA. These bodies are the pillars of the anti-corruption system in
Iraq. The applicability of previous oversight to particular contracts should be determined by law
or regulation. It can be determined based on price of the contract or whether the contract is
related to health, security, food or any other categories that is touching the life and security of the
public. The details of how the process functions can be decided by experts in the field of public
procurement from inside and outside the country. Previous oversight is preferred because it is
more difficult to recover from the impact of corruption or defects in an awarded contract than the
one that is not concluded.
There is, however, a cost to the proposal of previous oversight. This special oversight is
an extra restriction on the discretion of the contracting agencies. In addition, it increases delays
in the contracting process which is already a major problem to many procurement systems
especially in developing countries. It would be an intervention in the bureaucracy by two bodies
that are related to the legislative branch. Finally, it might create other corrupt opportunities if the
people involved in the exercise of the oversight were captured by bidders. These problems can be
fixed through strong and strict requirements including time limit and more transparency
872
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measures in their work, though ultimately no anti-corruption system can eliminate the human
tendency toward corruption.
2.15.2 Non-Availability of Information with Respect to the Works of Bid Protest Forums
and Poor Reasoning in Their Decisions
One of the major problems of the bid protest mechanisms in Iraq is their opacity. Under
the UNCITRAL Model Law, decisions of the contracting agency and decisions of the
administrative body, as the case may be, are to be made available for inspection to the general
public. 873 However, there is one restriction on the publication requirement, namely that “no
information shall be disclosed if its disclosure would be contrary to law, would impede law
enforcement, would not be in the public interest, would prejudice commercial interests of the
parties or would inhibit fair competition.” 874 Such restriction is to protect the interests of all
parties including the public.
On the other hand, the GAO makes a copy of protest decisions available to the public,
unless the decision contains protected information. 875 Furthermore, even if the decision contains
protected information, a version of the decision is made available provided that the protected
information is omitted. 876 According to the Freedom of Information Act, 877 agencies in the US
are required to allow the public to have access to government documents when certain conditions
applied. Thus, there is a general obligation on government agencies to allow access to documents
regarding their work. Bid protest decisions are also subject to statutory requirements of being
accessed.
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Although there is a section of the MOP website dedicated to the OGPCP, there is little
information with respect to bid protest decisions. At the time of the writing of this dissertation,
there is no access to the decisions of the CRCs and the IAT. Neither Order 87 nor the IRGC
requires publication of the work of the CRCs or the IAT. In fact, the culture of transparency has
not yet developed in the administrative system of Iraq. The lack of availability of the decisions of
both forums creates unpredictability, lack of transparency, and difficulty to evaluate their works
by experts, academics, interested parties, or the general public.
Another problem with the few IAT decisions that are available is poor reasoning.
Providing adequate reasoning is an obligation of the protest forums under many jurisdictions and
the agreements covered in this dissertation. The UNCITRAL Model Law requires the contracting
agency and the administrative body reviewing bid protests to issue their decisions in writing
including the reasons for the decision. 878 The WTO/GPA states that “a review body that is not a
court shall be subject to judicial review or shall have procedures which provide that, including
others, opinions or decisions are given in writing with a statement describing the basis for the
opinions or decisions.” 879
Poor reasoning is not only a problem to the decisions of the IAT but is also a problem for
all judicial decisions in the country. The vast majority of the decisions of the judicial bodies
including the IAT are actually without reasoning. They usually state something like that “as the
facts in this case are compatible with the legal requirements and meet the elements of the crime,
the plaintiff is correct in her/his allegations.” Further, court decisions are usually a page or two in
length as judges rarely elaborate or explain how they applied the law to the facts of the case.
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Thus, it is very difficult to comment on the judicial decisions and to evaluate whether the
court was successful or not in applying the law because there is no analytical information in such
decisions. In addition, there are many terms, principles, and phrases that are vague or ambiguous
in Order 87 and the IRGC such as “interested party”, “direct economic interest”, and “unfair
treatment.” Judicial forums are the only authoritative party that can interpret these terms and
develop some guidance and tests to aid in their application.
Perhaps most importantly, adequately stating the court’s reasoning allows bidder’s to
change their behaviors by the following the laws and regulations. Such guidance would facilitate
understanding of how the procurement process works. Issuing IAT decisions and providing
adequate reasoning would help in developing the public procurement process because experts,
academics, and legal professionals could comment on them and enhance ability of the IAT
members to make better protest decisions.
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Chapter Three
3. Remedies Available to Unsatisfied Bidders under Iraqi Public Procurement Laws and
Regulations
3.1 Introduction
One of the fundamental elements of a successful bid protest system is the availability of
adequate remedies for unsatisfied bidders when challenging the decisions of contracting
agencies. 880 If a bid protest to agencies’ decisions does not introduce meaningful relief,
unsatisfied bidders are discouraged from coming forward to reveal improper or illegal activities
related to the process of awarding public contracts. 881 As a result, most the procurement systems
recognize various types of remedies available to protesters where their claims are sustained in
protest fora. 882 However, the nature and type of remedies available to protesters differ from on
jurisdiction to another according to their legal principles.
International and regional procurement agreements emphasize the importance of
existence of meaningful remedies to unsatisfied bidders. 883 The most important interim measure
available to protesters is suspension of contract award procedures. 884 Another common remedy is
the existence of corrective actions, which consist of cancelling the award decision and requiring
the agency to re-solicit the tender, or award the contract to the protester. 885 In addition, protesters
are entitled to other remedies in the form of monetary compensation including bid preparation or
protest costs. 886
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The award of remedies has its own rules and restrictions according to public procurement
laws and regulations. Accordingly, this chapter examines the remedies available to unsatisfied
protesters under Order 87 and the IRGC. It deals with the requirements and restrictions
according to which these remedies may be granted. It mostly concentrates on examining two
major remedies, suspension of procurement procedures until the procurement is resolved and
corrective actions, because other types of remedies are subject to other laws such as contract and
trot law.
The suspension of the procurement award procedures during the protest proceeding is one
of the remedies that triggers strong criticisms. 887 Delaying the procurement process and abuse of
this measure by some protesters are the essence of these criticisms. 888 On the other hand, the
suspension remedy is considered as one of the crucial measures for the effectiveness of a bid
protest system 889 as it encourages unsatisfied bidders to challenge contracting agencies’
decisions. Thus, we examine the importance of these remedies and problems they create to the
procurement system.
3.2.1 Suspension of the Procurement Process
Order 87 states “upon the filing of a tender protest after award, the governmental unit or
agency that awarded the public contract shall immediately order the awarded contractor to cease
working on the contract.” 890 The Order does not set forth any other requirements for suspension
of the award procedures. Thus, the suspension, according to the Order, is automatic because it
does not need a court order to obligate the contracting agency to issue an administrative decision
requiring the contractor to cease working on the contract. Also, there are no other requirements
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that protesters must meet to be eligible for suspension. The moment a unsatisfied bidder files its
protest, the contracting agency must order the suspension. It does not even require a petition
from the protester to demand suspension from contracting agencies or review bodies.
On the other hand, the IRGC also emphasizes the suspension measure by requiring
agencies not to sign the contract until the bid protest is resolved. 891 Nonetheless, it imposed a
condition on unsatisfied bidders for suspending the conclusion of the contract. 892 Under such
condition, the contracting agency is required to suspend procurement procedures only when the
protester submits a formal undertaking to pay the contracting agency all the damages occasioned
by such suspension in case the protest is frivolous or unjustified. 893 The IAT also applies this
condition to protesters requesting suspension. 894
The IRGC should not have introduced such a discouraging condition. The intention of the
designers of Order 87 was to maximize oversight over the procurement activities. Order 87 states
in the preamble that availability of dispute resolution mechanisms is one of the main reasons for
the promulgation of the Order. 895 In addition, Order 87 opened the door for challenging even
solicitation provisions of a tender issued by contracting agencies, which was not common under
the previous procurement law. 896 Although the OGPCP has the power, under Order 87, to issue
regulations to facilitate enforcement of the Order, 897 it does not have the authority to promulgate
a provision that contradicts with the main purpose of the Order by minimizing oversight and
deterring unsatisfied bidders to protest.
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Suspension measures were introduced as an incentive for unsatisfied bidders to exercise
their oversight right over procurement activities. However, the condition discourages protesters
from challenging award decisions due to fear of potentially requiring payment of damages that
can be considerable. Further, the language of the provision is vague because it is not clear who
decides that a protest is frivolous or unjustified, not it is clear who decides the amount of the
damage that the agency will incur. Is a protest considered frivolous merely by the fact that it has
been rejected by the CRC or by the IAT? This condition may be used by contracting agencies to
deter bidders from filing protests. Instead, the OGPCP may issue regulations that provide for
imposing fines on contractors that abuse suspension measures.
In a protest before the IAT, the protester requested the suspension of procurement
procedures and the court stated that “the court unanimously agreed to award the suspension of
the contract award procedures.” 898 It seems that even the IAT does not understand that the
suspension is automatic. Thus, it does not need a request from the protester and it does not need
a court order to be awarded. 899 The automatic suspension being a privilege provided for by
operation of law, courts and contracting agencies should not make it pending their consent.
Another explanation for making the suspension subject to the approval of the IAT might be that
the Court intended to ensure that the protester pledged an appropriate formal undertaking
required by the IRGC. 900 Yet, as discussed previously, this condition is not legally justified.
Order 87 does not establish the time period during which the suspension of the
contracting process should continue. The IRGC, however, states that the suspension shall
continue until the protest is resolved. 901 The question arises as to how long it takes for a protest
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to be resolved before both the CRCs and the IAT. The time period for resolving a bid protest
including the appellate process varies, but the shortest period of time is three months and the
longest is six months to a year. 902 Accordingly, the suspension period might be long which is not
desirable considering the disruption of services that occurs because of bid protests.
Although Order 87 and the IRGC state that the contracting agency shall immediately
cease working on the contract upon the filing of a protest, they do not specifically determine the
time that the suspension should start. The commencement of the suspension period is important
because contracting agencies and winning contractors usually act quickly after the award
decision to conclude and start executing the contract. 903 Further, a contracting agency might
prepare for the conclusion of a contact without knowing that the award decision has been
challenged. This scenario is expected in Iraq because contracting agencies are not authorized to
receive bid protests. 904 Instead, there are central review bodies, CRCs, which are housed in the
main offices of ministries and non-cabinet agencies. 905 Thus, delays can easily be anticipated
before CRCs notify the contracting agency of a protest.
Order 87 should have introduced a short period of time within which the contracting
agency is required not to conclude the contract awaiting potential protests by unsatisfied bidders.
Terminating a concluded contract is more difficult than canceling an award decision in case a
protest is sustained. This dissertation emphasizes the use of electronic means for
communications between the parties involved in procurement activities. Sending a notification of
a protest to a relevant contracting agency might take several days if it is sent through regular
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mail or the Agency Postman, while dispatching such notification is nearly instantaneous through
electronic means.
3.2.2 Suspension of Procurement Procedures under the US Procurement Law
The US system provides for an automatic suspension only when a protest is brought to
the GAO. 906 Suspension provisions are provided to ensure that effective relief can be obtained by
protesting contractors and to encourage competition in contracting. 907 US law also differentiates
between pre-award and post-award protests filed to the GAO respecting suspension. 908 If a
protest is filed before award, a contract may not be awarded after the agency’s receipt of the
notification of protest from the GAO. 909 On the other hand, if a protest is filed after award, the
contracting agency must immediately direct the contractor to cease performance under the
contract. 910 Although the Iraqi procurement system designed after the US model as it allows preaward protests, Order 87 does not recognize this differentiation because it only covers the effect
of post-award suspension, resulting in cessation of contract performance. 911
The GAO must notify the contracting agency of the filing of the protest in a specified
time limit. The time limit starts running “on the date of contract award and ends on the later of
(A) the day that is 10 [calendar] days after the date of the contract award; or (B) the date that is 5
[calendar] days after the debriefing date offered to an unsuccessful offeror for any debriefing that
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is requested and, when requested, is required.” 912 If the GAO fails to notify the agency of
receiving a protest, the offeror’s right to suspension will be effectively abolished. In addition,
contracting agencies are required to suspend procurement procedures only when they receive the
notice of a protest from the GAO, meaning that notice by the protester does not trigger
suspension. 913
If a unsatisfied contractor requests a suspension of procurement procedures before the
COFC, the award of such suspension is subject to several conditions. The COFC uses the
traditional four-part test required for injunctive relief in order to award suspension, which is not
easy to be established. 914 The COFC considers: (1) the protester’s likelihood of success on the
merits of the case; (2) whether the contractor suffers irreparable harm if the court rejects
injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective parties favors the grant of
injunctive relief; (4) whether it is in the public interest to grant injunctive relief. 915
Similar to Iraqi law, the COFC may require a protester to furnish a bond to the court,
which can be expensive and the protester might lose it if the protest is denied. 916 Nevertheless,
under Iraqi law, pledging a bond is a prerequisite to filing a bid protest and such a bond is
submitted to the contracting agency not to the court. 917 In addition, US law requires that the
contracting agency suspend the procurement procedures on receipt of a notification of a protest
from the GAO. 918 Thus, it is the GAO’s obligation to ensure that the contracting agency receives
the notice of a protest in a very short period of time.
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In contrast, Order 87 and the IRGC are silent on the issue of notice. Yet, the notice of
CRCs and the IAT to the contracting agency of the filing of a protest is hugely important. If the
contracting agency is unaware of a protest, it might conclude the contract and limit the relief that
a protester can obtain. Order 87 or the IRGC should thus have covered such notice and provided
for a time limit for CRCs and the IAT to notify the agency in order to prevent unnecessary delay
in the protest procedures. If CRCs and the IAT are given unspecified time to notify the
contracting agency of a protest, they might not act as quickly as it is required under the principles
of speedy resolution of bid protests.
3.2.3 Suspension under the WTO/GPA, UNCITRAL, and the EC Remedies Directives
UNCITRAL also provides for a suspension of procurement procedures. Although it
recognizes the importance of an automatic suspension, as it allows the settlement of disputes in
non-judicial fora making the settlement more economical and efficient, granting such a
suspension is subject to several conditions. 919 First, the protest must not be frivolous. 920 Second,
it must contain a declaration by the protester demonstrating that he or she will suffer irreparable
injury in the absence of suspension. 921 Third, the likelihood of success of the protester in his or
her claim is also considered. 922 Fourth, the suspension should cause disproportionate harm to the
procuring entity or to other contractors. 923
This approach, according to UNCITRAL, is designed to strike a balance between the
right of the supplier to have the protest reviewed and the contracting agency to conclude a
contract in an economic and efficient way without delay and disruption in the procurement
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process. 924 Regarding the rejection of frivolous protests, UNCITRAL states that the reviewing
body should have the power to look on the face of the complaint to reject such protests. 925 With
respect to the second requirements, UNCITRAL states that the declaration that is required is not
intended to be adversarial or evidentiary. 926 Instead, the protester merely needs to affirm the
existence of certain circumstances that may cause him or her suffer irreparable injury. 927
In addition, UNCITRAL limits the suspension initially to seven days and allows an
extension for up to 30 days. 928 The head of the contracting agency, the approving authority, and
the administrative body are allowed to extend the period of the suspension to 30 days in total.929
UNCITRAL explains that the initial seven-day suspension is intended to allow the contracting
agency or the administrative body reviewing the protest to assess the merits of the complaint and
to determine whether an extension of the suspension is necessary. 930 Further, UNCITRAL limits
the disruption and delay resulting from bid protest through the 30-day cap on allowed
suspension. 931
On the other hand, suspension of the procurement procedures under EU Directives is also
available to unsatisfied protesters. Under the EC Remedies Directive for the Utilities Sector,
member states shall include measures “to take, at the earliest opportunity and by way of
interlocutory procedure, interim measures with the aim of correcting the alleged infringement or
preventing further injury to the interests concerned, including measures to suspend or to ensure
the suspension of the procedure for the award of a contract or the implementation of any decision
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taken by the contracting entity.” 932 Nonetheless, such suspension is not automatic because the
Directive allows the reviewing body to take into account the impacts of the suspension on the
interests of all parties concerned including the public. 933
Thus, courts in most member states apply a balance-of-interests test according to which a
protester seeking suspension may have to show that he will suffer irreparable and serious harm if
interim measures are not granted. 934 In addition, the harm must outweigh the damage which the
suspension would cause both to the contracting agency and the public interest at large. 935 Finally,
the complainant might also be required to show that the damage or harm he is likely to suffer, if
the interim measure is not granted, could not be adequately compensated through monetary
damages. 936
The EU Remedies Directives also introduced a standstill period in which the contract
may not be concluded following the award decision for at least 10 calendar days from the day
following the date on which the award decision is sent to the tenderers and candidates
concerned. 937 If fax or electronic means are used or, if other means of communication are used,
the standstill period is 15 calendar days following the date the award decision is communicated
to the contractors concerned. Or the standstill period is 10 calendar days following the date of
receipt of the contract award decision when electronic or other means used for
communication. 938 This mechanism is unique to the EC procurement regime compared to other
international and regional agreements dealing with public procurement. The standstill period is
important for contractors submitting tenders in the EC because in many European countries
932
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when the contract is concluded there is no chance for a set aside of the award decision and the
remedy in such cases is limited to monetary damages.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has examined the standstill period and suspension
measures. Since the remedies available to unsatisfied bidders in many member states are limited
to monetary damages after the contract is concluded, the ECJ took the view that the review
mechanisms exist so that a bidder may have the chance to set aside an award decision before the
conclusion of the contract. 939 According to the ECJ, the legal systems of some member states
make it impossible to set aside an award decision because the contract is concluded the moment
the award decision is issued. 940 In such legal systems, the occurrence of the award and
conclusion at the same time deprive bidders from the cancellation of a defective award
decision, 941 making monetary damages the only remedy available to unsatisfied bidders after the
conclusion of a contract,
Accordingly, the ECJ states that “complete legal protection requires that it be possible for
unsuccessful tenderers to examine in sufficient time the validity of the award decision.” 942 Thus,
a reasonable period of time must elapse between the time the contracting agency notifies
unsuccessful offerors of the award decision and the conclusion of the contract in order to allow
granting interim measures. 943 In addition, the Court emphasized that complete legal protection
also requires notifying offerors of the award decision. 944 Requiring agencies to notify only the
winning contractor of the award decision, as is the case in some member states, would decrease
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the possibility of challenging award decisions because unsuccessful contractors would not be
aware of the award decision. 945
The ECJ interpreted the existence of such legislation that requires notifying only the
winning contractor as a barrier to prevent the set aside or annulment of award decisions. 946 Thus,
the Court stated that the mere existence of a time lapse in which tenderers may take action
against the award decision is not sufficient without having an obligation on contracting agencies
to keep offerors informed of the award decision. 947 The intention of the ECJ in this interpretation
is the fact that one of the incentives for offerors to challenge award decisions is to obtain the
tender or at least to have the award decision be set aside or annulled. However, when the contract
is concluded, the remedy is limited to monetary damages. Accordingly, the court states that “the
right of review for tenderers must be independent of the possibility for them to bring an action
for damages once the contract has been concluded.” 948
The EC Remedies Directives do not deal with matters related to which court or
independent body should have the jurisdiction to grant suspension. This jurisdictional matter is
left to the legal system of the member states. In France either administrative courts or ordinary
civil courts may decide on the application requesting suspension. 949 This jurisdictional
distinction depends on the difference between administrative contracts versus ordinary contracts.
In other words, the application requesting interim measures with respect to an administrative
contract before it is concluded must be submitted to the administrative court. 950 The president of
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the administrative court has the power to issue some preventative measures including the
suspension of procurement procedures. 951
After the contract is concluded, application for obtaining interim measures cannot be
brought to the administrative court because it does not have the competence to decide on these
issues. 952 The party seeking suspension after the contract is signed must follow an expedited
proceeding known as procédure en référé, 953 which is similar to the summary judgment process
in common-law systems. Generally speaking, the power of a court deciding en référé is limited
to interim measures. 954 However, under provisions implementing Directive 89/665, the court’s
powers have been expanded to include the power to render an administrative act null and void.955
The decisions of the juge des référés are provisional in nature and may be reversed by a court
that the juge des référés is a member adjudicating the case on its merits. 956 A judgment that has
been rendered based on procédure en référé is final. 957
Under Order 87 and the IRGC, the contract is not concluded the moment the contracting
agency issues the award decision, because according to the IRGC, the award decision must be
approved by the head of the contracting agency. 958 A bidder does not need to apply for
suspension because it is automatic. 959 More importantly, the conclusion of the contract does not
prevent suspension because suspension also extends to the performance stage of the contract.960
Order 87 is clear in stating that the contracting agency must order the contractor to cease working
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on the contract when a protest is filed. 961 Thus, contractors are saved from applying for
suspension before reviewing bodies or ordinary civil courts.
With respect to the WTO/GPA, it states that “challenge procedures shall provide for rapid
interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement and to preserve commercial
opportunities, such action may result in suspension of the procurement process.” 962 Granting
suspension relies on several factors 963 that are similar to the requirements for preliminary
injunction under the US system. The first is the strength of the applicant’s case as it is not
appropriate to order suspension for cases that do not have sufficient merits. 964 For instance, the
applicant might be required to show that the case is arguable and there is a likelihood of
success. 965
Second, many countries require the applicant seeking suspension to demonstrate that
irreparable damages will be suffered if suspension is not awarded. 966 However, in many
jurisdictions where the award of damages is sufficient to remedy the situation, no irreparable
damage is suffered in the absence of suspension. 967 Third, suspension sometimes is denied or
granted after conducting a balance of interests by review bodies. 968 The review body usually
examines the adverse consequences of the suspension on the interests involved. 969
These interests can include; first, the disruption consequence of the suspension on the
delivery of public services to third parties. 970 For instance, the disruption can be significant as in
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the case where the contract is for the construction of an urgently needed hospital. 971 The interest
might not be significant as in the case where the contract is for furnishing an office or building.
In the former example suspension might not be granted as the delay might cause serious damages
to the public, but in the latter example it is likely that suspension would be granted because
public interest will not suffer significant damages.
Second, the interests of other firms participating in the procurement activity are also
considered in granting suspension. 972 The interests of the winning contractor are seriously taken
into account especially when it has started working on the contract. 973 “The longer the
proceedings take to complete, the greater will be the damage caused by suspension, and the
greater the reluctance of the review body to order such a measure.” 974 Considering these interests
in granting suspension necessitates providing for an exception according to which contracting
agencies are allowed to override suspension.
Third, sometimes a review body may require that an undertaking be pledged by the
applicant seeking suspension to pay any damage that may result in the suspension in case the
applicant loses the protest. 975 In the field of public procurement, this undertaking means that the
protester will compensate the contracting agency for any losses suffered because of a delay
resulting from the suspension. 976 This undertaking represents a significant deterrence to
protesters seeking suspension. 977 These conditions that are required to grant suspension are not
mentioned in the WTO/GPA specifically because regional and international agreements leave
these details to the legal systems of member states.
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3.3 Exception to the Suspension Procedure
Order 87 provides for an exception of suspension of procurement procedures. It states
that a minister or a senior official responsible for contracting activities is authorized to require
the contractor to keep working on the contract, if he or she determines that the protested contract
is of such importance to the public interest that ceasing work will unduly harm public interest.978
There are three requirements for this exception to be exercised by a minister or senior
contracting official. First, undue harm must be explained in writing by the head of the
contracting agency. 979 Second, the head of the contracting agency must notify the IAT of his or
her intention to exercise this exception. 980 Third, the head of the contracting agency is required
to consider the likelihood of success of the protest. 981
Two of the three major requirements are under the discretion of the senior contracting
officials. The exception would have been more preventive of abuse, if the provision introduced
some types of restrictive measures such as requiring the consent of the IAT or the OGPCP
instead of mere notification. Further, the provision should have introduced some incidents, at
least as examples, that may be considered important to public interest or may constitute undue
harm. Discretion without proper restrictions has the potential of leading to abuse and corruption.
Since Order 87 was enacted after the US procurement model, some explanations from the
US case experience might be helpful to understand how this exception is exercised. Under the
US law, the contracting agency may override the suspension on a finding of urgent and
compelling circumstances or when the override is in the government’s best interest. 982 The
COFC in its early decisions granted more deference to the agency’s determination of “urgent and
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compelling circumstances” or “best interest of the United States”. 983 However, the COFC has
taken a far less deferential attitude since its decision in Reilly’s Wholesale Prooduce, Inc. v.
United States. 984 In Reilly, the COFC identified several factors that agencies must consider in
analyzing both “best interest” and “urgent and compelling circumstances” to invoke the
exemption, override. 985 These factors are:
(i) whether significant adverse consequences will necessarily occur if the stay is
not overridden; (ii) conversely, whether reasonable alternatives to the override
exist that would adequately address the circumstances presented; (iii) how the
potential cost of proceeding with the override, including the costs associated with
the potential that the GAO might sustain the protest, compare to the benefits
associated with the approach being considered for addressing the agency's needs;
and (iv) the impact of the override on competition and the integrity of the
procurement system, as reflected in the Competition in Contracting Act. 986
These factors restrict the discretion of the contracting agency to a limited extent. They are still
subject to the discretion of the contracting agencies because determination of the existence of
each factor requires the contracting agency to evaluate the situation and make a discretionary
decision. Nonetheless, they prevent a contracting agency from exercising unfettered discretion
by considering unreasonable factors and circumstances as constituting the “best interest of the
government” or “compelling and urgent circumstances”. According to the IAT’s decisions
available to the author, the issue of the exception has not been raised in any of the cases. The
IAT should develop some standards and tests to be used by heads of contracting agencies in
deciding the exemption to suspension.
The exception on the suspension measure is not peculiar to public procurement systems
of various countries and regional and international agreements. All UNCITRAL, the WTO/GPA,
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and the EU Directives allow exceptions from suspension. Under UNCITRAL, the contracting
agency may override suspension when urgent public interest considerations require the
procurement to proceed. 987 The grounds of the override must be explained in a certificate that
urgent considerations exist. 988 Such certificate is made part of the record of the procurement
proceedings and it is conclusive with respect to all levels of review except judicial review. 989
On the other hand, both the WTO/GPA and the EU Remedies Directives provide for an
exception to suspension. They both allow the exception based on the balance-of-interests test.
The WTO/GPA states that “procedures may provide that overriding adverse consequences for
the interests concerned, including the public interest, may be taken into account in deciding
whether such measures should be applied.” 990 Further, the EC Directive states that “member
states may provide that the body responsible for review procedures may take into account the
probable consequences of interim measures for all interests likely to be harmed, as well as the
public interest, and may decide not to grant such measures when their negative consequences
could exceed their benefits.” 991
In addition, the EC Remedies Directives also allow exceptions on the standstill period in
three instances. First, if EC Directives do not require prior publication of a notice for the contract
concerned in the Official Journal of the European Union. 992 Second, if there is only one tenderer
who is awarded the contract and there are no other candidates involved in the procurement
activity. 993 Third, “contracts based on framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems
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as long as the value of the individual contract is under the thresholds and all the relevant
provisions of the substantive Directives have been followed.” 994
3.4 Corrective Actions
A protester’s preferred remedy in the review proceedings is usually to correct the breach
that occurred and require the contracting agency to re-solicit the tender in question. 995 For
instance, a contractor may allege that in evaluating a bid the procuring entity considered a factor
not indicated to offerors in advance, breaching national procurement rules. 996 The protester in
this example seeks an order to set aside the original bid evaluation process and require the
agency to reevaluate the tender. 997 Corrective actions may include several acts such as annulment
of the award decision, awarding the contract to the protester, or terminating a concluded
contract. 998
Under Order 87, the IAT must rule on the protest and may direct the contracting agency
to take corrective action, including but not limited to, terminating the awarded contract, resoliciting tenders, reevaluating tenders received for consideration.” 999 Since Order 87 was
enacted after the US model, these corrective actions are similar to those that the GAO is allowed
to recommend in deciding protests. Under the FAR, the GAO may recommend that the
contracting agency:
(A) refrain from exercising any of its options under the contract;
(B) recompete the contract immediately;
(C) cancel the solicitation issued pursuant to the public-private competition
conducted under Office of Management and Budget Circular A–76 or any
successor circular;
(D) issue a new solicitation;
994
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(E) terminate the contract;
(F) award a contract consistent with the requirements of such statute and
regulation;
(G) implement any combination of recommendations under clauses (A), (B), (C),
(D), (E), and (F); or
(H) implement such other recommendations as the Comptroller General
determines to be necessary in order to promote compliance with procurement
statutes and regulations. 1000

Both the US and Iraqi systems allow review bodies to terminate a concluded contract. This
approach is in contrast to many legal systems of European countries because they do not
empower the review body to terminate a concluded contract. 1001 Thus, the only remedy available
to unsatisfied bidders with respect to a concluded contract in most European countries is
monetary damages. 1002 In fact, the decision of the review body requiring termination of a
protested contract does not directly affect its validity because a contract is an agreement between
two parties and only those parties can terminate it. 1003 However, the decision to cancel an award
would be a legal basis for contracting agencies to rely on in terminating a concluded contract.
Recognizing the diversity in legal systems, UNCITRAL does not identify specific
remedies to be made, instead it provides for a list of options. 1004 According to UNCITRAL, an
independent administrative body may grant or recommend, 1005one of the following remedies:
(a) Declare the legal rules or principles that govern the subject-matter of the
complaint;
(b) Prohibit the procuring entity from acting or deciding unlawfully or from
following an unlawful procedure;
(c) Require the procuring entity that has acted or proceeded in an unlawful
manner, or that
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has reached an unlawful decision, to act or to proceed in a lawful manner or to
reach a lawful decision;
(d) Annul in whole or in part an unlawful act or decision of the procuring entity,
other than any act or decision bringing the procurement contract into force;
(e) Revise an unlawful decision by the procuring entity or substitute its own
decision for such a decision, other than any decision bringing the procurement
contract into force. 1006
In Canada, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) has jurisdiction over procurement
disputes arising out of the GPA, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and
internal Canadian procurement disputes between the Canadian provinces. 1007 The CITT may
recommend various corrective measures, but it must take into account a number of factors
provided for in the CITT’s Act in choosing such measures. 1008 The Act states that “where the
Tribunal decides to conduct an inquiry, it shall, within the prescribed period after the complaint
is filed, provide the complainant, the relevant government institution and any other party that the
Tribunal considers to be an interested party with the Tribunal’s findings and recommendations, if
any.” 1009
In addition, where the Tribunal determines that a complaint is valid, it may recommend
such remedy as it considers appropriate, including any one or more of the following
remedies 1010:
(a) that a new solicitation for the designated contract be issued;
(b) that the bids be re-evaluated;
(c) that the designated contract be terminated;
(d) that the designated contract be awarded to the complainant; or
(e) that the complainant be compensated by an amount specified by the
Tribunal. 1011
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(3) The Tribunal shall, in recommending an appropriate remedy under subsection
(2), consider all the circumstances relevant to the procurement of the goods or
services to which the designated contract relates, including
(a) the seriousness of any deficiency in the procurement process found by the
Tribunal;
(b) the degree to which the complainant and all other interested parties were
prejudiced;
(c) the degree to which the integrity and efficiency of the competitive
procurement system was prejudiced;
(d) whether the parties acted in good faith; and
(e) the extent to which the contract was performed. 1012

Nullifying the award decision is one of the most important corrective actions. However, the
controversial issue is what constitutes an award decision. Is the award decision limited to the
final decision that determines the winning contractor, or does it include other preliminary
decisions taken by the contracting agency that complement the final award decision? This issue
is closely related to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the IAT and CRCs discussed in Chapter II.
Under Order 87 and the IRGC, the award decision that is reviewable before the IAT and CRCs is
limited only to the decision that identifies the winning contractor. 1013
In other words, contracting agencies’ actions that occur prior to the issuance of the award
decision and that are conducted with the sole purpose of reaching the award decision are beyond
the jurisdiction of CRCs and the IAT. For instance, the decision to exclude an offeror from
competition or to disqualify technical specifications and financial capabilities of a contractor
occurs before the award decision but affects the right of contractors to participate in the tender.
The award decision can be described as a combined administrative act that consists of several
other preliminary decisions. Limiting the meaning of award decision to the sole decision
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identifying the winning contractor excludes many important agencies’ decisions from effective
review.
Thus, if a contractor wants to challenge a decision of the contracting agency excluding
him or her from competition because of wrongful evaluation of technical or financial
capabilities, the IAT or CRCs would not have jurisdiction to review and annul such a decision.
However, some contracting-related actions, such as the one in the previous example, except for
the award decision, can still be challenged before the agency that issued the decision or before
the administrative court under the CSA. 1014 Any decision that is related to award of a contract
such as exclusion of a contractor form participating whether because of violation of procurement
rules or as a result of improper evaluation of tenders should be under the jurisdiction of the IAT.
In contrast to Iraqi law, EC Directives affords a broader meaning to the award decision.
The ECJ has found that Article 2(1) (b) of Directive 89/665 allows annulment of improper
decisions of contracting agencies in relation to the technical and other specifications, not only in
the solicitation provisions, but also in any other document associated with the award in
question. 1015 This interpretation may include documents containing decisions of the contracting
agency issued at a stage prior to the invitation to tenders. 1016 More importantly, the Court held
that a decision of a contracting agency to withdraw an invitation to tender for a public contract
must be open to review. 1017 On the other hand, the GAO in rare cases recommends that award of
the contract be made to the protester. 1018
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3.5.1 Monetary Damages
Monetary damages are one of the types of remedies that contracting agencies are required
to provide to contractors under certain circumstances. They are another way of encouraging
contracting agencies to comply with procurement laws and to correct breaches in public
contracting. 1019 Many jurisdictions provide for monetary damages for protesters. However, the
requirements of determining and quantifying such damages vary from one jurisdiction to another
and from one procurement agreement to another. The most common damages that are available
to protesters are bid or proposal preparation costs and protest costs.
3.5.2 Bid or Proposal Preparation Costs
Order 87 and the IRGC are both silent on the issue of bid or proposal preparation costs.
However, under Iraqi laws, the concept of damages is available when complainant’s rights have
been infringed by public or private parties. Ordinary civil courts have jurisdictions over cases
seeking monetary damages. 1020 In contrast to the Iraqi procurement system, many countries and
regional and international procurement agreements provides for damages, especially bid
preparation costs. For instance, the US procurement system, the EC Remedies Directives, the
UNCITRAL, and the WTO/GPA provides for bid preparation costs as a form of damages.
Under the US procurement system, the GAO is allowed to recommend awarding bid
preparation costs to a successful protester. 1021 In one decision the GAO held that the basis of
recovery of bid preparation costs is the theory that the government, by announcing a solicitation,
enters into an implied contract with bidders or contractors that their bids or proposals will be
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fairly and honestly considered. 1022 The GAO’s opinion was based on Heyer Products Co. v.
United States case. 1023 However, bid preparation costs are not granted merely because a bid
protest is sustained. 1024 Thus, in order for bid preparation costs to be awarded, a protester has to
be unreasonably excluded from competition and no other remedy is appropriate to remedy the
infringement occurred. 1025 Examples of inappropriateness of remedies except for damages are
often when the performance of the contract is complete or when it is impractical to terminate the
contract because performance has reached its final stages. 1026
Nonetheless, GAO will not generally grant bid preparation costs if the protester has not
been in line for award of the contract in question. 1027 In one case, the GAO “found that a
protester had a substantial chance of receiving the award when the protester was one of three
contractors in line for award.” 1028 If a solicitation is withdrawn for proper reasons not related to
the protest, no bid preparation costs will be awarded. 1029 In addition, a protester will not be
granted bid preparation costs if it will have the chance to compete for the contract under a
resolicitation that has been conducted as a result of its own protest. 1030
On the other hand, the COFC may also award bid preparation costs. The Court held that
an offeror may recover bid or proposal preparation costs if it can prove that the Government’s
consideration of the proposals submitted was arbitrary or capricious. 1031 In MVM, Inc. v. United
States the Court stated that:
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An award of bid proposal and preparation costs will also advance the public
interest and help to ensure government compliance with procurement regulations.
Offerors incur expenditures in preparing a bid proposal. When the government
makes a prejudicial error, a disappointed bidder may expend additional funds on a
bid protest action. If the disappointed bidder knows that it will be unable to
recover any costs, it will have less incentive to bring a bid protest action due to
the helps to ensure that the government complies with procurement
regulations. 1032
Further, bid or proposal costs may not be awarded if the protester has a reasonable chance of
winning the competition when the corrective action is taken. 1033 Accordingly, if the court awards
an injunction providing the protester with a fair opportunity to win the competition, such costs
may not be recovered. 1034 In contrast, bid preparation costs are awarded if the protestor has no
chance to win the competition. 1035 In one case the Federal Circuit held that the “agency
responded to injunction by recompeting using Federal Supply Schedule and protester had no
schedule contract.” 1036
In order for successful protesters to obtain bid preparation costs before the COFC, the
protester is required to demonstrate that such costs are allocable and reasonable. 1037 According to
the Federal Circuit, expenses considered as bid preparation costs are those spent on researching
specifications, reviewing bid forms, examining cost factors, and preparing draft and actual
bids. 1038 The Federal Circuit states that “costs incurred in anticipation of or to qualify for a
contract award are not recoverable bid preparation expenses.” 1039 Although costs must have been
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incurred in preparing an initial or revised proposal, there is no requirement that a solicitation
must be issued before such costs may be recovered. 1040
Under the EC procurement regime, member states are required to take corrective actions
or “to take at the earliest opportunity if possible by way of interlocutory procedures and if
necessary by a final procedure on the substance, measures other than those provided for in points
(a) and (b) with the aim of correcting any identified infringement and preventing injury to the
interests concerned; in particular, making an order for the payment of a particular sum, in cases
where the infringement has not been corrected or prevented.” 1041 In addition, the EC Directives
obligate member states to award damages to persons injured by infringement of EC procurement
rules. 1042 However, some details regarding which court is empowered to award such damages or
the quantity of those costs are left to the national law concerned. 1043
With respect to the costs of preparing bids or proposals, the Remedies Directive for
Utilities Sector, 92/13/EEC, provides for the recovery of such costs. However, the Remedies
Directive for the Public Sector is silent on the issue of bid preparation costs. The Remedies
Directive for Utilities states that
where a claim is made for damages representing the costs of preparing a
bid or of participating in an award procedure, the person making the claim shall
be required only to prove an infringement of community law in the field of
procurement or national rules implementing that law and that he would have had a
real chance of winning the contract and that, as a consequence of that
infringement, that chance was adversely affected. 1044
The requirements set forth for the eligibility of obtaining such costs is similar to that of the US
procurement system. The protester seeking damages must demonstrate that there was an
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infringement of EC procurement rules such as violation of the principle of contract
advertisement, allowing changes in bids submitted, or failure to set aside noncompliant
bidders. 1045 Further, similar to the US system, the protester must prove that he or she would have
had a real chance of winning the competition, but because of the infringement he or she lost that
chance. 1046 In other words, the aggrieved contractor has the burden of proving the causal
relationship between the infringement and the loss of the contract. In contrast, if the contractor
would not have won the contract for whatever reasons, he would not have made a profit any way.
In such cases, he is not entitled to recover bid preparation costs.
One controversial issue under the EC Remedies Directives is grounds for granting bid
preparation costs. It has been argued that a contractor has no basis of recovering bid preparation
costs under the Remedies Directives because of lack of causal relationship. 1047 The reason is that
either the protester would have won the contract and should then be entitled to damages in the
form of lost profit; or he would not, and then his bid preparation costs would have been wasted
anyway. 1048 In the latter case, his position would not have been different from the one in which
the relevant procurement rules would have been followed, and therefore there is no causal link
between the infringement and the damage, loss of bid preparation costs. 1049 Thus, it has been
argued that a bidder should normally bear the risk of losing his or her tender preparation costs
because participation in a tender procedure does not guarantee that a contractor’s tender will be
accepted. 1050
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However, the lack of the causal link has been denied as a factor by other reviewing
bodies as they believe that bid preparation costs are recoverable. 1051 The rationale behind the
recoverability of bid preparation costs is two major reasons. 1052 First, a contractor is entitled to
be treated fairly and in a nondiscriminatory manner. 1053 Inviting offerors to participate in a
tender procedure is not a guarantee that his or her tender will be accepted. 1054 However, every
offeror is entitled to a legitimate expectation that his or her tender will be considered and
assessed on an equal basis with other participants. 1055 Second, granting such costs for
procurement breaches enhances the integrity of the procurement process and reduces
discrimination as it provides offerors incentives to challenge decisions of contracting agencies
which may then deter agencies from infringements. 1056
3.5.3 Protest Costs
Order 87 and the IRGC are both silent on the issue of recoverability of protest costs. Still
US procedures are relevant given the drafting history of Order 87. With respect to the US
procurement system, the GAO is empowered to recommend granting protest costs, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees and consultant and expert witness fees. 1057 The GAO has consistently
rejected that its authority to grant protest costs applies to costs incurred before another forum. 1058
In one case the GAO held that its “statutory authority to recommend reimbursement of costs
does not extend to the costs associated with Sodexho’s administrative appeal of the initial A-76
cost comparison.” 1059
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In addition, protest costs are not granted if the GAO has not made a decision on the
merits of the case. 1060 For instance, if “an agency cancels a solicitation for a valid reason
unrelated to the protest, the protester will not be entitled to recover the costs of filing and
pursuing its protest.” 1061 Generally, the GAO recommends awarding protest costs regarding all
the issues challenged, not merely those upon which the protester succeeds. 1062 In contrast, “if the
GAO finds that losing protest issues are so severable as to essentially constitute a separate
protest, then the GAO will recommend that the agency pay only those protest costs which are
allocable to the winning issues.” 1063
Protest costs can be awarded even when the agency took corrective actions in a sustained
protest. 1064 However, the protester is not entitled to recover protest costs in every case in which
an agency decides to take corrective action; rather, a protester is granted protest costs where an
agency unduly delayed its decision to take corrective action in the face of a clearly meritorious
protest. 1065 “Undue delay in taking corrective action is generally found if the agency takes the
action after the filing of the agency report.” 1066 For instance, the GAO held that corrective action
occurred after the protester filed its comments on the agency report, and the GAO attorney
assigned to the protest had requested additional information. 1067
As a prerequisite to recover protest costs when a protest is resolved by the agency via
corrective action, not only must the protest have been meritorious, but it also must have been
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“clearly meritorious”. 1068 According to the GAO, “a protest is clearly meritorious when a
reasonable agency inquiry into the protester’s allegations would show facts disclosing the
absence of a defensible legal position.” 1069 Further, the GAO held that its “willingness to inform
the parties through outcome prediction ADR that a protest is likely to be sustained is generally an
indication that the protest is viewed as “clearly meritorious.” 1070
To recover protest costs when the agency takes corrective action, the protester must file
with the GAO within 15 calendar days after it has been informed of the agency’s corrective
action. 1071 Further, a protester must submit a copy of his or her protest-costs request and the
agency has 15 days to respond. 1072 The GAO will not grant costs that might be related to the
protest but they are not properly documented. 1073 The burden is on the protester to properly
document costs incurred, and the protester cannot rely on standard rates to establish its claim. 1074
The GAO will also deny legal expenses or fees that are not adequately documented by
the law firm. 1075 “Attorneys’ fees usually are the primary component of a claim for protest costs
and may be part of proposal preparation costs.” 1076 The GAO generally accepts the number of
attorney hours requested by the protester. 1077 However, the contracting agency may determine
specific hours as excessive and deny paying such costs provided that it undertakes a reasonable
analysis as to why they are excessive. 1078 “The GAO will examine the reasonableness of attorney
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hours claimed to determine whether they exceed, in nature and amount, what a prudent person
would incur in pursuit of his or her protest.” 1079
There is a statutory cap on attorneys’ fees, except where the protester is a small business
concern. 1080 The highest rate recoverable to large businesses for attorneys’ fees is $150 per
hour. 1081 However, the attorneys’ fees limit may be raised where “the agency determines, based
on the recommendation of GAO on a case-by-case basis, that an increase in the cost of living or
a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings
involved, justifies a higher fees.” 1082 With respect to outside consultant and expert witnesses’
fees, there is a statutory limit regarding recoverability of such fees on large businesses. 1083 The
rate is limited to the “highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the Federal
Government.” 1084
The UNCITRAL also allows the recoverability of protest costs. It states that contracting
agency shall award “any reasonable costs incurred by the supplier or contractor submitting the
complaint in connection with the procurement proceedings as a result of an unlawful act or
decision of, or procedure followed by, the procuring entity.” 1085 In contrast, the EC Remedies
Directives are silent on the issue of granting protest costs. The Remedies Directive for the
utilities sector mentions only granting bid preparation costs. 1086 The Remedies Directive for the
Public Sector does not even mention bid preparation costs because it merely states that member
states shall provide for award of damages to persons harmed by a breach. 1087
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3.5.4 Lost Profit
Some procurement regimes award lost profit for infringement of procurement rules as
monetary damages. EC Remedies Directives does not prevent the protesters from recovering lost
profit when their rights are infringed by contracting agencies. 1088 However, the burden of proof
is on the protester to demonstrate that in the absence of the alleged breach, he or she would have
been awarded the contract. 1089 French law also grants monetary damages in the form of loss of
profit provided that the complainant proves the existence of a fault, the damage suffered, and the
causal link between the fault and the damages. 1090 In addition, the complainant has to
demonstrate that he or she has had a substantial chance of winning the competition. 1091 Damage
claims, under the French law, are brought to ordinary civil courts. 1092
UNCITRAL does not mention granting lost profit as a remedy as it states that the
contracting agency shall grant compensation for “loss or injury suffered by the supplier or
contractor submitting the complaint in connection with the procurement proceedings.” 1093 The
Working Group that enacted UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement in the 1990s discussed
thoroughly the issue of awarding damages other than bid preparation costs including lost
profit. 1094 It has been argued that some jurisdictions do not allow granting damages such as
losses of profit because awarding such damages is deemed to be highly disruptive to the
procurement process. 1095 The reason for this disruptive effect is that such damages provide
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contractors with incentives to challenge agencies’ decisions and such challenges lead to more
delay. 1096
In addition, granting lost profit as damages would make contracting agencies pay large
amounts of money, thus burden the public fund. 1097 Thus, some members of the Working Group
believed that damages should be limited to the costs of preparing and submitting tenders. 1098 In
contrast, others argued that losses of profits should be included in the list of damages available to
contractors when provisions of the Model Law are violated by contracting agencies. 1099 As a
result of these different perspectives toward damages including lost profits, there was an
agreement in 1994 to leave the issue of whether or not to award damages other than bid
preparation costs to contractors injured to the enacting states. 1100 Finally, the Working Group in
2009 discouraged granting loss of profits in the 2009 Model Law. 1101
With respect to the US procurement system, both the GAO and the COFC have
uniformly denied recovery of anticipated profits. 1102 The Federal Circuit held that it is” improper
to award lost profits in the absence of a contract and no certainty that protester would have
received award.” 1103 In another decision refusing to award lost profits, the Court held that “lost
profits are speculative in nature and have consistently been denied.” 1104 Generally speaking,
granting lost profits is allowed under the Iraqi laws, 1105 but protest cases available to the author
do not include a case in which the issue of lost profits has been triggered. In addition, the IAT
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does not have the jurisdiction to decide cases claiming damages. 1106 Cases claiming damages are
under the jurisdiction ordinary civil courts.
3.6 Conclusions
Effective remedies are crucial for a successful bid protest system. Regional and
international agreements also emphasize the importance of availability of remedies to unsatisfied
bidders when procurement laws and regulations are breached. Iraqi public procurement law
provides contractors major types of remedies such as, suspension of procurement procedures,
corrective actions, and other monetary damages. However, there are ambiguities regarding the
conditions or requirements of awarding such remedies. For instance, the suspension is automatic
according to Order 87, while the IAT made it conditional upon the approval of its members.
Another condition that has also been introduced by the IRGC deters unsatisfied bidders
from protesting and requesting suspension of procurement procedures. Such condition requires
unsatisfied bidders to submit a formal undertaking according to which the protester promises to
pay all damages that is occasioned because of the protest in case the protest is frivolous. There
are other ways that can be used to punish a contractor who frivolously submit protests in order to
delay the procurement process. For instance, procurement laws and regulations can impose fines
on offerors who take advantage from the protest mechanism. In addition, there is an exception to
suspension of contracting procedures. Such an exception does not seem unreasonable or peculiar
to Iraqi procurement system. However, it is discretionary and may lead to abuse if there are not
restrictions on agencies regarding how frequently they use it.
There are other types of remedies including corrective actions. Corrective actions may
include nullifying the award decisions, directing the agency to re-solicit the contract, or in rare
cases may include cancellation of a contract. There are some issues about the forum that is to
1106
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award corrective actions and the bases of sustaining or refusing contractor’s requests for such
remedies. For instance, the IAT and CRC are not granted the power to review the complaint of a
contractor who is being unfairly removed from competing for a contract. Such complaint should
be submitted to the administrative court sits at the Council of State. The IAT and CRC should be
allowed to review any decisions that us related to the award of a public contract.
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Chapter IV
4. The Potential Role of Anti-Corruption Bodies in the Bid Protest Process

4.1 Introduction
This Chapter examines the possibility of the role of anti-corruption institutions in Iraq in the
bid protest processes. The basis of this examination is the major purpose that both the anticorruption system and the bid protest process share: strengthening integrity and reducing the
level of corruption in public institutions. The fundamental task of fighting corruption in Iraq is
assigned to three anti-corruption bodies; the Integrity Commission (IC), the Board of Supreme
Audit (BSA), and Offices of Inspectors General (OIG). 1107 Similarly, one of the major purposes
of establishing bid protest system is reducing corruption and irregularities in public procurement
activities. 1108
Corruption is widespread in Iraq especially in the field of public procurement because public
contracting is considered a lucrative opportunity that involves transactions worth hundreds of
millions of dollars. 1109 In addition, large amounts of the Iraqi annual budget are allocated to
procurement projects that are mostly conducted through public contracting. 1110 Thus, corruption
stands in the center of the bid protest and anti-corruption systems. Nonetheless, none of the anticorruption institutions in Iraq is involved in the bid protest process. There might be some
cooperative relationship between the two systems; however, the relationship does not seem to
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have a systemic or formal structure, although cooperation in the efforts of limiting corruption is
considered an essential element in the success of anti-corruption policies. 1111
This chapter examines the relevance of effective relationship between the two systems. If
there is necessity of establishing effective coordination between them, what types of relationship
would limit the level of corruption in the public procurement? Should anti-corruption institutions
be involved in the bid protest process? Should the potential relationship between bid protest fora
and anti-corruption agencies be passive by intervening or cooperating only when they request
assistance from each other? Or is a formal active cooperation required in which anti-corruption
institutions have a role in the resolution of bid protests? The relationship between the two
systems will be examined through analyzing the jurisdictions of each institution or mechanism
under their enabling statute and other relevant regulations.
4.2 Anti-Corruption System in Iraq
The anti-corruption system was established after 2003 by Order 55, 1112 which was enacted
by the CPA, the American-led authority that governed Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime.
Order 55 was abolished by Integrity Commission Law (ICL) No. 30 (2011) enacted by the Iraqi
Parliament. 1113 The ICL is similar to Order 55 with respect to maintaining the structure of the
anti-corruption system, consisting of the three major institutions previously mentioned. 1114 The
IC is the main body responsible for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations in Iraq. 1115
The second body is the BSA which is the highest public audit agency in the country. Order 77
reorganized the BSA, but it too was abolished by the Board of Supreme Audit Law (BSAL) No.
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31 (2011). 1116 Finally, the OIG is the third part of the anti-corruption system which was
15F

established in every ministry under Order 57. 1117
16F

The IC is an independent agency with its own budget and staff. It is also answerable to
Parliament. 1118 It is headed by a person who enjoys the rank of a cabinet minister and he or she is
appointed by Parliament for a 5 year term by absolute majority. 1119 The head of the IC must have
a bachelor in law with no less than 10 years of experience in law-related fields. 1120 The IC is
responsible for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations and has been granted various
powers to fulfil its duties. 1121 For instance, it has the power to investigate corruption cases
through investigators under the supervision of investigative judges. 1122 In addition, if a
corruption case is investigated by regular investigative courts rather than the investigators’ of the
IC, the IC must Follow-up such cases. 1123
The IC is also required to spread the culture of integrity and transparency including
observing professional and ethical standards in both the public and private sectors. 1124 In
addition, it must develop other programs that educate the public regarding the devastating impact
of corrupt practices. 1125 Further, it is empowered to propose bills to Parliament that strengthens
anti-corruption programs. 1126 It must also promulgate regulations that have the force of law
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requiring public officials to disclose their financial interests and any conflicts-of-interests inside
and outside Iraq. 1127
Another major duty of the IC is issuing a code of conduct for public officials to follow that
contains ethics rules to guarantee proper performance of their public duties. 1128 In addition, the
IC is empowered to perform any act that results in reducing corruption provided that two
conditions are met. 1129 First, the act that is to be performed is necessary for preventing or
fighting corruption. 1130 Second, such an act is effective in achieving the purposes of the
Commission.1131 Thus, the IC has been granted fairly broad jurisdictions with respect to
enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations.
The Commission has a two-fold jurisdiction: preventive and curative. 1132 Preventive
measures include requiring public officials to disclose their financial interests and potential
conflicts of interests. 1133 They also require officials to sign the code of conduct and observe it in
their daily activities and educating the public regarding the negative impact of corruption on
society. 1134 On the other hand, curative measures include investigation of corruption cases
through its investigators or becoming a party in any corruption case that is not investigated by
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the IC itself. 1135 The IC is required to perform its duties in tackling corruption in cooperation
with the BSA and the OIG. 1136
The BSA constitutes the second pillar of the anti-corruption system. The Board is not
new to Iraq, having been established in 1927. 1137 Similar to the IC, it is an independent body
with its own budget and staff subject to the control of Parliament. 1138 It is also headed by an
official appointed by the absolute majority of Parliament for four years and he or she enjoys the
rank of a cabinet minister. 1139 All public agencies of the government of Iraq or any other body
that uses public funds are subject to the jurisdiction of the BSA. 1140 However, the judiciary is
exempted from the BSA’s jurisdiction, though only in the course of exercising judicial
powers. 1141
The BSA has broad powers in performing its duties. For instance, it is empowered to access
any documents, receipts, transactions, or administrative orders that are related to the function of
auditing and oversight. 1142 It also has the power to obtain answers, explanations, and information
necessary to conducting its duties from any administrative departments in question. 1143 More
importantly, all secret programs and expenditures related to national security are also subject to
the jurisdiction of the BSA. 1144 The power to investigate such expenses was very limited in the
past.
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In contrast to the IC, the jurisdiction of the BSA is limited to financial auditing. Thus, the
BSA does not have jurisdiction to investigate administrative or criminal issues. However, if the
BSA discovers a violation of law in performing its duties, it may request the IC or the OIG to
investigate such violation. 1145 If the financial violation constitutes a crime, the BSA is required to
inform the Public Prosecution Office, the IC, the OIG, or specialized investigative units. 1146 The
head of the BSA may request from them minister or the head of the agency that is subject to
oversight to investigate with the official responsible for the violation and he or she may demand
that such official be dismissed from his or her official duties. 1147 In addition, the BSA may bring
a civil lawsuit on behalf of the government to recover the damages resulting from the alleged
violations. 1148
The third pillar of the anti-corruption system is the OIG. The CPA designed the OIG after
the US model of Inspector Generals’ program through Order 57. There is an OIG in every Iraqi
ministry that is headed by an Inspector General (IG). 1149 The IG is to be appointed by the Prime
Minister for a 5-year term subject to the approval of Parliament by the majority vote of its
members. 1150 Such an appointment may be renewed once under the same requirements of the
initial appointment.1151 The purpose of establishing the OIG is to strengthen the integrity and
performance of ministries through mechanisms of audit, investigation, and performance
review. 1152
The OIG is under obligation to “audit all records and activities of the ministry, for purposes
of ensuring the integrity, transparency and efficiency of ministry operations, and provide
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information for decision-making and recommend improvements to ministry programs, policies
and procedures as appropriate.” 1153 It is also required to conduct administrative investigations
and review the processes and programs of the ministry for measuring performance. 1154 Order 57
requires the OIG to receive and assess complaints of waste, fraud, abuse of authority, and
mismanagement. 1155 It also requires the OIG to take measures to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse
of power, including but not limited to legislative and regulatory reviews and evaluating programs
and process of the ministry in order to identify gaps that facilitate abuse and fraud. 1156
In fulfilling its duties, the OIG has been granted various powers. It is empowered to have
“full and unrestricted access to all offices, limited access or restricted areas, employees, records,
information data, reports, plans, contracts, memoranda, and any other materials including
electronic data of the ministry.” 1157 It also has the “authority to subpoena witnesses, administer
oaths or affirmation, to take testimony and to compel the production of such books, papers,
records and documents, including electronic data as is deemed to be relevant to any inquiry or
investigation undertaken.” 1158 In addition, the IG is allowed reasonable access to the head of any
governmental entity or office. 1159 The IGs also have the authority to obligate any official of the
ministry to report fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption acts to the OIG. 1160 Thus, the OIG has
broad power in performing its functions.

1153

Id., Sec. 5 (1).
Id., Sec. 5 (2).
1155
Id., Sec. 5 (4).
1156
Id., Sec. 5 (8).
1157
Id., Sec. 6 (1)(a).
1158
Id., Sec. 6 (1)(b).
1159
Id., Sec. 6 (1)(c).
1160
Id., Sec. 6 (1)(d).
1154

231

4.3 The basis of cooperation between the anti-corruption system and the bid protest
processes
The basis of cooperation or overlap of jurisdiction between anti-corruption and bid
protest systems can be identified through the goals they are designed to achieve. Reducing the
level of corruption and enhancing transparency and integrity of the administrative process are
among the major goals these systems were designed to protect. In other words, both systems
share the jurisdiction of fighting corruption and enhancing integrity of the area they are
empowered to function. However, fighting corruption is extremely broad and it includes legal,
administrative, financial, and even cultural aspects.
Generally speaking, strengthening transparency and integrity of public contracting is one
of the major goals of every public procurement system. 1161 Under Order 87, the major principles
of the Iraqi procurement system include: “international standards of transparency, predictability,
fairness and equality of treatment” 1162; and “procurement process integrity, minimum ethical
standards and non-conflict of interest.” 1163 Establishing effective bid protest processes is the
mechanism through which procurement officials may enhance the integrity of public
procurement. Accordingly, “offeror’s rights to file tender protests and related appeals” 1164 and
“tender dispute resolution mechanisms and the timely resolution of such disputes” 1165 are
fundamental principles of the public procurement process.
Corruption has a broad scope because it contains administrative, criminal, and financial
elements. In fact, it is difficult to describe it in a comprehensive definition. “Attempts to develop
such a definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political
1161

See Schooner, supra note 10, at 104.
Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 1 (b).
1163
Id., Sec. 1 (c).
1164
Id., Sec. 1 (d).
1165
Id., Sec. 1 (e).
1162

232

problems.” 1166 This complexity made some anti-corruption agreements avoid introducing a
definition to corruption. For instance, the United Nation Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC) and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (African
Union Convention) do not define corruption. 1167 Instead, they list those acts that constitute
corrupt practices. 1168
Regardless of the difficulty that accompanies defining corruption, there is a general
definition that is used frequently by academics and professionals. According to this definition
that is introduced by the World Bank corruption is “the abuse of public office for private
gain”. 1169 This definition has been criticized because it excludes misuse of power within the
private sector. 1170 Thus, the TI has introduced a broader definition of corruption which states that
corruption is “misuse of entrusted power for private gain”. 1171 The controversy surrounding the
definition of corruption is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the purpose is to show the broad
nature of the concept of corruption.
Such broadness in meaning and scope results in understanding the issue of cooperation
among various stakeholders as a strong tool in reducing the level of corruption. 1172 Cooperation
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among various agencies in tackling corruption is required in both domestic and international
efforts. One of the purposes of the UNCAC is to promote, facilitate and support international
cooperation and technical assistance to prevent and combat corruption, including in asset
recovery.” 1173 Furthermore, under the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials (CCBFPO) of the Organization of Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD),
each party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties and
arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party for the purpose of
criminal investigations and proceedings brought by a Party concerning offences within the scope
of this Convention.” 1174
In addition, some of these agreements also stress the significance of the role of cooperation
among domestic authorities to prevent and cure corruption. Under the UNCAC, all state parties
are required to cooperate “between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its public
officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting
criminal offences.” 1175 In addition, state members must take measures to encourage, according to
its domestic law, cooperation between domestic investigative and prosecuting authorities and
establishments of the private sector in relation to corrupt practices criminalized under the
UNCAC. 1176 The OECD considers close cooperation between public authorities responsible for
the enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the private sector as one of the fundamental
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principles in fighting corruption in the public procurement arena. 1177 Thus, collective action or
cooperation among public bodies, private firms, international organizations, and civil society is
particularly important in the field of public procurement in order to tackle corruption
effectively. 1178
While international cooperation will not be discussed, this chapter examines inter-agency
cooperation to fight corruption in the public procurement field. The difficult question is how
such cooperation can be achieved among agencies with different statutory mandates and
jurisdictions. Limiting corruption is a shared goal between the anti-corruption system and bid
protest processes. Is there any place for the anti-corruption bodies in the resolution of bid
protest? Thus, the rest of this chapter examines the concept of inter-agency cooperation.
4.5 Hypothesis of interaction between the anti-corruption system and bid protest processes
Fighting corruption as a shared goal is broad in terms of having potential multiple areas
of interaction. Major bases for review of bid protest mechanism include the solicitation terms to
determine whether such terms unfairly restrict full and open competition. 1179 They also examine
the award of contracts to determine whether protesters received fair treatment in the award
process. 1180 The underlying reasons that make the terms of a provision restrictive to full and open
competition and make an award decision unlawful are sometimes corruption-related acts.
Restrictive tender provisions and unfair treatment are more likely to be the result of bribery,
extortion, conflict of interest, abuse of power or any other illegal acts that are subject to the
jurisdictions of anti-corruption institutions.
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Any illegal acts, such as fraud waste, and abuse of power, in a ministry is subject to the
jurisdiction of the OIG to investigate it administratively and recommend proper solutions to the
minister or head of a non-cabinet agency. 1181 In addition, any financial irregularities in awarding
public contracts are subject to the jurisdiction of the BSA. 1182 Finally, the IC has broad
jurisdiction but most prominently is its jurisdiction of investigating and forwarding corruption
cases that involve criminal elements to trial.1183 Thus, there is a strong connection between the
function of the bid protest bodies and that of the anti-corruption institutions.
The rampant corruption that Iraq suffers from requires cooperative efforts especially in
the area of public procurement. Tackling corruption from various fronts without a coordinated
policy and strategy undermines anti-corruption efforts. One of the major reasons of these divided
tasks between the anti-corruption and the bid protest systems is the fact that the legislative
branch enacts laws in different time period, without coordination. 1184 Although Order 55 was
enacted before Order 87, there is no provision in Order 87 to address cooperation with the anticorruption institutions. The legislator apparently failed to consider the importance of cooperation
between the anti-corruption and the bid protest systems. 1185
Article 11 of the IRGC requires that the Public Contract Divisions (PCD) work with the
OIG. 1186 This is the only example of a provision that addresses cooperation with the anticorruption institutions in both Order 87 and the IRGC. In addition, according to an
administrative order describing the structure of the PCD, one of the major functions of the PCD
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is coordination with other government institutions including the BSA. 1187 However, none of
these provisions provide any more details to explain the forms of such cooperation. A mere
requirement of cooperation is not sufficient for effective cooperation. The legislator again failed
to establish mechanisms to achieve effective interaction between the two systems.
In addition to the failure of the legislator to consider meaningful cooperation, agencies
that are empowered to enforce these laws also failed to establish an effective cooperation based
on the shared jurisdiction of fighting corruption. Although this dissertation does not suggest that
there is no cooperation between these agencies at all, there is, in fact, no indication of even
occasional cooperation according to the websites of these agencies. 1188 This explains the lack of
interest in professional interaction between the two systems. However, this dissertation
recommends systemic cooperation that is based on effective involvement with coordinated
policies and strategies, including regular meeting with the heads of the agencies involved in
order to respond to new challenges.
The traditional perspective regarding the administrative process, consisting of several
bodies in isolation might be the reason for limited cooperation between these agencies. In this
view, “each agency is supposed to enjoy significant discretion in its choices of priorities,
substantive policies, the forms of which it implements those policies, how it enforces them and
against whom, and so on.” 1189 This model is practically applied in Iraq rendering any suggestion
of strong cooperation unacceptable because such close interaction might be seen as intervention
in the jurisdictions of agencies involved. However, considering the strict positivism that is
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applied in Iraq, organizing such a potential interaction by law should facilitate overcoming this
resistance on the part of various agencies.
4.6.1 Advantages of Involvement of Anti-Corruption in the Bid Protest Process
This dissertation suggests that there should be involvement of anti-corruption institutions
in the bid protest processes. The level of corruption in public administration and especially in the
public procurement sector and the lack of a comprehensive or coordinated strategy to fight
corruption warrant such an involvement. The function of bid protest mechanisms complements
that of anti-corruption institutions. The two systems are designed to detect corruption, fraud, and
abuse of power. Thus, the author believes that the two systems should not work in isolation from
each other. There are several reasons why the involvement of the anti-corruption bodies is
beneficial to the bid protest processes. These reasons are considered below.
4.6.2 Strengthening the Independence of the Bid Protest Review
One of the essential elements of a successful bid protest system is the independence of
the review body. 1190 Independence is a major aspect in the evaluation of the effectiveness of
every forum. However, the difficult question is what is independence? How can independence be
achieved and secured? Independence is a term of art and it has different elements in every legal
and administrative system. Thus, regional and international agreements avoid imposing a
specific concept for independence on the member states. Instead, they merely provide several
criteria for an institution to be considered an independent body. The following sections examine
those criteria.
Regional and international procurement agreements do not introduce strict requirements for
the independence of the agency-level bid protest mechanism. They leave the issue of organizing
agency-level bid protest processes to the legal system of member states. However, some
1190
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jurisdictions, such as the US procurement system, attempt to mitigate the impact of lack of
independence of the agency-level mechanism. Under the US system, agencies are required to
allow unsatisfied contractors an opportunity to submit protests to an agency official who is senior
to the contracting officer in the agency hierarchy. 1191
The idea is that “there will be less likelihood of institutional bias in the review process if
the review function is kept out of the hands of the person who was directly involved in making
the original allegedly improper decision.” 1192 As a result, each contracting agency is under
obligation to identify the official or officials who will perform such independent review. 1193 In
addition, contracting agencies are required, when practicable, to ensure that officials conducting
this review have not had previous personal involvement in the procurement activity. 1194 This
mechanism can be helpful because offerors might feel more comfortable having their protests
reviewed by an official other than the one who was involved in the decision-making process.
On the other hand, regional and international agreements dedicate several provisions to
the issue of independence of non-agency review bodies. Every jurisdiction and regional and
international procurement agreement or model identifies various independence requirements.
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, administrative review must be conducted by a body that is
independent of the procuring entity. 1195 In addition, if the reviewing body is the one that under
the law is to approve certain actions or decisions of the procuring entity, care should be taken to
ensure that the part of the body exercising the review function is independent of the section that
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performs the approval function. 1196 “This independence is necessary to ensure both fairness and
the appearance of fairness.” 1197
The concept of independence under the WTO/GPA is that “challenges shall be heard by a
court or by an impartial and independent review body with no interest in the outcome of the
procurement and the members of which are secure from external influence during the term of
appointment.” 1198 Accordingly, the review body must not benefit from the procurement
transaction in question in order to be considered impartial or independent. In other words, the
procuring agency is not considered independent because it benefits from the protested
procurement. Thus, agency-level review bodies are not independent for the purposes of this
Article.
In addition, the members of such a body must be secure from external influence. 1199
However, Arrowsmith suggests that this provision is controversial with respect to review bodies
that are not courts. 1200 For instance, “it is not clear what safeguards must exist against dismissal
or other termination of the term of office, or the extent to which pay and other conditions must
be guaranteed.” 1201 The term “independent agency” has its own meaning under the legal system
in every country. Thus, such a term should be examined under the legal principles of every
country separately.
Furthermore, a review body which is not a court should either be subject to judicial
review or have procedures which provide that:
(a)
participants can be heard before an opinion is given or a decision is
reached;
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(b)
participants can be represented and accompanied;
(c)
participants shall have access to all proceedings;
(d)
proceedings can take place in public;
(e)
opinions or decisions are given in writing with a statement describing the
basis
for the opinions or decisions;
(f)
witnesses can be presented;
(g)
documents are disclosed to the review body. 1202
The requirements of the EC Remedies Directives for a body to be considered independent are
similar to those of the WTO/GPA. Under the EC Remedies Directives,
Whereas bodies responsible for review procedures are not judicial in character,
written reasons for their decisions shall always be given. Furthermore, in such a
case, provision must be made to guarantee procedures whereby any allegedly
illegal measures taken by the review body or any alleged defect in the exercise of
the powers conferred on it can be the subject of judicial review or review by
another body which is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of the
Treaty and independent of both the contracting entity and the review body. 1203
In addition, “the members of the independent body referred to in the first [the above] paragraph
shall be appointed and leave office under the same conditions as members of the judiciary as
regards the authority responsible for their appointment, their period of office, and their
removal.” 1204 Article 2(9) states that “at least the President of this independent body shall have
the same legal and professional qualifications as members of the judiciary.” 1205 “The
independent body shall [also] take its decisions following a procedure in which both sides are
heard, and these decisions shall, by means determined by each Member State, be legally
binding.” 1206 Accordingly, there are strict structural and procedural requirements for the
independence of a body.
Features of independence include written reasons for the bid protest review decisions,
meeting the requirements of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, and being independent of the
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contracting agency. The requirements of Article 234 of the EC Treaty have been interpreted by
the European Court of Justice. 1207 The Court states that “the question whether a body is a
tribunal or a court within the meaning of Article 234 is determined by whether the body is
established by statute, is a permanent establishment, is the compulsory judicial body, applies
contradictory procedure to the hearing of cases, makes decisions based on the rule of law and is
independent.” 1208 Thus, the requirements of the EU Remedies Directives are quite strict and
amount to those of a judicial body.
4.6.3 Evaluation of the CRC and the IAT under the Independence Requirements Set Forth
in Regional and International Agreements
If bid protest mechanisms in Iraq, the CRC and the IAT, are examined to determine to what
extent independence requirements exist, there will be two different results because the CRC and
the IAT are different in their structure and function. With respect to the CRC, the IRGC does not
specify which party or official is authorized to establish the CRC. It only states that there must be
a CRC in every ministry, independent bodies, region, and in every province. 1209 It, further, states
that a CRC must be connected to the head of the agency or to anyone who has been authorized
by the head of the agency. 1210 The IRGC should have determined the official that is to be
empowered to establish a CRC and appoint and remove its members from duties.
Furthermore, the CRC must report to the head of the agency, 1211 which means that it is part
of the contracting agency that issued the challenged decision. Accordingly, it is not independent
under the independence requirements set forth by the UNICTRAL Model Law, the EC Remedies
Directives, and the WTO/GPA. More importantly, all decisions of the CRC are
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recommendations subject to the approval of the head of the agency concerned. 1212 Considering
the structure of the Iraqi ministries, which consists of several general directorates in the
provinces, the CRC appears to enjoy some level of independence when reviewing the decisions
of these general directorates. Such independence is based on the fact that CRCs are not part of
these general directorates. Instead, CRCs are housed in the headquarters of the ministries or noncabinet agencies and subject to their control, not the director-general who runs the agency its
action under protest. 1213
In other words, this structure is similar to the mechanism that the US procurement system
adopted to enhance the independence of the agency-level review. In such a mechanism,
protesters are allowed to request that their protests be reviewed by an official other than the one
who initially made the protested decision. 1214 Accordingly, the CRC is independent in the sense
that it is not the contracting agency which issued the decision. Instead, it is a separate ministerial
committee above the contracting agency. Nonetheless, both the CRCs and subsidiary general
directorates are parts of the same ministry or non-cabinet agency and subject to their control. As
a result, the CRC has some level of limited independence compared to the standards set forth by
regional and international procurement agreements.
Yet, this modest level of independence is disturbed in that both CRCs and general
directorates have an interest in the outcome of the contract. Both of them are part of the ministry
or non-cabinet agency that ultimately benefit from the services or goods potentially received
based on the proposed contract. In addition, although the IRGC is silent on the appointment and
removal of the members of the CRCs, it can be inferred that the head of the agency has the
power to remove the members of the CRCs as they are considered lower-level officials to the
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minister or heads of non-cabinet agencies. CRC members are also selected among the officials of
the ministry or non-cabinet agencies and subject to all administrative disciplines that the minister
or an agency head is allowed to exercise on his or her officials.
With respect to the independence of the IAT, the IRGC contradicts Order 87 as the Order
states that the OGPCP shall establish and adopt the rules and procedures of the IAT, 1215 while
under the IRGC, the IAT is to be established by a decision of the Minister of Planning. 1216 Since
Order 87 is silent on the details of the IAT, the IRGC organized the composition and other
details of the court. For instance, rules regarding who may invoke the jurisdiction of the IAT and
the time limit for filing protests are regulated by the IRGC. The IAT shall, under the IRGC,
consist of four members headed by a judge selected by the Higher Judicial Council (HJC). 1217
In addition, the IAT has a specialized and experienced representative from each of the MOP
by an official with the rank of director general or higher, the Iraqi Contractors Union, and the
Chambers of Commerce.
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other members, other than the judge, are appointed by the Minister of Planning. Nevertheless,
since the IAT itself is established by the Minister, the only possible conclusion absent a clear
guideline to the contrary is that the other members of the IAT are also to be appointed by the
Minister of Planning.
On the other hand, regional and international agreements emphasize that when an
administrative body functions as a final instance or judicial forum for bid protests, like the IAT,
two conditions should prevail. The first is independence of the body, and the second is adherence

1215

Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(b, ii).
The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (3).
1217
Id.
1218
Id.
1216

244

to certain procedural standards similar to those found in a court proceedings. 1219 Examining the
IAT in light of the two requirements does not provide us with a clear answer. The structure and
jurisdiction of the IAT is quite unique compared to other judicial bid-protest forums in other
jurisdictions.
The IAT meets some requirements of independence set forth by the above mentioned
agreements such as independence from the contracting agency. It is also a body that has no
interest in the outcome of the procurement transaction in question. However, it does not meet
other requirements because its members are appointed by the Minister of Planning, except for the
judge. 1220 In contrast, the above mentioned agreements require that the appointment of members
of such body shall be similar to the appointment of members of the courts. 1221
Another point regarding the composition of the IAT is that it has a member who is an
official representing the MOP. 1222 The rationale behind such an appointment is not clear and it is
against the principle of independence because there are obviously no representatives of the
executive among court members. Under Order 87, the IAT is named a tribunal 1223 and in Arabic
the IAT is called a court. 1224 There should not have been a member from the MOP in the
composition of the IAT in order to secure the independence of the court.
In addition, the IAT has two other members from the Iraqi Contractor’s Union and Iraqi
Chamber of Commerce. Three members of the IAT are also not appointed like members of the
judiciary. This structure potentially undermines the independence of the IAT in the view of the
contractor community and the public in general. Since there are three members in the
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composition of the IAT that are not from the judiciary, the decision-making process could appear
biased because each one of the members represents a specific interest rather than the public or
general interest.
Nonetheless, the existence of representatives from the industry and business sectors has its
own benefit. It allows participation of the stakeholders in the decision-making process. Thus, the
appointment of the members of the IAT does not conform to the requirements of the regional and
international agreements. However, these agreements are not binding on Iraq, even if their
requirements may be beneficial as guidance. It should be noted that Order 87 specifically
requires the OGPCP to use these agreements as guidance in issuing its implementing
regulations. 1225
Hong Kong has a similar experience as its Review Body consists of 12 members appointed
by the Secretary of Commerce, Industry, and Technology. 1226 Such positions are classified as a
chairman, two deputy chairmen, and nine members. 1227 The Review Body has always included
one representative from the legal profession, construction, engineering, or architectural firms,
and universities. 1228 Most of the members are lawyers and, in order to ensure the legality of the
review process, it is required that the chairman and the two deputy chairmen all have legal
qualification. 1229
Thus, to ensure and strengthen the independence of the IAT, one solution could be changing
the members of the IAT to three judges appointed by the HJC. Further, the appointment powers
of the Minister of Planning should be cancelled. Another solution might be to increase the IAT
members similar to the Hong Kong example to include representatives from a wider spectrum of
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experts. The best solution is to amend Order 87 to reorganize the structure and function of the
IAT similar to other independent agencies. Independent agencies under the Iraqi legal structure
are discussed in subsequent sections.
According to such potential amendment, all powers regarding the appointment and removal
of the IAT members may be vested with the Judiciary or Parliament. This step is important to
free the IAT members from the influence of the Minister of Planning. Such influence is possible
because members appointed by the minister might seek to please him or her in order for the
minister to renew their positions.

Further, the IAT’s function should be regulated more

extensively by such potential amendment to include, for instance, strengthening the jurisdiction
of the IAT to access documents regarding the protest in question.
The IAT does meet the second requirement of independence, which is adherence to certain
procedural guarantees in the resolution of bid protests. 1230 The IAT is required under the IRGC
to follow the procedural standards set forth in the Civil Procedure Law (CPL) for regular civil
courts on matters that are not been covered by Order 87 and the IRGC. 1231 Order 87 and the
IRGC include very limited procedural rules for the IAT to follow in resolving bid protests. 1232
As a result, the IAT extensively applies the CPL in bid protest resolution.
Finally, the dissertation suggests that it is equally important to improve the quality of the
review offered by various forums, in addition to structural and composition issues. Indeed, the
independence of the review process may be more important than the structural independence of
the body. There might be an agency-level protest mechanism that is very effective and efficient;
therefore, it is respected by all parties. In contrast, there might be an independent body that meets
1230
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the legal requirements of independence and adherence to certain procedural guarantees, but in
practice it is not honest and contractors would not rely on its review.
In addition, the effectiveness of protest mechanisms depends on the situation of the integrity
and governance of the entire administrative and legal structure in a particular country. The mere
factor of structural independence, sometimes, matters little. However, providing bid protest
mechanisms with structural independence and procedural rules facilitates their effectiveness.
4.6.4 The Concept of Independent Agencies under the Iraqi Legal System
The above analysis evaluated the independence of the CRC and the IAT under the standards
of regional and international agreements. However, the concept of independence is different
under the Iraqi legal and administrative structures. The Iraqi Constitution has dedicated Chapter
Four to the organization of independent agencies. It states that “the High Commission for Human
Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Public Integrity are
considered independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives,
and their functions shall be regulated by law.” 1233 In addition, Article 103 states
First: The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communication
and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and
administratively independent institutions, and the work of each of these
institutions shall be regulated by law.
Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is responsible before the Council of
Representatives. The Board of Supreme Audit and the Communication and Media
Commission shall be attached to the Council of Representatives.
Third: The Endowment Commissions shall be attached to the Council of
Ministers. 1234
However, the detail of what independence means in these articles is not clear and left to the
statutes organizing the structure and functions of these independent agencies. In addition, the
Constitution mentions two types of independence. Article 102 states that the Electoral
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Commission, the IC, and the Commission for Human Rights are “independent”. On the other
hand, Article 103 states that the Central Bank, the BSA, the Communication and Media
Commission, and the Endowment Commission are “financially and administratively
independent”. Thus, under the Constitution, there are “independent” agencies and there are also
“financially and administratively independent” bodies.
The Federal Supreme Court interprets the difference between “independent” and
“financially and administratively independent” agencies. In Decision No (228/T/2006) (the 2006
decision), the Court states that the independence mentioned in Article 102 of the Constitution is
that the officials of the IC are independent in performing their duties according to the ICL. 1235
No party has control over the Commission’s officials except for laws regulating the
Commission’s functions and no public institutions are allowed to intervene or influence the
IC. 1236 Nonetheless, the IC is subject to Parliament’s oversight according to Article 102 of the
Constitution.1237 Parliament is the only party that is allowed to question the IC’s officials only
when they exceed their statutory boundaries. 1238 Accordingly, the decision concludes that the
term “independent” means that these institutions mentioned in Article 102 are self-organized
agencies and functions according to the statutes organizing them without any intervention from
other bodies. 1239
On the other hand, the Court in a very misleading analysis states that the term
“financially and administratively independent” mentioned in Article 103 restricts the meaning of
independence to financial and administrative matters. 1240 It will not provide more than the
1235
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previous sentence in describing the meaning of financial and administrative independence. Based
on the analysis of the court, it is extremely difficult to identify a difference between the two
types of independence in Article 102 and 103 of the Constitution. Such a sensitive issue needs
more than half a page of analysis from the highest court in the country. This decision does not
provide a clear analysis as to what it means that an agency is described as independent
financially or administratively.
Regardless of the inconclusive analysis of the FSC in the above decision, the FSC has
recently issued an interpretive decision No. 88/Federal/2010 in 2011 (the 2011 decision), that
created strong controversy among politicians, scholars, and civil society activists. 1241 The 2011
decision is vague and misleading similar to the 2006 decision. Further, it was controversial
because the Court gave the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) oversight power over
independent agencies. 1242 The following sections cover the content of the decision in detail. The
decision was controversial to the extent that the Speaker of Parliament requested an explanation
from the FSC. 1243
The 2011 decision was issued to respond to a petition from the OPM requesting the Court’s
interpretation regarding constitutional provisions organizing independent agencies. 1244 The OPM
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stated in its petition that members of Parliament thought that independent agencies are attached
to Parliament and are not related to the OPM in any possible ways. 1245 Such an interpretation,
according to the OPM, contradicted with the duties and function of these agencies which are
executive in nature. 1246 In addition, the OPM asserted that such interpretation contradicts with
constitutional provisions as well as the principle of separation of powers. 1247
The OPM rejected any interpretation that suggested that independent agencies are out of the
reach of the executive by attacking the notion of independence itself. 1248 Independence to the
OPM meant that these agencies would not be completely independent. 1249 Instead, such agencies
are only financially and administratively independent. 1250 As a result of this misunderstanding of
the Constitution, the OPM argued, these independent agencies acted without any supervision and
oversight, 1251 because of Parliament’s limited enforcement capacity and hence its inability to
perform sufficient oversight. 1252 In contrast, the executive had various enforcement powers that
enable it to exercise proper oversight and supervision. 1253 More importantly, subjecting these
agencies, the OPM argued, to the follow-up and supervision of the OPM does not mean stripping
Parliament from oversight jurisdiction over public institutions.1254
The Court’s response to the OPM starts by interpreting these phrases from the Constitution:
“attached to the Council of Representatives or the Office of the Prime Minister”, “subject to
oversight of the Council of Representatives”, and “responsible before the Council of
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Representatives”. 1255 There are only four independent agencies that are expressly mentioned by
the Constitution to be “attached” to Parliament and only two that are “attached” to the OPM. 1256
According to the Court, attachment means that the higher authority determines the general policy
for the independent agency that has been linked to it by the Constitution. 1257 However, the FSC
does not explain what constitutes the general policy of an agency. It emphasizes that such higher
authority does not have the power to intervene in the decision-making process of the attached
agency. 1258 Such agencies have been granted independence by the Constitution to ensure
impartiality and objectivity in their decisions. 1259
Although the FSC acknowledges attachment of four agencies to Parliament by express
constitutional provisions, it held that this status does not prevent the OPM from supervising the
activities of these agencies. 1260 The foundation of this claim by the court is Article 80 (1) of the
Constitution. Article 80 states that the OPM is empowered to plan and execute the general policy
and plans of the government of Iraq and supervise the function of ministries and non-cabinet
agencies. 1261 Independent agencies are non-cabinet agencies as mentioned in Article 80 (1).
Accordingly, this interpretation of the Constitution strips independent agencies expressly
established by the Constitution from the privilege of independence. This interpretation appears to
contradict well-settled principle of interpretation that a specific term supersedes a general one.
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Interestingly, the court also criticizes the attachment of some of these agencies to
Parliament. It states that attaching those agencies that are performing executive-related functions
to Parliament is not justifiable. 1262 The justification of the FSC’s perspective regarding this issue
is three major points. First, such attachment contradicts the jurisdictions of Parliament set forth
in Article 61 and 62 of the Constitution which basically are lawmaking and oversight. 1263
Second, it does not conform to the principle of separation of powers. 1264 Finally, it contradicts
the practices of parliaments worldwide. 1265 According to the FSC, parliaments in other countries
are not empowered to run bodies that perform executive-related functions because they do not
have sufficient tools that enable them to properly exercise oversight and supervision on such
agencies. 1266 However, the Court does not explain what constitute executive-related functions. It
also fails to demonstrate the rationality of each of the reasons it presented as to why Parliament
cannot perform its oversight and supervision duties on independent agencies. Indeed, it appears
that the FSC merely substituted its own judgment over that of the drafters of the constitution.
On the other hand, there are still agencies that have not expressly been attached to
Parliament or the OPM and some others that are categorized as being “subject to oversight of the
Council of Representatives” or “Responsible before the Council of Representatives” by
constitutional provisions. The FSC held that all these agencies should be attached to the OPM
because the function of these agencies is close to the function of the executive. 1267 It also
emphasizes the meaning of attachment as the one that has been explained above. 1268 Attachment
means that the OPM has the power to determine the general policy of these agencies provided
1262
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that it will not intervene in their affairs. 1269 However, the FSC emphasizes that Parliament still
has oversight jurisdiction over such agencies as any other government bodies according to the
Constitution. 1270
This decision triggered widespread opposition to the FSC among politicians, scholars, civil
society activists. The Speaker of Parliament sent a petition to the FSC requesting an explanation
from the Court regarding the content of the 2011 decision. 1271 The FSC’s response to the Speaker
is misleading by creating an uncertain legal framework for independent agencies. The response
emphasizes that the content of 2011 decision is the same as the one of the 2006 decision. 1272 The
FSC excerpts some paragraphs of the 2011 decision regarding the concept of attachment. 1273 It
also excerpts the paragraph that addresses acknowledgement of express constitutional provisions
attaching some of independent agencies to Parliament or the OPM. 1274 With respect to those
agencies that are not mentioned in the Constitution as being attached to Parliament or the OPM,
the higher authority for these agencies must be determined according to the nature of their
function. 1275
The FSC also states that mentioning Article 80 in the 2011 decision comes from the notion
that constitutional provisions interpret each other. 1276 It also reaffirms the content of Article 80
that the OPM is empowered to determine the general policy and supervise the works of all
ministries and non-cabinet agencies. 1277 Empowering the OPM, according to the Court, of such
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supervision does not affect the independence of these agencies. 1278 Thus, the Court concludes its
response to the Speaker of Parliament by emphasizing the obligation of respecting the
professional, financial, and administrative independence of these agencies. 1279 In addition, it also
requires all parties to respect the laws that organize the function and duties of these agencies. 1280
4.6.5 Evaluation of the FSC’s Analysis in Both the 2006 and 2011 Interpretive Decisions
With respect to the 2006 decision, the FSC provides a high level of independence to
agencies that are mentioned in Article 102. The decision affirms that no party is allowed to
intervene in the affairs of these agencies. 1281 It also states that such agencies are subject only to
the authority of law. 1282 Although these agencies are attached to Parliament, Parliament’s
intervention is limited to the situation when one of these agencies violates its regulating
statute. 1283 Granting an important weight to the statute organizing the structure and function of
these agencies is in conformity with the Constitution. Article 102 states that the function of these
agencies shall be regulated by law. 1284
On the other hand, the Court states that financial and administrative independence,
mentioned in Article 103, is more limited compared to the concept of independence mentioned in
Article 102. 1285 Although agencies in the former example enjoy financial and administrative
independence, they are still subject to control of the bodies they are attached to in performing
their duties. 1286 Such agencies are allowed to act independently in their financial and
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administrative affairs. 1287 However, such independence does not prevent bodies to which
independent agencies are responsible before from intervening in their function because such
higher bodies have supervision and oversight power over them. 1288
The court’s analysis of financial and administrative independence is problematic. It does not
explain the parameters of financial and administrative independence. It also allows Parliament or
the OPM to which such agencies are attached to intervene in their affairs through the power of
supervision and oversight. 1289 The supervision and oversight power is a term of art under the
Iraqi legal system. It means that the body that is granted the power of supervision and oversight
has jurisdiction to intervene by approving, amending, or cancelling actions of the subordinate
agency. 1290 This interpretation does not conform to the Constitution by virtue of several reasons
discussed in the following sections when analyzing the content of 2011 decision.
With respect to the 2011 decision, several major problems need to be addressed. First, the
FSC contradicts itself, as the 2011 decision in some parts takes a different approach than the
2006 decision. In the 2011 decision, the FSC focuses its attention on differentiating between
“agencies attached to the Council of Representatives”, “subject to oversight of the Council of
Representatives”, and “responsibility before the Council of Representatives”. 1291 In the 2006
decision, the FSC focused on differentiation between “independent” and “financial and
administrative independent”. 1292 Accordingly, the result and content of the two decisions became
different.
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In the 2006 decision, the court provided independent agencies mentioned in Article 102 of
the Constitution with a high level of independence. It stated that these agencies are independent
and no party or authority is allowed to intervene in their activities as such agencies are subject
only to the law organizing them. 1293 The problem of the 2006 decision was the Court’s
interpretation of financial and administrative independence as it is discussed above. Under the
2011 decision, Parliament and the OPM to which some independent agencies are attached by
express constitutional provisions, have the power to determine the general policy for these
agencies. 1294
Nonetheless, Parliament or the OPM must not intervene in the function of these agencies
because they are independent. 1295 Allowing Parliament or the OPM to determine the general
policy of independent agencies is a violation of the plain text of the Constitution, because the
concept of attachment used by the court undermines the concept of independence. In addition,
the court held that other independent agencies that are not attached to either Parliament or the
OPM but that perform executive-related function must be attached to the OPM. 1296 Thus, the
FSC provided two totally different opinions in the 2006 and 2011 decisions.
The Court fails to acknowledge that the Constitution organizes the provisions of
independent agencies in a separate chapter. 1297 Section Three of the Constitution is dedicated to
the organization of the government. 1298 Chapter One of this Section covers the legislative branch,
Chapter Two covers the executive branch, Chapter Three covers the judiciary, and Chapter Four
covers independent agencies. 1299 Dedicating a separate chapter for independent agencies is
1293
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purposeful. 1300 It reflects the foundation on which the constitution is established. 1301 If the
Constitution wanted independent agencies to be part of one of the three branches, it would have
not dedicated a separate chapter to their organization.
When the Constitution mentions that an independent agency is attached to Parliament or the
OPM, it does not mean that such an agency is under their control. Instead, the attachment
appears to be for the purposes of appointing and removing the head of the agency. For instance,
the IC, under the Constitution, is responsible to Parliament, 1302 but what controls the function of
this agency is the ICL, formerly Order 55. 1303 According to the ICL, the head of the IC fully
directs and administers the agency. 1304 In addition, the BSA is attached to Parliament based on
Article 103 of the Constitution.1305 Nonetheless, Parliament’s involvement in the affairs of the
BSA is extremely limited to appointment and removal of the head of the BSA as well as annual
reporting to Parliament. 1306 The entire jurisdictions of the BSA are to be exercised under the
direction of the BSA Council. 1307
Second, the FSC ignored the statutes that organize the structure and function of these
independent agencies. Article 102 and 103 of the Constitution state that functions of these
independent agencies “shall be regulated by law.” 1308 Accordingly, the Court should have
reviewed the issue of independence in light of these enabling laws or statutes. Under Order 55,
which organized the structure and functions of the IC and was in effect at the time the FSC
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issued the 2011 decision, the head of the IC is responsible for running the Commission.1309 The
head of the IC is required to “authorize, direct, and control all operations of the commission and
ensure that it fulfills its duties under law.” 1310 Further, he or she shall prepare the budget for and
approve expenditures of the IC and hire, fire, or discipline the personnel of the Commission.1311
Thus, except for the appointment and removal of the head of the IC as well as a reporting
requirement, there is no involvement of Parliament or the OPM in the exercise of the IC’s duties.
In addition, the new ICL refutes the fundamental argument of the Court in holding that the term
attached to Parliament or the OPM allows them to determine the general policy of the agency.
In contrast, the ICL states that the head of the IC, shall determine the general policy of the
Commission.1312
Another implication that the constitution intended complete independence for these agencies
is the change of the philosophy of governance that occurred after the fall of Iraq’s previous
regime. This change can be demonstrated in Order 77, enacted in 2004 as an amendment to the
BSAL. Order 77 states that “all powers and authorities granted by the Board of Supreme Audit
Law to the now-dissolved Office of the President, Revolutionary Command Council, and its
Council Chairman are hereby revoked.” 1313 Among the powers of the President, according to the
old BSAL, was the appointment of the head of the BSA, 1314 but now such an appointment is
vested in Parliament. 1315
Moreover, some terms the court uses in the 2011 decision are very important to determine
the nature of relationship between Parliament or the OPM and the independent agency
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concerned. For instance, although the Court held that these agencies are independent, Parliament
or the OPM to which these agencies are attached must determine the general policy of such
agencies. 1316 However, it does not define what general policy of an independent agency means.
The lack of precise definition of the concept of general policy allows Parliament or the OPM to
interpret it broadly in order to intervene in the function of an independent agency attached to it.
In addition, the FSC states that independent agencies that perform executive-related functions
must be attached to the OPM. 1317 However, it also fails to identify, at least as an example, what
these functions are. Further, it does not explain based on what legal principle these agencies that
are described as “independent” should nevertheless be attached to the OPM.
The most troubling part of the 2011 decision is the Court’s analysis that all independent
agencies including those that are attached to Parliament are subject to the supervision of the
OPM. 1318 The FSC justifies its controversial analysis based on Article 80 of the Constitution.
Under Article 80, the OPM is allowed “to plan and execute the general policy and general plans
of the State and oversee the work of the ministries and departments not associated with a
ministry.” 1319 Accordingly, independent agencies, being non-cabinet agencies and part of the
Iraqi government, are subject to Article 80 (1). 1320
The Court’s justification is troubling because, again the Constitution dedicated a separate
chapter for the organization of independent agencies. It is true that independent agencies are part
of the government of Iraq. However, this fact does not specifically mean that they are part of the
executive. If the Constitution intended to subject independent agencies to the supervision of the
OPM, it would have stated so expressly in Chapter Four. Subjecting independent agencies to the
1316
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supervision of the OPM strips them from the independence that is guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Finally, the court misinterprets the principle of separation of powers when it states that the
attachment of independent agencies must be determined according to their nature of activities. If
the nature of the function of an independent agency is close to that of the executive, the FSC held
such agency must be attached to the executive. The court’s analysis indicates that it strictly
applies the principle of separation of powers according to which there should be sharp
jurisdictional distinction among the three major branches. 1321 However, the strict application of
separation of powers is not so easily delineated anymore because it is impossible to draw a line
between the jurisdictions of the three branches. 1322
In conclusion, the status and features of independent agencies are not clear, and the FSC’s
response to the inquiry of the Speaker regarding the 2011 decision exacerbated this uncertainty.
The FSC declared in that response that the 2011 decision is not different from the content of the
2006 decision. 1323 However, there are huge differences between the two decisions. The 2006
decision provides some of the independent agencies strong independence status that conforms to
the intent of the Constitution. Nonetheless, agencies that are independent financially and
administratively, under the 2006 decision, are not granted strong independence similar to the
independence status presented in the 2011 decision. On the other hand, the content of the 2011
decision provides independent agencies with little independence because it allows the authority
to which the agencies are attached to supervise the functions of such agencies. In addition, it
subjects all independent agencies to the supervision of the OPM without exception.
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Even with uncertain and weak standards of independence contained in the FSC’s 2011
decision, it is difficult to conclude that the CRC is an independent body. The CRC is structurally
part of one of the ministries or non-cabinet agencies, so it is not independent. In addition, it is not
functionally independent because all decisions of the CRC are recommendations subject to the
approval of the head of the agency. Further, there are no strict procedural requirements for the
CRC to follow in the resolution of bid protests. The appointment and removal of the members of
the CRC are not regulated by law as it is subject to the discretion of the head of the agency.
Thus, the CRC can be considered as the agency-level bid protest mechanism in Iraq.
4.6.6 Benefiting from the Experience of Anti-corruption Institutions and the Powers They
are Granted
Anti-corruption institutions have ostensibly 10 years of experience in fighting corruption
in Iraq. 1324 In fact, the BSA has over 85 years of experience auditing financial records of the
Iraqi government. 1325 Cooperation of bid protest mechanisms with the IC, the BSA, and the OIG
will be beneficial to the resolution of bid protest processes. These agencies have obtained
specific knowledge regarding corrupt practices in the government. The reports of the IC
demonstrate that the Commission is active on fighting corruption, considering the difficult
situation of working on such a sensitive issue in Iraq.
According to the 2013 Report, there have been 109,531 notifications of corruption brought
to the attention of the Commission since 2004. 1326 The number of notification of corruption was
3491 in 2004-2005, while the number in 2013 increased to 14,070 notifications. 1327 In addition,
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408 persons were referred to courts for prosecution in 2008, while the number is 4625 in
2013. 1328 The number of convicted individuals in 2004-2006 was 103, while the number of
individuals convicted in 2013 was 1464. 1329 Three ministers, 40 directors-general, two
candidates for Parliament, and eight candidates for provincial councils were among those who
have been convicted. 1330
With respect to preventive measures, only 1535 financial disclosure forms were received
by the IC in 2004-2005, while in 2013 the number increased dramatically to 11,883. 1331 In 2011,
the IC received 15,673 financial disclosure forms from senior public officials. 1332 The response
rate of senior officials submitting their financial disclosure forms to the IC has been increasing
since 2004. With respect to the members of Parliament, the percentage rate of those forms
submitted to the IC was 10% in 2004-2005, while this number increased to 65% in 2012 and
50% in 2013. 1333 Further, 42% of all ministers submitted financial disclosure forms to the IC in
2005, but 93% of ministers submitted their disclosure forms in 2013. 1334 From the 11,883
disclosure forms received by the IC, 4316 of them have been inspected by the Commission. 1335
The above numbers demonstrate the growing role of the commission in fighting
corruption in Iraq. There is no doubt that the level of corruption is still among the highest in the
world. However, the situation would have become even worse if the IC had not existed. The
Commission’s efforts had a positive effect on the level of corruption especially corruption of
lower-level officials, at least by obtaining a few convictions. In addition, there is no better ways
to fight corruption except through an independent agency like the IC. Some observers are
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skeptical about the role of anti-corruption commissions as it has a limited effect on
corruption. 1336 Nonetheless, efforts should be directed to strengthening the Commission through
exerting influence on politicians to work seriously in reducing the level of corruption.
In addition, the BSA and the OIG perform their duties in fighting corruption, but there are
no data to show the details of their functions in the past couple of years. Data reflecting the
experience of these agencies would be helpful to the bid protest processes. The only way for the
anti-corruption institutions and the bid protest processes to address corruption properly is close
cooperation. More importantly, involvement of the anti-corruption institutions, in the author’s
view, is necessary to strengthen protest resolution as challenged procurement transactions
usually involve corrupt acts. The question, however, is how these agencies can be involved in the
bid protest processes. The following sections will address this question.
An advantage of having anti-corruption institutions involved in protest resolution is the
powers that these agencies are granted under their respective statutes. The powers each anticorruption institution possesses are not the same. The IC’s powers are mostly related to the
criminal investigation of corruption allegations. 1337 The IC is empowered to investigate any
corruption cases through its investigators under the supervision of a magistrate. 1338 Corruption
cases are mostly those actions that involve office-related crimes such as bribery and
embezzlement. 1339
In addition, the IC’s investigative powers have priority over the jurisdiction of any other
bodies that investigate corruption cases including military and security force’s investigation
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units. 1340 Such military bodies are required to forward all documents to the IC related to the
case. 1341 Further, the IC is allowed to utilize all forensic and technological means in preventing
and investigating corruption cases. 1342 Magistrates are required to inform the IC when they open
an investigation in any corruption cases. 1343 Finally, all government agencies are required to
cooperate with and to provide the IC with any documents the Commission requests that are
related to a corruption case. 1344
On the other hand, the BSA is the highest auditing agency that is empowered to inspect all
documents and records of government agencies to ensure that money is spent according to laws
and regulations. 1345 It is the highest auditing agency in the country and all government agencies
are subject to its jurisdiction. 1346 Similar to the IC, the BSA also has the power to access all
documents, files, papers, orders, and decisions that are related to the Board’s auditing and
oversight function. 1347 In addition, the OIG is also empowered to have full and unrestricted
access to all offices, employees, data, reports, plans, and other materials related to the work of
the IG. 1348
All of the three agencies have specific function in the anti-corruption efforts. Under the ICL,
the BSA shall forward all evidence on acts of fraud, corruption, waste, and abuse of power to the
IG concerned. 1349 The IG is required to conduct inspection and administrative investigations on
the content of the reports of the BSA and submit the results of it investigation to the appropriate
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minister or head of non-cabinet agencies concerned. 1350 In addition, the IG is also required to
inform the IC or relevant investigative authorities about any act that constitutes a crime
according to applicable laws. 1351 Finally, the IC is the only body that is vested with the power to
open a criminal investigation on corruption cases. 1352
Thus, through effective cooperation, bid protest fora can benefit from the experience of the
anti-corruption institutions in the fight against corruption in the public procurement process. Bid
protest mechanisms might come across some issues that, if investigated properly, will reveal
corrupt acts. However, they do not have the mandate to investigate corruption cases; therefore
corrupt acts might escape investigation. In addition, bid protest mechanisms can benefit from
unlimited powers to access documents of government agencies granted to anti-corruption
institutions. The only way to achieve this goal is through close cooperation. Yet, the important
matter is determining types of effective cooperation which will be discussed in the subsequent
sections.
4.6.7 Benefitting from the Advantages of Inter-Agency Cooperation
Involving anti-corruption in the bid protest process may achieve the advantages of interagency cooperation. First, interagency cooperation can be productive. 1353 Most agencies focus on
one area of interest 1354 such as the anti-corruption institutions focusing on fighting corruption.
Thus, agencies can share their expertise and knowledge with another agency for better outcomes
in dealing with a particular issue. 1355 In fact, this cooperation could allow one agency modify its
decision-making process 1356 to consider some factors that would have not been addressed
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initially. This scenario is feasible because agencies usually represent different constituencies, and
adhere to different statutory mandates.” 1357
In addition, inter-agency interaction has been identified as a factor to reduce abuse of
power and deviation from the purposes specified by lawmakers. 1358 The Federalist Paper covered
this concern by stating that “experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions” that “so contrive the interior structure of the government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places.” 1359 Further, it has been argued that inter-agency cooperation allows decisionmakers to consider different interests, values, and arguments. 1360 In such instances, agencies’
decisions are more likely acceptable to the people concerned and may survive judicial review. 1361
Inter-agency cooperation has been viewed as making agencies function as lobbyists
toward their counterparts. 1362 The traditional theory of administration contemplates that agencies
are roughly independent actors performing specific tasks. 1363 Each agency is granted significant
discretion “in its choices of priorities, substantive policies, the forms in which it implements
those policies, how it enforces them and against whom.” 1364 However, this traditional theory has
been criticized because it ignores the influence that agencies can have on each other. 1365
Agencies interact with each other frequently from high level officials to filed officers. 1366 Indeed,
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these interactions are probably more intense and more frequent than each agency’s dealings with
the executive, legislative, or judicial branches.” 1367
“Agency interactions are not simply a competition for resources, power, or presidential
attention.” 1368 Rather, they are sometimes intentional and part of the design structure of
agencies. 1369 In addition, they constitute significant restrictions on agencies’ discretion when
they execute policies and regulations. 1370 In addition, inter-agency cooperation saves the
government money and effort. Such cooperation is more efficient than having two agencies
empowered to address the same issue, such as corruption. Simultaneous action results in wasteful
governmental expenditures, dual prosecutions, or inconsistent regulation. 1371 Cooperation is
necessary for the fight against corruption as discussed above. In Iraq to date, there is no
indication of effective cooperation between anti-corruption institutions and bid protest
mechanisms, or between the former and the public procurement process in general.
Still, the traditional administrative approach has its own advantages. In this model, each
agency enjoys its independence in performing its duties emanating from laws and regulations.1372
Accordingly, agencies rarely interact with each other because they follow their jurisdictional
boundaries. 1373 In addition, when two agencies cooperate to work on an issue, this interaction
might offer twice as many opportunities for capture, attract twice the parliamentary scrutiny, and
subject more bureaucrats to lobbying from legislators. 1374 “Thus, divided administration presents
risks, both to the strength of the Executive and for efficient government.” 1375
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The above criticisms of inter-agency interaction might occur in Iraq if this model is adopted
between the anti-corruption and bid protest systems. It would not be reasonable to prejudge the
success of inter-agency cooperation before it has been practiced on the ground. Effective interagency cooperation requires careful plans including specific identification of issues to be worked
on in cooperation, regular meetings between high-level officials to discuss new challenges, and
strong enforcement mechanisms. Otherwise, mere agreements to work in cooperation on issues
that are not clear or are overly general will not achieve productive inter-agency interactions.
The major problem for any possible introduction of inter-agency cooperation in Iraq is the
culture of the administrative environment. The common perspective in Iraq is the traditional one
according to which agencies are viewed as separate from each other. Changing such an
environment will be no easy task and requires educating senior officials of the importance of
cooperation and working together more closely. Agencies in Iraq work like intelligence-type
agencies in terms of restricting access by the public and other agencies to their operations and
documents. Thus, any cooperation attempt might be viewed as intervention in the affairs of
another agency.
There are instances of inter-agency cooperation, but they are based on an informal structure
and conducted only when statutes or regulations require them. Even though cooperation might be
required by law or regulations, in practice it becomes a mere routine by the passage of time. The
point is such cooperation is usually procedural. For instance, contractors are required to have a
document from the General Commission for Taxes certifying that they do not owe any taxes in
order to be eligible to bid to win a contract. 1376 Introducing substantive cooperation in the public
procurement and anti-corruption fields requires involvement of senior officials from both sides to
establish strong plans and enforcement mechanisms.
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4.7 Potential Cooperation Forms between the Anti-Corruption System and Bid Protest
Mechanisms
As it has been discussed above, the major difficulty for Iraq is not whether inter-agency
cooperation between the two systems results in reducing the level of corruption in public
procurement. The author believes that the lack of cooperation between anti-corruption and bid
protest systems has a negative impact on the anti-corruption efforts in public contracting.
However, the difficult question is what the best types of cooperation are that can be suggested
for cooperation between the two systems. Forms of cooperation may include consultation,
involvement of anti-corruption institutions in the bid protest processes, or partial involvement
according to the request of bid protest mechanisms. The anti-corruption system consists of three
bodies with varying degrees of jurisdictions and independence. According to their jurisdictions
and structures, their participation in the bid protest processes differs.
The best interaction of the OIG in the bid protest processes would be through
participating as a member in the agency-level bid protest mechanisms. It is a major failure for
lawmakers in Iraq that they did not involve the OIG in the CRCs, even though the OIG is the
party that is responsible for reducing abuse, fraud, and waste in every ministry and non-cabinet
agencies. 1377 Public procurement is a major field that might involve many suspicious acts
regarding corruption and abuse of power. It is the OIG’s duty to detect corruption in the
operations of the ministry he or she serves. 1378 The best way to detect illegal acts in public
procurement is to be involved in bid protest resolution.
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The OIG has a strong mandate to conduct administrative investigation about any actions,
decisions, orders or documents of the respective ministry in which the IG is initially
appointed. 1379 It has also been granted extensive powers to achieve this mandate including
unlimited access to documents, files, or records of the ministry. 1380 In addition, it has the power
to subpoena witnesses. 1381 More importantly, the powers of the OIG have been determined by
statute. 1382 Thus, it is difficult for agencies of a ministry subject to the jurisdiction of the OIG to
challenge or ignore the IG’s requests.
In contrast, the IRGC that organizes the establishment and function of the CRCs does not
assign any power to the CRC. For instance, it is silent on the CRC’s access to documents of the
procurement transaction in question. CRC might have some powers in resolving bid protests.
However, there is a difference between powers specifically identified by law or regulations and
powers exercised based on practice in terms of strength and ability to impose an obligation on
parties subject to such laws and regulations. Accordingly, the statutory powers of the OIG enable
the IG to work more independently.
In addition, the structure of both the agency-level bid protest forum and the OIG facilitates
such involvement without triggering major administrative challenges or difficulties. One reason
that makes inter-agency interactions difficult in Iraq is the view that such interactions lead
agencies to intervene in the affairs of each other. Such fears have no basis in the involvement of
the OIG in the CRC. Every ministry or non-cabinet agency has its own CRC and OIG. 1383 The
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jurisdiction of both of them is limited to the actions of the ministry they are working in. In
addition, the headquarters of both the OIG and the CRC are in the main offices of ministries or
non-cabinet agencies. 1384 In other words, the involvement of the OIG should not cost
government any more expenditure. Thus, no difficulty or resistance should emerge from
involving the OIG into the CRC.
With respect to the potential role of the BSA in the bid protest processes, the BSA can work
in close cooperation with the CRC or the IAT whenever it needs consultation with respect to
financial matters. Public procurement involves documents with complex values and numbers
which require special skills to be detected or audited that cannot be conducted by the CRC or the
IAT. In addition, there are certain letters contractors are required to submit to contracting
agencies from banks to be eligible to participate in a tender. 1385 These include for instance,
letters confirming that the contractor has sufficient funds for the projects and security guarantees.
Such letters are sometimes submitted by contractors in collusion with the bank without
having any factual bases. The BSA is the best institution to detect the authenticity of such
documents. The BSA does not need to be involved in the bid protest processes as an active
participant. Instead, there is always room for cooperation of the BSA and the bid protest
mechanisms. More than 80 years of auditing experience should not be ignored because it has the
potential to be helpful in multiple ways. More importantly, the BSA enjoys extensive powers
over all government agencies with respect to financial auditing. 1386 If an agency refuses to
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submit documents to the CRC that are related to the resolution of a protest, the BSA can
intervene and obtain the documents much more easily.
Finally, with respect to the IC, the IC can interact with bid protest mechanisms in many
ways including consultation, participation or involvement in the resolution of bid protests, or
even becoming a forum itself. Consultation can potentially occur when the IAT or CRC seeks the
assistance of the IC for a matter that is related to corruption, for instance, whether certain acts
constitute corruption sufficient for the IC to intervene and take appropriate measures against
them. Consultation is considered the weakest forms of cooperation or interaction with the bid
protest mechanisms.
Further, the IC can be involved in bid protest resolution with both the CRC and the IAT. It
has strong investigative skills and experience in detecting illegal acts in any government actions
or processes. It should be involved in the bid protest resolution because it is the major anticorruption institution in the country. It is a fundamental gap in the anti-corruption efforts that the
IC does not participate in such an important field that involves many corruption opportunities.
One of the major purposes of establishing bid protest mechanisms is strengthening transparency
of the procurement system. 1387 Thus, each CRC should have had a representative from the IC
whether it is an investigator or an employee with legal background.
There is admittedly a practical problem for this suggestion, which is related to the structure
of both the IC and the CRC. The IC is considered an outside agency to any CRC and it is
considered within the ambit of Parliament. 1388 Unlike the IC, the OIG belongs to the same
ministry as the one to which the CRC belongs, 1389 making any possible involvement of the OIG
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in the CRC easy. More importantly, the involvement of the IC in the CRC affairs might create
problems related to the separation of powers. As the IC is a Parliamentary body, CRC is part of a
particular ministry which is an executive function. This argument might be used by ministries as
they may resist the involvement of the IC in the bid protest mechanisms.
The solution is not that difficult because if there are negotiations between the OGPCP and
the IC, they might reach an agreement to amend the IRGC to include a representative from the
IC to the CRC. Another way to do so is amending the ICL to allow such involvement. Amending
the IRGC is easier because it is a regulation and does not need to undergo the complex
procedures of enacting or amending statutes. The OGPCP is empowered to amend the IRGC on
its own initiative. 1390 On the other hand, if the involvement occurs based on amending the ICL,
its stability and strength would be more protected.
With respect to the involvement of the IC in the IAT, similar to the CRC, an IC should have
a representative in the IAT. In fact, it is necessary for the IC to be involved in the IAT because
the IAT has representatives, other than the judge, from the Ministry of Planning, Contractor’s
Union, and Iraqi Chambers of Commerce, but no one from the IC. The IC as a major anticorruption institution has a huge interest in the bid protest processes which is to detect illegality
in awarding public contracts. Thus, the IRGC should be amended to include in the formation of
the IAT a representative from the IC.
Similar to the involvement of the IC in the CRC, the issues related to separation of powers
might also arise here. However, this involvement should cause no difficulty because the IAT
already has two members from the private sector. Accordingly, adding a member from the IC
should not trigger any arguments regarding violating separation of powers. In fact, the legal basis
1390
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of including a representative from the IC is much stronger than including members from the
private sector. The IC has a broad mandate to fight corruption in all government agencies
including in the public procurement sector. In addition, the IC is a government agency not a
private-sector entity. Thus, a potential amendment to the IRGC that includes the IC in the IAT
solves this problem. The establishment of the IC is governed by the IRGC, which is a regulation,
not statute.
Finally, the best form of involvement of the IC in the bid protest processes is, in the author’s
view, making the IC the third forum for resolution of bid protests. Establishing the IC as a forum
for the bid protest resolution would not be easy. Doing so requires Parliament to amend the ICL
to empower it to receive and review bid protests. In addition, it requires hiring experienced staff
in the field of public procurement in order to be able to conduct bid protest review. The IC
already has skillful investigators, but it does not have public procurement experts. Further, such
potential amendment should identify detailed procedural rules for receiving and resolving bid
protests. Such rules should include determining who has the power to challenge contracting
agencies’ decisions, what can be challenged, the time limit for submitting protests and resolving
them by the IC, and the binding effect of the decisions of the IC made with respect to bid
protests.
There are two rationales for this proposal. First, the CRC’s independence is quite limited
because it is part of a ministry or non-cabinet agency and all of its decisions are
recommendations subject to the approval of the head of the agency. 1391 Although the IAT is an
independent tribunal according to Order 87, 1392 it is still established by the decision of the
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Minister of Planning. 1393 Further, two of IAT’s members are also appointed by the Minister of
Planning making its independence limited. 1394 In contrast, the IC is an independent body
responsible before Parliament, which appoints its head, and it has its own budget and staff. 1395
Second, effectiveness and speediness are other reasons for justifying the establishment of the
IC as a third forum. Agency-level bid protest mechanisms are usually not the preferred forum by
contractors except for simple issues. They are not independent structurally and procedurally
because they are under the control of the head of the contracting agency. The CRC in Iraq does
not have the power to issue binding decisions because its decisions are subject to the approval of
the head of the agency. 1396 Furthermore, there are no rules for its review procedures, making it
subject to the discretion of officials conducting the review. 1397
On the other hand, the IAT is a court under Order 87 1398 and it adheres to all procedural
rules set forth in the CPL, which is applied by civil courts in Iraq. 1399 The CPL contains strict
procedural requirements for courts to follow when they decide a case. Applying the CPL by the
IAT in resolving bid protests results in lengthy and expensive review procedures, while bid
protest resolution requires a speedy process. 1400 Accordingly, the IAT would be expensive and
time consuming for protesters. Thus, empowering the IC to receive and resolve bid protests will
be a middle solution between the CRC, which does not adhere to extensive procedural rules, and
the IAT, which relies on strict procedural rules that may delay resolution of bid protests.
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The success of the IC as a potential third forum for the resolution of bid protests depends
largely on how much such a forum responds to the fundamental principles of an effective bid
protest system, which are speediness, effectiveness, independence, and effective remedies. 1401
There should be procedural rules, but such procedures should be clear, simple, and affordable for
contractors. Further, the amendment should expand the bases for challenging contracting
agencies’ decisions including challenging the choice of agencies in selecting the method of
contracting.
Such amendment should permit offerors to submit protests to the provisions of tenders.
Allowing contractors to challenge only award decisions as is the case in Iraq, is not sufficient as
the Iraqi bid protest system does so. Strict and short time limits for submitting protests by
unsatisfied bidders and resolving such protests by the IC should be included. The IC should be
empowered to issue binding decisions on agencies and to be empowered to award effective
remedies. For instance, it should have the power to cancel or amend the tender documents,
cancel the award decision, and award corrective actions. Finally, the decision of the IC as a third
forum could be appealed before the Council of State or the Federal Supreme Court. Such an
amendment should adopt these principles to make the IG an effective third forum.
4.8 Conclusion
The traditional view of administration, which contemplates agencies in isolation from
each other, is common in Iraq and is still practiced. Such a perspective for administration
damages the efficiency of agencies in the area of anti-corruption and bid protest mechanisms.
These two systems share one enemy that affects their performance, which is corruption. It is no
longer feasible that these systems work in complete isolation from each other. In fact, both of
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them share statutory duties to fight corruption and strengthen the integrity of the processes they
are empowered to organize.
It is long past time for policy makers in Iraq to transfer from the traditional view of
administration to a more collaborative, modern public administration system. In such a system,
effective cooperation and interaction should be encouraged and adopted, especially in dealing
with complex and multi-dimensional issues such as corruption in public procurement.
Cooperation among public agencies has a lot of advantages discussed above. More importantly,
the strong correlation between corruption and public procurement requires close cooperation
among the anti-corruption and bid protest systems that is missing in the Iraqi example. Of
course, there are problems with inter-agency cooperation including separation-of-powers
concerns or inter-agency disputes on issues that are shared. However, lack of cooperation in the
area of anti-corruption bodies and bid protest mechanisms is even more damaging.
The difficult question is what types of interaction should be promoted between anticorruption institutions and bid protest mechanisms. Interaction has more than one form or
structure including consultation or participation in the decision-making process with another
agency. Since anti-corruption consists of three major institutions, each institution can interact
with the bid protest mechanisms in certain possible ways. Some methods of interaction of anticorruption institutions have been analyzed in the previous sections. However, these are not only
forms of interaction between the two systems. Rather, they are the most productive ones in the
author’s view.
The interaction of anti-corruption agencies in the bid protest system differs according to
their structure and jurisdictions. Nonetheless, for the most part, involvement of these agencies in
the bid protest fora is suggested. Involvement is important because it conforms to statutes
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regulating these agencies. This dissertation suggests involvement of the OIG in the CRC
functions because the OIG is responsible for detecting fraud, waste, and abuse of power in all
activities of the ministry in which the IG is employed. Such involvement of the OIG is in
conformity with its statute. In addition, this dissertation strongly recommends the IC be involved
in the bid protest processes because the IC is empowered to investigate corruption in all
government sectors including public procurement. It also suggests that the best involvement of
the IC in the bid protest system is to become a third forum together with the CRC and the IAT.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The dissertation set out to examine methods of effectuating the bid protest system in Iraq
in order to tackle corruption in public procurement more effectively. Examining such an
important issue requires analyzing bid protest organization under regional and international
agreements and procurement systems of other countries. It also requires addressing the
discussion in the literature about which works best for procurement: oversight or discretion. Bid
protest processes are considered an oversight mechanism on the entire public-procurement
process. They often limit the discretion of contracting officers on how they administer the
procurement process.
Extensive analysis of the rules and procedures governing resolution of bid protest
systems was necessary to examine the status of the bid protest system. Rules and procedures of
bid protest processes determine important issues including whether they fairly allow protesting
the decisions of contracting agencies or restrict bases of challenging such decisions. In addition,
the dissertation examined the relationship between corruption and public-procurement, especially
bid protest processes. It specifically examines the status of cooperation and interaction between
anti-corruption agencies and bid protest forums.
1.1 Conclusions
1.2 Discretion or Oversight
The dissertation concludes that striking a balance between discretion and oversight is
an extremely difficult task in designing public procurement systems. Legal and administrative
scholars are divided into pro discretion and pro oversight. Pro-discretion scholars strongly
oppose increasing oversight measures on administrative processes because it undermines the
innovative spirit of officials in performing their tasks. If their discretion is too limited, these
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scholars argue, officials will avoid introducing new ideas or programs out of fear of litigation,
such as bid protests in public procurement.
In addition, more oversight results in complicating and delaying the entire administrative
process. For instance, bid protest processes, which are considered forms of oversight, often
require a reasonable amount of time to resolve a protest. Thus, resolution of bid protests delays
the conclusion of government contracts, resulting in interruption of services to the public which
sometimes could bequite harmful to the public good. Bid protests are also expensive because
they impose significant costs on both government and contractors. Government needs to provide
bid protest forums to unsatisfied bidders, which requires staff and office buildings. It must also
pay bid preparation and protest costs in case it loses a protest. Unsatisfied bidders also need to
spend money preparing bid protests and attorney’s fees for protest and potential litigation.
On the other hand, pro-oversight scholars mitigate the negative consequences of
oversight cited by pro-discretion scholars. They present advantages of oversight by bid protests
on the entire procurement processes. First, bid protest mechanisms correct incidences of
corruption, abuse of power, and illegalities in awarding public contracts. Second, involvement of
third parties to challenge decisions of agencies is more cost effective than any other way such as
parliamentary oversight. Third, since laws and regulations are often complicated and require
interpretation, bid protest processes is a tool through which such terms can be interpreted.
These scholars argue that bid protests are not that common in practice and relatively few
contractors abuse them, by submitting frivolous protests, or otherwise to obstruct the
procurement process. There are also other tools to deal with delay such as strict time limits for
submitting and resolving protests. Contractors are also subject to several administrative and
criminal punishments if they abuse the bid protest system. More importantly, since contractors
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have strong financial incentives to scrutinize the procurement process, they play the role of
private attorneys general. Thus, bid protest processes are the enforcement mechanism for the
procurement system to achieve its major goals: transparency, integrity, and competition.
As discussed above, the difficult question is what works best for public procurement:
more discretion or more oversight. The dissertation concludes that answering such a difficult
question requires examining several major issues together in a particular jurisdiction to decide
which works best. In other words, it suggests that generalization should be avoided in examining
the influence of bid protest on procurement system. For instance, an abstract statement that bid
protest mechanisms as an oversight tool will not work for procurement system lacks precision
and adequacy. In contrast, statements such as competition undermines the integrity of a
procurement system would also not be helpful.
Examining the administrative structure, the level of transparency and accountability, and
the status of public procurement processes in the country in question should be the initial step. It
is also crucial to examine, theoretically and empirically, the influence of bid protest procedures
on the discretion of officials and on contractors. For instance, evaluating whether the
procurement system follows strict time limits for resolving bid protests is necessary. The
frequency of abuse of bid protest mechanisms by unsatisfied bidders who submit frivolous
protests should also be examined.
It is essential to analyze the level of discretion of procurement officials in order to
determine whether there are reasonable restrictions to prevent abuse and corruption. In addition,
various surveys should be conducted among procurement officials, contractors, scholars, and
professionals in order to assess the impact of both oversight and discretion on the procurement
system. Thus, after such careful study of the administrative and procurement environment,

282

designers of procurement system should decide whether a procurement system needs increased
oversight or more discretion.
Although the dissertation emphasizes careful examination of the administrative and legal
structure of a particular country to determine which works best, two general statements are
almost certainly still valid. First, increased oversight is often indicated for developing countries
that suffer from high levels of corruption. In such countries, regular oversight mechanisms such
as administrative judicial review do not function properly. Thus, the solution for developing
countries would often be establishing independent agencies to be responsible for reviewing bid
protests. Second, developed countries in which administrative and judicial review function
properly, granting more discretion to contracting agencies might benefit the procurement
process.
1.3 Structure of Bid Protest Mechanisms
The structure of bid protest mechanisms is centralized in Iraq because both the agencylevel and the judicial forum are located in the capital. Such centralization negatively affects the
effectiveness of the bid protest system because it makes access to them difficult by contractors
not located in the capital. It also makes the bid protest process more costly because it requires
unsatisfied bidders to travel to Baghdad or to hire a lawyer, an expensive proposition especially
for small businesses. Bid protest processes rely on speedy resolution of protests, but
centralization delays the resolution of protests.
There are other reasons that for why centralization in Iraq undermines the speediness
and effectiveness of bid protest processes. Communication between public agencies themselves
and between agencies and concerned parties is conducted through traditional ways. Even the
postal services are unreliable and extremely slow. Electronic communication is used rarely by
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government agencies because of lack of electricity and poor internet services. In addition, there
are insufficient regulatory frameworks for the organization of legal aspects of electronic
communication. Finally, the culture is still conservative in relying on electronic communication
which will need time to change.
The dissertation suggests that bid protest mechanisms should be decentralized in order to
facilitate access to them by local contractors. It would also be helpful in expediting the resolution
process because of less time required for communication between interested parties and
contracting agencies. However, there are some disadvantages of decentralized bid-protest
mechanisms including capture of the system by local dominant businesses or politicians. In
addition, decentralized mechanisms might create different interpretations and procedures of
procurement laws and regulations.
1.4 The Underlying Procedures of Bid Protest Resolutions
Another major issue the dissertation asses is the significance of the underlying procedures
of the bid protest system. Many regional and international procurement agreements provide for
bid protest mechanisms. However, they do not address details of these procedures because
organization of such underlying procedures is left to the jurisdictions of member states. States
have different legal and administrative structures that will have an impact on the organization of
the bid protest system. For instance, bid protest processes are different according to common law
and civil law systems. The literature does not address such underlying procedural distinctions
adequately except for some major principles regulating bid protest processes.
The dissertation concludes that the underlying procedures of every bid protest system
must be examined in order to evaluate the effectiveness of a system. There are several issues that
cannot be addressed properly except by examining the underlying procedures of a bid protest
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system. For instance, it is sometimes difficult to identify who an interested party is only from the
general definition that is posited in many jurisdictions for such an important concept. It is often
difficult to decide whether a sub-contractor is considered an interested party, or whether such
definition includes some government agencies.
It is also difficult to determine what can be challenged before bid-protest review bodies
because procurement laws and regulations often state that such bodies are empowered to review
bid protests. Yet what constitute bid protests can only be identified by going back to the
underlying procedures of bid-protest resolution. Regional and international agreements often
require the availability of bid protest mechanisms for breaches of the agreement by a member
state. However, they do not specify what constitutes a breach because that is left to the
substantive law of member states.
Do breaches include only award decisions, i.e., the decisions that identify the contractors
that won the competitions? Or do they include other decisions related to the award decision, such
as disqualifying a bidder from a competition? Such issues are important because the jurisdiction
of bid-protest review bodies is often limited. In such cases, courts or administrative bodies have
the power to review other procurement-related decisions. Bid protest mechanisms in Iraq, for
example, are only allowed to receive protests that challenge the award decision itself. In such
cases, contractors cannot challenge the decision of evaluation committees that remove a
contractor from competition. Offerors cannot challenge the decision of contracting agencies
choosing the method of contracting, either. Challenging such decisions should be before other
courts or administrative bodies. In some civil law countries, public contract disputes are divided
into those that are subject to the jurisdiction of bid protests and those that are subject to other
courts or bodies.
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This concept is called the theory of detachable acts in the civil law system. According to
the detachable theory, all acts on public contracts are not all similar in their legal effect. There
are some preliminary steps in public contracting that are not considered contractual decisions,
but are rather considered administrative in nature. As a result, the body or court that is
empowered to review public-contract disputes are different from the body or court that has the
jurisdiction to review administrative decisions. All of these important details can only be
examined by addressing the underlying procedures of bid protest resolution.
The dissertation concludes that examining underlying procedures is also essential to the
dynamic of how varying laws are involved in addressing specific issues such as bid protests.
Public procurement laws and regulations are not the only laws that are involved in dealing with
bid protests. In fact, other laws are actively involved in the bid protest resolution including
administrative law, civil procedural law, or contract law. Bid protest bodies rely on contract law
to answer basic questions related to contract formation such as offer and acceptance. In addition,
they highly rely on the law of civil procedure in resolving bid protests including subpoena of
witnesses, administering oaths, or notification of parties to a dispute. Such issues must be
examined because they all affect the resolution process. For instance, if an unsatisfied bidder
fails to follow a time limit that is required under the civil procedures, it might lose the chance to
submit a meritorious protest.
With respect to the Iraqi case, examining the underlying procedures revealed several
major problems that undermine the function of the bid protest system as an oversight tool. For
instance, the definition of interested parties includes only those contractors that participated in a
tender. This definition excludes a broad range of contractors from being able to challenge
contracting agencies’ decisions. In contrast, in many jurisdictions the scope of “interested
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parties” for purposes of determining who has competence to participate in the protested tender
includes contractors other than those that participate in a tender.
Furthermore, the Iraqi procurement system does not allow challenging provisions of a
tender prepared by contracting agencies. Provisions of a tender contain a wealth of information
about the requirements of participation in that tender. They can be used to facilitate corruption by
limiting goods or services to be procured to a certain product or company, or by excluding
products of certain competitors. Thus, in the Iraqi case, if provisions of a tender are written to
include certain products, other competitors cannot challenge such provisions instantly because
they have to wait until the award decision is issued.
This approach is against the principle of speedy resolution of bid protests. If provisions of
a tender are problematic, the evaluation process and the award would normally be unfair and
biased because such provisions restrict competition. Accordingly, it would be far more efficient,
rather than requiring a bidder to wait until the award decision is issued, to address the problem
earlier and before, undertaking the award procedures. Allowing interested parties to challenge
provisions of a tender reduces disputes in later stages of the procurement process and helps
contracting agencies corrects breaches or mistakes easily. Further, disallowing challenging
provisions of a tender restricts the right of offerors to scrutinize the procurement process.
The above examples are to show the significance of the underlying procedures in
effectuating a bid protest system. Examining and addressing such procedures assist in identifying
shortages and problems that negatively affect the performance of bid protest mechanisms.
Accordingly, the dissertation concludes that bid protest procedures in Iraq should be amended to
expand the scope of protesters’ rights by eliminating the above restrictions. In addition, more
studies are necessary respecting the underlying procedures of bid protest processes.
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1.5 Coordination between Anti-Corruption Institutions and Bid Protest Mechanisms
The dissertation concludes that there is no effective cooperation or interaction between
anti-corruption bodies and bid protest forums in Iraq. Lack of effective cooperation or interaction
between such institutions undermines the entire anti-corruption efforts in public sector including
public procurement. One of the major goals of both anti-corruption and bid protest systems is
preventing and reducing corruption in government institutions. However, institutions responsible
for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations and procurement law work in isolation to each
other.
Anti-corruption agreements and conventions emphasize cooperation among national
authorities as one of the most effective strategies for fighting corruption. In addition, there are
other factors that justify interaction between the two systems. Anti-corruption agencies
theoretically enjoy a high level of independence guaranteed by the Iraqi Constitution and the
laws governing their functions. Such independence is crucial for establishing an effective bid
protest processes because independence is one of the major concerns in designing a bid protest
system. By such cooperation or interaction, bid protest mechanisms may benefit from the
independence of anti-corruption agencies.
Cooperation or interaction brings a mix of experience and tremendous powers to the anticorruption efforts in the public procurement sector. Anti-corruption institutions are granted
strong criminal, administrative, or auditing investigative powers to prevent and reduce
corruption. They also have unrestricted access to government programs, documents, data,
records, or any other materials necessary for exercising their daily functions properly.
Cooperation or interaction saves government public funds because it should prevent having two
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or more agencies investigating the same issue separately. It also facilitates sharing of knowledge
and experience between anti-corruption agencies and bid protest mechanisms.
The dissertation suggests establishing not only cooperation between such agencies but
also involvement of the anti-corruption agencies in the bid protest processes. However, such
potential involvement might be strongly rejected by some legal and administrative scholars. The
first concern would be separation of powers concerns because some of anti-corruption agencies
are subject to the control of Parliament not the executive. Thus, such involvement would be seen
as an intervention by the legislative branch into the affairs of the executive branch. In addition, it
could create confusion and complicate the procurement process as two agencies try to impose
their preferred regulatory frameworks. In such cases, the compromise that might be reached is by
incorporating additional requirements from both sides that are unnecessary. Another possible
outcome of involvement is conflict between such agencies if they fail to agree on a regulatory
scheme.
1.6 Future Research Plans
Major issues that have been discussed in this dissertation are all appropriate subjects for
further and more extensive research. The issue of what works best for public procurement
between oversight and discretion is one of these issues that needs to be examined under the Iraqi
administrative law. Such issues have not been examined in the Iraqi academic literature, and it is
important that they be studied. For historic reasons, the organization of public procurement in
Iraq is largely left to the discretion of contracting agencies. This often results in contractors not
being granted fair opportunities to challenge contracting agencies’ decisions. In other words, the
administrative culture in Iraq was and still is not sufficiently transparent.
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Another issue that needs further study is examining the underlying procedures of bid
protest resolutions. This issue consists of several essential subjects that each can be a separate
research topic in itself. For instance, topics such as the definition of interested parties,
jurisdiction of bid protest forums, and what can properly be protested by unsatisfied bidders are
examples of such important issues. Such issues are important because they can be used to limit
or expand the opportunity of unsatisfied bidders to challenge the decisions of contracting
agencies. It can also limit bases of challenging procurement-related decisions.
The most promising topic for future research is the cooperation or interaction between the
anti-corruption agencies and bid protest mechanisms. Addressing such controversial issue
requires examining fundamental principles of public administration in Iraq. It also requires
examining the current laws and regulations to identify major forms of cooperation or interaction
that such laws mandate. In addition, addressing informal forms of cooperation or interaction is
important as often laws and regulations are silent on details of possible inter-agency interaction.
In fact, it happens that laws and regulations do not require any form of cooperation or
interaction, but interaction is sometimes necessary on the ground. Dealing with such a new topic
in the Iraqi legal literature requires addressing cultural aspects of inter-agency cooperation or
interaction. The culture is quite conservative and strategies for overcoming resistance to effective
interaction might not be received easily. Of course, the dissertation does not suggest intervention
in every activity of agencies. Rather, it suggests effective cooperation in areas that fall under the
jurisdiction of each agency in one way or another such as corruption for anti-corruption system
and bid protest processes.
Conducting empirical studies on all the major issues discussed in this dissertation would
be helpful in understanding the status of public procurement in Iraq more accurately. It was
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almost impossible to conduct such empirical studies for this dissertation because of lack of
access to information regarding bid protests. However, the author hopes that in the future more
information will be available to conduct such empirical analysis. Surveys among contractors and
contracting agencies will reveal major problems facing them. They also provide for more
accurate information about the level of corruption in the public procurement, how much
discretion contracting officials have, and abuse of the bid protest system by unsatisfied bidders.
1.7 Recommendations
1.8 In the case of Iraq, this dissertation has made the following recommendations:
* Decentralization of bid protest mechanisms is necessary in order to facilitate access to protest
forums by unsatisfied bidders. The first step for such decentralization should start from
decentralizing distribution of procurement powers. Although Order 87 grants contracting powers
solely to a qualified government agency or a committee within each governmental agency, such
powers are effectively all in the hand of ministers or head of non-cabinet agencies. In addition,
the CRC that functions as the agency-level protest mechanism is empowered only to issue
recommendations. Its decisions are subject to the approval of agency heads. Accordingly,
contracting powers should be awarded to general directorates in the provinces in order to be able
to review protests.
Alternatively, ministers or heads of non-cabinet agencies should be required to delegate
the power of reviewing bid protests to a general directorate in large cities. In fact, heads of
contracting agencies are empowered to delegate their powers, but at their sole discretion.
Delegation should be required not discretional. However, there should be clear rules governing
such contracting powers that are to be awarded to general directorates or for possible delegation
of such powers. Clear rules and procedures are required to avoid conflicting or varying results.
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* Amending procurement laws and regulation to expand the definition of interested parties. Such
expansion should include not only contractors that actually participated in a tender, but also
those who did not participate but they are eligible to participate. Generally speaking, contractors
that are eligible to participate are those working in similar areas. The current definition excludes
many contractors from challenging decisions of contracting agencies. In fact, it is quite
problematic to allow only participating contractors to file bid protests because this approach
leaves some public contracts without the possibility of being protested at all. For instance, when
a contracting agency decides to award the contract using the sole source contracting method,
there will be only one contractor that can protest. If that sole contractor gets the contract by
corruption, there are no other contractors to challenge the award decision.
* Expanding bases of challenging decisions of contracting agencies. For instance, allowing
unsatisfied bidders to challenge provisions of a tender and choice of contracting agencies to
select contracting methods. The current system allows only challenging to the award decisions
and excludes all other preliminary stages from the jurisdiction of bid protest forums. In fact,
preliminary stages can be protested, but they are not under the jurisdiction of bid protest forums.
They are subject to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. Challenging provisions of a tender
procedure and choice of contracting agencies to select contracting methods is an international
standard.
* Increasing availability of information about public procurement activities to the public is
crucial for a transparent procurement system. One of the major problems facing the author in
writing this dissertation was lack of information about public procurement in Iraq. Although
there is a section for public procurement activities on the website of Ministry of Planning, there
is little information about bid protest processes. Procurement laws and regulations should require

292

contracting agencies to publish bid protest decisions with adequate reasoning as part of
enhancing the transparency of the system.
* Amending procurement laws and regulations regarding remedies available to unsatisfied
bidders is necessary. For instance, it should include removing the condition requiring protesters
to submit a pledge promising to pay all the damages resulting from suspension of procurement
procedures in case the protest is frivolous. In addition, providing for a standstill period in which
a contracting agency is prevented from concluding a contract even though the award decision has
been issued, when such a decision is challenged by a bidder. Amendments should include
empowering the IAT to receive requests for compensation of bid preparation and protest
litigation costs.
* Establishing effective cooperation between anti-corruption agencies and bid protest
mechanisms to tackle more adequately corruption in public procurement. Both systems function
to enhance transparency and integrity of the procurement system. Such cooperation may be
conducted by agreement between the two systems without being required by laws or regulations.
However, statutory or regulatory frameworks that establish mandatory interaction mechanisms
between such agencies are more effective because law or regulation has a binding effect on
agencies.
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